Search

Begin New Search Content Type Journal Article

3041. The Disciplinary Gaze of the Camera's Eye: Soldiers' Conscience and Moral Responsibility

Author:
Erella Grassiani and Desiree Verweij
Publication Date:
06-2014
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:
Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Even though the concept of conscience is complex and multi-interpretable , it is still widely seen as the prime source of morally responsible behavior and often referred to as the 'internal witness' and as such the moral guide of our actions. However, what happens to conscience in the practice of violent conflict in the post-modern era? Today's battlefields are not mysterious and unknown places anymore; we can 'join' the happenings live through satellite connections and journalists who are on site. In such an era where it seems that nothing we do stays unseen it is interesting to look at what happens to soldiers' conscience and their moral responsibility when they are being watched ; when their actions are 'witnessed' by outsiders armed with cameras. Is there a relation between the external witness and thus judgment from outside, from a wider sometimes unseen audience and the 'internal witness' (private reflection on one's behavior), what became known as 'conscious'? Does the camera, in reflecting soldiers actions, work as a conscientious witness? Is it the disciplinary gaze of the camera that keeps soldiers from engaging in immoral behavior? Yet, if this is the case how can we explain soldiers photographing themselves or letting themselves be filmed when committing immoral acts?

3042. The Limits and Implications of the Air-Sea Battle Concept: A Japanese Perspective

Author:
Matsahiro Matsumura
Publication Date:
06-2014
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:
Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:
The world has seen the international distribution of power gradually shifting, driven in great part by China's rise and America's relative decline. Almost continuously for two decades, China has kept double-digit growth rates in defense spending and, consequently, made military build-ups that are unprecedented in modern international history. China has also demonstrated a series of increasingly assertive diplomatic and military actions as related to its irredentist claims to Taiwan, the Senkaku Islands, the Spratly Islands, and the Paracel Islands, among others. Although the regional security order of the East Asia and the Western Pacific appears sufficiently stable, the US and its major regional allies together have to deter and, if necessary, defeat possible China's armed aggression against the territorial status quo. Doing so is a challenge even for the hegemonic US, on the grounds that the aftermath of the 2008 Lehman Shock has seriously impaired the health of the US political economy, and that its defense spending is anticipated to undergo one major cut after another, at least, for a decade to come.
Political Geography:
United States, Japan, China, America, Taiwan, and East Asia

3043. Swiss Neutrality Examined: Model, Exception or Both?

Author:
John Dreyer and Neal G. Jesse
Publication Date:
06-2014
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:
Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:
This paper examines the experience of Switzerland within the greater discourse of neutrality in international relations. When many scholars or policy makers discuss neutrality, they often draw upon the experience of the Swiss. Switzerland has, since the early 19thcentury, constructed an identity as a neutral state. Unlike nearly every other neutral European in modern political history, Switzerland has been successful. In this paper we show the Swiss as an outlier in the dialogue on neutrality. Switzerland has been far more successful at neutrality than any other state for reasons of culture, history and international recognition. Neutrality as a policy has been largely a failure for most states. The Swiss, however, possess three major attributes that allow them to succeed and prosper in their role as neutral. First is the incorporation of an armed deterrent into the national culture. Second is the provision of neutrality as a collective good. Finally is the solidification of Swiss neutrality into international law, custom and convention over nearly 200 years.
Political Geography:
Europe and Switzerland

3044. Nowhere May They Roam: Ottoman Area-Denial Operations and Lessons for the Strait of Hormuz

Author:
Timothy Choi
Publication Date:
06-2014
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:
Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:
On March 18th, 1915, a combined fleet of British and French battleships attempted to force their way through the Dardanelles, the southern half of the Turkish Straits that connected the Mediterranean with the Black Sea. "Attempted" is the key word, for it was a spectacular failure. Two of the greatest navies in the world had failed to enforce their will upon the puny and seemingly obsolete forces of the Ottoman Empire, sparking the infamous and bloody Gallipoli land campaign.
Political Geography:
United States and Turkey

3045. Transitional Fossils of the Atomic Age: Regulus and Sea Master

Author:
Edward Andrew Kaplan
Publication Date:
06-2014
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:
Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Revolutions in strategy and military affairs happen one step at a time. "Revolution" implies a sudden shift, with old and worn ideas, and the weapon systems they support, ceding ground to the fresh and modern. The medieval castle gives way to the trace italienne. Panzers rip through slow-moving, "methodical," infantry. Precision munitions guided by definitive intelligence eviscerate a veteran Iraqi Army. In retrospect, these "revolutions" can appear fated, but this paper argues that this is not always the case. The apparent discontinuity between one method of warfare and its so-called revolutionary successor is on closer inspection often filled with short-lived "failed" projects. They do not last long (or even reach active service), but they are essential evolutionary steps for later, more enduring, systems. Their most important contribution is to introduce novel ideas, often taken from outside conventional military circles, and they can be an important way for an organization to change its approach to core functions. When these intermediate systems are forgotten, they make the final step look like a revolutionary leap, as opposed to a steady advance of evolutionary development. This paper restores to visibility two overlooked parts of one such process, the movement from carrier-based seapower to nuclear-armed ballistic missile submarines.
Political Geography:
United States

3046. Preparing for Peace in Time of War: Canada and the Post-Hostilities Planning Committees, 1943-1945

Author:
Monique Dolak
Publication Date:
06-2014
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:
Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:
During the Second World War, as the likelihood of Allied success grew, the Canadian Department of External Affairs (DEA) looked towards the post-war world. The increasingly international posture of the Canadian government, coupled with concerns over the shape of the post-war international structure, and Canada's role within it, inspired the Department of External Affairs (DEA) to focus its efforts on post-war planning. For the first time in the DEA's short history, it began to vigorously "plan for the future". This took the form of Post-Hostilities Planning (PHP) Committees. The PHP framework was not only an exercise in post-war planning, but inter-service and interdepartmental relations. While the three Canadian military services were active participants in the work done, it was dominated by the DEA. Considerations of the military often tended toward more immediate wartime concerns. The PHP committees also served as a means of bringing the services into closer contact and communication with one another. However, political and diplomatic considerations dominated and the services were often sidelined during meetings. Thus, while the Canadian Chiefs of Staff and their representatives sat on the Committees, their ability to shape policy proved limited.
Topic:
War
Political Geography:
Canada

3047. Strategic Influence Reconsidered: Defence Research and Combat Development in Canada's Early Cold War Army

Author:
Andrew Godefroy
Publication Date:
06-2014
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:
Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Throughout the twentieth century, even when not at war, professionally-minded citizen armies continued to think about future conflicts; in particular what they might be like, where they might take place, against whom, and if possible, why. As well, armies that were smart enough to think ahead did what they could to be ready for the next conflict through engagement in strategic foresight activities, the investigation of new ideas and concepts, the examination and assessment of emerging trends, the creation of new doctrines, and the development of robust physical, intellectual, and social capital within their standing armies. Finally, commanders would often seek to train their soldiers for tasks both probable and possible, knowing all the while that despite the best efforts and preparations it would be impossible to fully anticipate every possibility, and therefore, mitigate all future risk.
Political Geography:
Canada

3048. Defense at the Forward Edge of the Battle or rather in the Depth? Different approaches to implement NATO's operation plans by the alliance partners, 1955-1988

Author:
Helmut R. Hammerich
Publication Date:
06-2014
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:
Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Military historians love studying battles. For this purpose, they evaluate operation plans and analyze how these plans were executed on the battlefield. The battle history of the Cold War focuses first and foremost on the planning for the nuclear clash between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Although between 1945 and 1989-90 the world saw countless hot wars on the periphery of the Cold War, the "Cold World War," as the German historian Jost Dülffer termed it, is best examined through the operational plans of the military alliances for what would have been World War Three. To conduct such an analysis we must consider Total War under nuclear conditions.
Political Geography:
Europe and Germany

3049. Preparing for the War of the Future in the Wake of Defeat: The Evolution of German Strategic Thought, 1919-1935

Author:
Mark Shannon
Publication Date:
06-2014
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:
Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Germany's defeat in the First World War came as a profound shock. While the nation was stunned by the peace settlement that followed, the military was faced with the inescapable reality that their approach to fighting a prolonged industrialized conflict was flawed. The years following Germany's defeat found the army in search of reasons for its failure. The officer corps sought to analyze its experience with "total war" and to draw the correct lessons from it. In this way, the army could prepare for the war of the future, secure in the knowledge that any repetition of the First World War could be avoided. In short, the German armed forces began the detailed process of distilling relevant military lessons from the conflict and applying them to their perception of a future war. While many of the lessons learned and studied had to do with tactics and technology, it is the purpose of this analysis to examine the strategic debate that ensued. Regardless of how strategy would be formulated in the coming years, it maintained at its heart one simple objective that is best summarized in a conversation between General Walther Reinhardt and Colonel Albrecht von Thaer in January 1919. Thaer expressed his pessimism for the coming years but Reinhardt, a liberal officer who was about to assume command of the War Ministry disagreed. He openly stated that "the goal is and remains a free Germany, hopefully restored to its former borders, with [the] strongest, most modern army with [the] newest weapons. One must not let this goal recede from view for even one moment." Rearmament and conscription would return, he declared, but when Thaer suggested this might be possible in the distant future, Reinhardt assured him that "We must and will be in position to do so in 15 years." Clearly, planning for the next war began at the moment defeat in the First World War was realized.
Political Geography:
Canada and Germany

3050. The Past as Future: The US Army's Vision of Warfare in the 21st Century"

Author:
Terry Terriff
Publication Date:
06-2014
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:
Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Today the US Army is engaged in the effort to learn the appropriate lessons from the wars it has been engaged in since the autumn of 2001 and to think through what type of force it needs to be, with what kinds of capabilities, in order to prepare for further future conflicts in the 21st Century. Estimating the character of future conflicts, and then preparing one's forces appropriately, is not an easy task. A critical line of argument today is that the vision of future warfare the Army developed in the decade plus following the end of the Cold War left it ill-prepared for the wars it found itself conducting in Afghanistan and Iraq. In an article published in 2007, US Army Lt. Col. Paul Yingling very pointedly, and very boldly for a serving officer, contended that, "throughout the 1990s our generals failed to envision the conditions of future combat and prepare their forces accordingly." The US Army's operational experiences in the first decade of this century, particularly in the early years of the long conflict in Iraq, suggest that it marched eyes wide shut through the decade of the 1990s into the 21st Century.
Political Geography:
United States