Khalid Mishal!s interview with the New York Times was his first to a U.S. news organization in more than a year. The excerpts published by the Times on 5 May were taken from a five-hour interview conducted in Arabic over two days at his house in Damascus. Although the excerpts do not cover much ground that was not covered in Mishal's long interview with JPS in March 2008 (see the two-part Mishal interview in JPS 147-48), they are interesting in that they are clearly directed at the new Obama administration. The full excerpts of the Times interview can be found online at www.nytimes.com.
Less than a month after Operation Cast Lead (OCL) ended, an Israeli peace activist who had occasionally served as an unofficial emissary between Israel and Hamas revealed that ten days before the operation's launch the Olmert government had rejected Hamas's back-channel offer to negotiate the renewal of the interrupted cease-fire, as well as a prisoner exchange involving captured Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit. Gershon Baskin, co-founder and director of the Jerusalem-based Israel/ Palestine Center for Research and Information, wrote a detailed account of the episode in the Jerusalem Post, concluding that it gave the lie to the government's claim that OCL was a "war of no choice." The full text of this article can be found online at www.jpost.com.
Avigdor Lieberman, leader of the rightwing Yisrael Beitainu ("Israel Is Our Home") party, was appointed foreign minister in March 2009 in Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's Likud government coalition, which formed nearly six weeks after the Knesset elections of 10 February 2009. Lieberman, who ran under the slogan "no loyalty, no citizenship"- demanding that Arab citizens of Israel pledge allegiance to the Jewish state or be expelled and calling for the "annihilation" of Hamas-won an unprecedented fifteen seats, beating out Labor to become Israel's third-largest party in the Knesset. Lieberman, a settler and immigrant from the former Soviet Union, caused a stir with his first speech as foreign minister, in which he declared the road map to be the sole document binding Israel to its pledges post-Oslo. The full text of the speech can be found online at www.mfa.gov.il.
The Israel Project (TIP), a pro-Israel media consulting firm "devoted to educating the press and the public about Israel while promoting security, freedom, and peace," commissioned Republican pollster and political language expert Frank Luntz to craft a language strategy for "visionary leaders who are on the front lines of fighting the media war for Israel" to talk to Americans with the aim of "winning the hearts and minds of the public." Luntz's first Global Language Dictionary for TIP was published in 2003; the 2009 Global Language Dictionary is the result of revisions based on research conducted in 2008.
The following are excerpts from a speech by Lt. Gen. Keith Dayton, the U.S. security coordinator (USSC) to the Palestinian Authority (PA), whose rare on-therecord address to the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP) was closely followed by observers of the Palestine- Israel conflict. Dayton has served as USSC since 2005 and recently accepted another two-year term.
This section is part 102 of a chronology begun in JPS 13, no. 3 (Spring 1984). Chronology dates reflect Eastern Standard Time (EST). For a more comprehensive overview of events related to the al-Aqsa intifada and of regional and international developments related to the peace process, see the Quarterly Update on Conflict and Diplomacy in this issue.
This section lists articles and reviews of books relevant to Palestine and the Arab-Israeli conflict. Entries are classified under the following headings: Reference and General; History (through 1948) and Geography; Palestinian Politics and Society; Jerusalem; Israeli Politics, Society, and Zionism; Arab and Middle Eastern Politics; International Relations; Law; Military; Economy, Society, and Education; Literature, Arts, and Culture; Book Reviews; and Reports Received.
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Arabia, and Jerusalem
Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes
Abstract:
This essay provides a comprehensive synthesis of the Polish military's fighter aircraft selection process, assesses the dominant issues, and answers the question, “Why did Poland choose the F-16?” It begins with a brief examination of Poland's military aircraft status and military aircraft industrial production capability from approximately 1990 to 2002, its requirements for an advanced fighter aircraft, and Poland's military hardware procurement and acquisition processes. Analysis then turns to acquisition reforms associated with the F- 16 decision, the institutional structure for purchasing military aircraft, the mechanics of the F-16 decision, and who ultimately made the decision. Given the centrality to the decision process, a capabilities comparison of the three competitors—the Lockheed Martin F-16, Saab/BAE Systems JAS-39 Gripen, and the Dassault Mirage 2000-5 Mk II—is offered and interoperability considerations addressed. This study then outlines the financial construction of the three bids, to include economic issues and pressures from the U.S., French, and Swedish governments and industry, and an in-depth analysis of industrial offsets. Lastly, it will examine political issues associated with the F-16 purchase.
Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes
Abstract:
In contrast to the former republics of Yugoslavia that fought wars to reach their sovereignty, Montenegro achieved its independence democratically. This was a longer process, but it demonstrated that, even in the traditionally unstable Balkans, the most sensitive issues can be resolved peacefully, based on the concepts and principles of Western democracy. It is this specific feature of Montenegro that requires a special approach to finding adequate modalities to participate in the Partnership for Peace Program (PfP), taking into account the theory and practice of international relations.
Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes
Abstract:
This article examines, primarily from the perspective of U.S. forces, the challenges faced by technologically advantaged forces on the asymmetrical battlefield vis-à-vis the legal principle of distinction. Distinction, the linchpin of international humanitarian law, requires that parties to a conflict conduct their operations in a manner that distinguishes between combatants and civilians, as well as between civilian objects and military objectives. Paradoxically, the technological edge that advanced militaries enjoy over their enemies may present problems in terms of ensuring compliance with the distinction principle, particularly at the tactical level of warfare. The conflict in Iraq has demonstrated that on an asymmetrical battlefield, the weaker party may adopt tactics that violate the norm in order to offset its technological disadvantage. When this occurs, compliance by the advantaged party is also complicated. Safeguarding the principle of distinction, therefore, requires altering the cost-benefit calculations of the side facing defeat at the hands of its stronger opponent.