Over the last decade, international constitutionalism has been the focal point of contemporary international legal debate and practice, as evidenced inter alia by the Kadi-Jurisprudence of the European Courts and the burgeoning literature that employs constitutional as well as fragmentation terms with respect to modern international law. The discourse deals with the pluralistic structure of modern international law, post-national law and constitutional diversity, as well as the quest for an international rule of law, the shifting allocation of authority in international law and the possible demise of general international law. This seemingly new discourse is all- pervasive, with implications in international politics, law, trade, human rights and, global environmental law.
This paper examines the explanatory and the prescriptive value of German (and related) federalist ideas with regard to the constitutionalization of international law. The author contends that respective scholars have, on the one hand, developed federalist thought with regard to the national constitutional level which may help to explain or shape international processes of constitution-building. On the other hand, they have themselves promoted international federalism as a natural extension of their national constitutional doctrine, hence partially weakening the classical dichotomy between national and international law.
Alfred Verdross was one of the first scholars who transferred a meaningful concept of constitution to international law. Like international constitutionalists today, he aimed at establishing the autonomy of international law vis-à-vis State sovereignty and State consent. With his theory of moderate monism, Verdross refers to a further issue raised by today's multilevel constitutionalism, i.e. the relationship between international and domestic law. In contrast to some modern approaches, Verdross's use of the term 'constitution' in international law was only metaphorical. More ambitiously, international constitutionalism also serves as a kind of meta-theory for international law in the present debate.
This article seeks to contextualize the international legal contributions of Hersch (Zvi) Lauterpacht (1897-1960) against his specific historical conditions. It therefore begins with an overview of his biography. The intention is to emphasize his Jewish background in the context of the overlapping cultural and social influences of his time. The article then moves to deal with the three main pillars of Lauterpacht's theoretical approach to international law – his 'Kelsenian twist', the individual and nation State sovereignty. The purpose here is review them in light of his Jewish affinity and German-speaking legal education. The article is concluded with the argument that our understanding of Lauterpacht's international legal contributions could be infinitely richer when and if they are reread against a Babylonian Talmudic text, which is used below in an analogical fashion.
This paper examines Francis Lieber's concept of modern war as “public war” — in the Code he drafted for the 1863 Union Armies and in his earlier writings. Though Lieber was not the first to engage the distinction between private and public war, his treatment of modern war as exclusively public nevertheless deserves special attention. It became, in time, a foundational concept of the 19 th Century effort to modernize and humanize the laws of war. Today, it remains embedded, albeit implicit, in contemporary international humanitarian law and its paradigmatic interstate war outlook.
In the debate on the constitutionalization of international law, Kant's work Toward Perpetual Peace is the most important point of reference when talking about the intellectual origin and philosophical background of the idea of constitutionalizing international law. But while it is undeniable that Kant called for a juridification of international relations, it is far less clear which form of juridification Kant aims at . In this essay, I want to show that Kant's ultimate ideal of international law is neither a State of States nor the peace federation (which seems to be commonly accepted), but the cosmopolitan republic , that is, a single homogenous world State. Only such a cosmopolitan republic, backed up by enforceable laws, can be called a constitution in the Kantian sense. Kant's proposal of a peace federation is nothing but a first step towards this ultimate end.
This paper argues that cosmopolitan constitutionalism suffers from a liberal bias when it comes to comprehend the challenges and conflicts of international politics. This liberal bias becomes obvious in the way cosmopolitan constitutionalism conceives the meaning and function of democracy in global governance. For the cosmopolitan constitutionalism, democracy is mainly thought of as a mechanism to guarantee a political process that brings about reasonable, sustainable and fair compromises between the diverging interests of states and individuals.
International constitutionalism comes in many different forms. A distinction may be made between those claiming that we today have an international constitution and others arguing that what is of importance is to apply constitutional thinking to the international legal system. The article discusses whether we have an international constitution and concludes with a negative answer. This means that we still must operate with different international legal regimes and with the distinction between the international and national legal systems, i.e. aspects of pluralism. However, the challenge is how to secure constitutional guarantees in a pluralist legal order.
The article discusses the potential of a constitutional matrix to conceptualize public international law. Next to criteria of constitutional quality the very functions of a constitution are analyzed. The constitutional reading of public international law is seen not in contrast to obvious fragmentations but as a means to deal with fragmental legal orders.
Global constitutionalism still remains an essentially contested concept. While both its descriptive and normative usages remain unclear, the possibility and the desirability of framing the postnational constellation in constitutionalist terms meet equally strong objection. Yet, recently, even pluralist approaches to the globalization of law which call for a more radical departure from the statist legacy explicitly or implicitly refer to the notion of constitutionalism. Animated by democratic concerns for the inclusion of all those concerned by a rule as well as legal certainty and equality, they envisage a new kind of conflicts law that allows for a mutual recognition and reconciliation of the different legal orders and regimes emerging in world society. Hence, constitutionalism, when employed in a global context, appears but as a reminiscence of an historical achievement. It serves as a cipher under which the reconstruction of law under conditions of globalization has begun and will continue until more adequate concepts will be discovered.