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1. Hypocritical Inhospitality: The Global Refugee Crisis in the Light of History

Author:
Luke Glanville
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Institution:
Carnegie Council
Abstract:
Political authorities often claim that states have an absolute right to decide for themselves who enters their territory and the conditions on which they enter by mere virtue of their sovereignty. In 2018, for example, the then U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, Nikki Haley, responded to the UN’s criticism of the Donald Trump administration’s practice of separating children from parents entering the United States without documentation, including those claiming asylum, with a typical appeal to sovereign prerogative: “We will remain a generous country, but we are also a sovereign country, with laws that decide how to best control our borders and protect our people. Neither the United Nations nor anyone else will dictate how the United States upholds its borders.”1 A brief glance at the history of sovereignty, however, reminds us of two crucial things. First, sovereignty is socially constructed, and its meaning and implications have changed and continue to change over time. Sovereignty need not entail, and historically has not entailed, an absolute right to regulate the movement of people in and out of one’s territory.2 Second, we are reminded of the deep and problematic ties between the history of sovereignty’s construction and the history of the European colonial project.3 Sovereignty was for a long time considered a privilege enjoyed only by Europeans and those non-Europeans whom Europeans deigned to acknowledge as civilized members of the “family of nations.” It was not until the second half of the twentieth century that Europe’s widespread empires were finally dismantled, self-government was granted to formerly colonized peoples, and the institution of the territorially bounded sovereign state spread across the globe. More than that, for centuries, the wealth of Europe’s sovereign powers was augmented, and the territories of their soon-to-be-sovereign settler colonies beyond Europe were acquired by means of violent conquest, subjection, enslavement, displacement, and, often, slaughter of nonsovereign indigenous peoples. The powerful once demanded hospitality from the vulnerable. They now deny it to them. That much is well known. What is less well known is that one justification that European imperial powers offered for the violent subjection of nonsovereign non-Europeans, at least for a time, was indigenous peoples’ violation of a supposedly natural and enforceable duty of hospitality. Today, many of these same powers—including European Union member states and former settler colonies, such as the United States and Australia—work tirelessly and expend billions of dollars to resist granting hospitality to forcibly displaced people seeking asylum at their borders or waiting in refugee camps and urban centers in developing regions of the world. The powerful once demanded hospitality from the vulnerable. They now deny it to them. This essay examines the hypocritical inhospitality of these wealthy and powerful states in four stages. I first outline how the notion of a duty of hospitality was deployed as a justification for European colonialism. Second, I contrast this historical demand for hospitality with the denial of hospitality by former colonial powers today, noting that they legitimate this denial by again imposing an expectation of hospitality on others. Third, I consider the justified limits to the duty of hospitality, explaining how Immanuel Kant and others usefully sought a formulation of the duty that would protect the vulnerable from the predations of powerful intruders while still requiring the powerful to provide relief to the displaced vulnerable. And fourth, I argue, given that certain states accrued vast wealth and territory from the European colonial project, which they justified in part by appeals to a duty of hospitality, these states are bound now to extend hospitality to vulnerable outsiders not simply as a matter of charity or even reciprocity, but as justice and restitution for grave historical wrongs.
Topic:
Refugee Crisis, Colonialism, Humanitarian Crisis, and Hospitality
Political Geography:
Global Focus

2. Secessionist Conflict: A Happy Marriage between Norms and Interests?

Author:
Rafael Biermann
Publication Date:
03-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Institution:
Carnegie Council
Abstract:
This roundtable debates how norms, values, and interests are balanced and harmonized in a world of conflict. My contribution focuses on one specific policy field: secessionist conflict. Like Megan Bradley’s contribution on the international refugee regime,1 this essay takes a metaperspective and does not investigate any one specific case or actor.2 I assume a political science perspective, paying attention first to social norms (as standards of appropriate behavior), which encompass but go beyond legally codified norms of international law;3 and second to interests, whether they be national, group, personal, or other. My perspective here is a critical social constructivist one, investigating the dialectic relationship of norms, interests, and power. I introduce the concept of “norm selection” in a policy field, which offers choice within a cluster of competing norms. Finally, following Bernd Bucher’s call to bring back agency into what he terms international “norm politics,” this contribution prioritizes agency, arguing that it is actors with diverging interests who do the balancing of norms, values, and interests.4 This was one of the major insights we gained from the workshop preceding this roundtable.5 The central argument of my contribution is that the policy field of secessionist conflict is structured around a set of five rival norms, of which territorial integrity and self-determination form the core. This normative structure permits the parties involved in a secessionist conflict to select from a menu of norms those that best suit their interests. The selection displays remarkable regularities, indicating default positions for each type of actor. However, significant outlier cases signal that interests do not simply trump norms but that actors accord different values to those norms. This attribution is influenced by the dynamics of a normative environment in which norms rise and fall. In particular, since the Cold War ended, discourse as well as state practice have shifted away from the traditional taboo on secession toward more revisionist concepts, such as remedial secession or earned sovereignty, providing an opening for the secessionist wave that started with the breakup of the Soviet Union and of Yugoslavia. I present my argument in three steps. First, I introduce the above-mentioned cluster of norms that shape discourse and policies on secession, distinguishing the two core norms and the three circumjacent ones of noninterference, human rights, and democratic good governance. Second, I identify five major types of actors in secessionist conflicts and investigate how each balances those norms. Since this balancing is actor-specific and conforms to the interests that each pursues, I arrive at distinct default positions for each actor type. Whereas this analysis suggests that norms serve primarily as legitimation devices to advance the diverging interests of various actors, the last section discusses outlier cases where norms and interests do not match as presumed.
Topic:
International Law, Self Determination, Norms, and Secession
Political Geography:
Global Focus

3. A Human Rights Approach to Conflict Resolution

Author:
Claudia Fuentes-Julio and Raslan Ibrahim
Publication Date:
09-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Institution:
Carnegie Council
Abstract:
The role of human rights abuses in the causes, dynamics, and consequences of conflict illustrate the importance of a human rights approach to conflict resolution:1 if human rights are part of the problem, they must be part of the solution. This essay aims to show how a human rights perspective can improve the odds of transforming violent conflicts into sustainable peace by enhancing the design and implementation of peace processes and conflict resolution practices. In doing so, we will clarify the main characteristics of a human rights approach to conflict resolution and identify a set of human rights standards to guide its implementation. We will then briefly analyze the Colombian and the Israeli-Palestinian peace processes, each through the lens of the human rights approach. These two cases illustrate opposite ends of the spectrum when considering the inclusion of human rights in conflict resolution. At one end, the Colombian peace process illustrates how negotiations and a final agreement can recognize peace as a human right, highlighting the need to transform the structural conditions of injustice and human rights violations that give rise to armed conflict. At the other end, in the Oslo Accords between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization, human rights are virtually absent despite the fact that systematic abuses are among the main underlying causes and consequences of the conflict. In the conclusion, we address one of the main criticisms and challenges of a human rights–based approach to conflict resolution.
Topic:
Human Rights, Conflict, and Peace
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Colombia, Palestine, and South America

4. The Ethics of Kin State Activism: A Cosmopolitan Defense

Author:
George Vasilev
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Institution:
Carnegie Council
Abstract:
A notable feature of nationalism’s contemporary resurgence is the increasing eagerness that governments have shown to support and shape the political causes of populations living abroad whom they conceive of as ethnic kindred. Governments engaged in such “kin state activism” assume a natural entitlement to speak for and assert authority over minorities and diasporas in other states, invoking a belief in common territorial, cultural, and even biological origins as a moral basis for that entitlement. A striking example of the trend is the Russian government’s declaration that it will defend the interests of ethnic Russians wherever they may be and regardless of their citizenship.1 The government has made good on this intention since 2014 through the invasion of Crimea and through support for pro-Russia secessionist fighters in eastern Ukraine. Russian officials have also made thinly veiled threats to apply the doctrine in Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia, where large Russian-speaking minorities reside and maintain strained relations with authorities.2 Kin state activism has also become increasingly apparent in other contexts, even though it has not involved the military coercion and flagrant disregard for international law characterizing Russia’s interventions. Examples that have made headlines recently include Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and his Fidesz (Federation of Young Democrats) party’s cross-border political collaborations with Romania’s Hungarians,3 Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s appeal to Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras to take action against the discrimination of Greece’s predominantly ethnic Turkish Muslims,4 and Croatian President Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović’s lobbying for electoral reform in Bosnia so that ethnic Croats there can gain increased representation.5 These and other examples typify a trend in which governments are more stridently assuming a right to protect, counsel, represent, politically organize, indoctrinate, naturalize, financially support, advocate for, and even govern populations beyond state jurisdictions on the basis of an ethnic conception of shared identity.
Topic:
Nationalism, Minorities, Citizenship, and Ethnicity
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Turkey, Greece, Hungary, and Croatia

5. The Marketization of Citizenship in an Age of Restrictionism

Author:
Ayelet Shachar
Publication Date:
03-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Institution:
Carnegie Council
Abstract:
Tough action and rhetoric are the stamp of U.S. President Donald Trump’s immigration policy. The decision in September 2017 to revoke the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA)—a program that shields young undocumented immigrants (“Dreamers”) from removal, granting them an opportunity to complete school, enroll in college, volunteer for the armed services, or join the workforce—proved to be the most contentious in a groundswell of executive orders, directives, memos, and wide-ranging enforcement efforts to curtail unauthorized presence.1 Critics describe such sweeping measures as amounting to an anti-immigrant crusade. Supporters, meanwhile, applaud them as taking the handcuffs off immigration enforcement officers and border patrol agents. With the rising tide of restrictionism and the government’s tough-on-immigration approach under the rubric of a “nation of laws,” it is easy to lose sight of the only immigration program that has been renewed and extended under the Trump administration: the EB-5 program, or the “golden visa.”2 The contrast between the DACA “Dreamers” and the EB-5 “Parachuters” reveals the sharp edge, and deep injustices, of current policies. In 2017 the president signed into law and renewed the extension of the EB-5 program, which offers the world’s wealthy a coveted path to securing lawful permanent residence (LPR) status, jumping the queue and gaining an easy pass through the otherwise increasingly bolted gates of admission. The price tag for securing a green card via the EB-5 program ranges from $1 million to a “discounted” rate of $500,000 if funds are for specially designated rural areas or areas of high unemployment.3 The American golden visa, like comparable schemes in other desirable destination countries, caters to the global 1 percent. It treats money transfers—in large quantities—as a currency for acquiring entry visas, residence permits, and, ultimately, citizenship itself. Unlike the Dreamers, who now face the risk of deportation from the only country they have ever known as home, these visa applicants have no prior “bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States.”4 Instead, they gain a privileged route to enter the United States and remain lawfully in the country based on their ability to transfer capital across borders. The contrast between the DACA “Dreamers” and the EB-5 “Parachuters” reveals the sharp edge, and deep injustices, of current policies. The former have already become part of the fabric of the United States—including its society and economy—through their ongoing, peaceful, and productive presence, yet the sword of deportation continues to hang over their heads. On the other hand, the latter benefit from expedited and simplified pathways to obtain full-fledged legal membership, even if they fail to establish any tangible connections to their new home country. The intrusion of market logic into the sovereign act of defining “who belongs” raises significant justice and equality concerns that require closer scrutiny. The United States is not alone in testing, blurring, and eroding the state-market boundary regulating access to membership. A growing number of countries are putting their visas and passports up for sale. The proliferation of these programs is one of the most significant developments in citizenship and immigration practice in the past few decades, yet it has received scant attention in the literature. In the following pages, I begin to address this lacuna by identifying the core legal and normative puzzles associated with this new trend, which I will refer to as the marketization of citizenship to highlight a dual transformation: the commodifying of access to membership and the hollowing out of the “status, rights, and identity” components of citizenship.5 Marketization is never merely an economic process; it is also deeply political, as it reshapes and reengineers the boundaries of and interactions between states and markets, voice and power, the inviolable and the mercantile. The intrusion of market logic into the sovereign act of defining “who belongs” raises significant justice and equality concerns that require closer scrutiny, both empirical and normative—the remit of this essay. I treat these new developments as a productive site to explore foundational questions about the character of citizenship and its transformation in today’s world. I begin by tracing the global surge in the marketization of citizenship, providing illustrative examples, before turning to explore the official rationales for the EB-5 and exposing their shortcomings. Moving from the positive to the normative, I develop several lines of critique that seek to show that this new trend is uniquely threatening to notions of citizenship reflecting the horizon of equality and participation, regardless of which theories of state and society—liberal, civic republican, or democratic—inform them.
Topic:
Migration, Immigration, Citizenship, and Borders
Political Geography:
United States and North America

6. The Case for Foreign Electoral Subversion

Author:
Cecile Fabre
Publication Date:
09-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Institution:
Carnegie Council
Abstract:
Most foreign policy is not implemented through war. Yet, with a few recent exceptions—like James Pattison’s 2018 monograph The Alternatives to War—political and moral philosophers have yet to explore all options between war and doing nothing.1 Here I consider one such option: subversive interference in a democracy’s nationwide elections. In that regard, the years 2016–2017 have proved rich in controversies. In France, Russian banks with close ties to the Kremlin provided cash loans to the National Front in the run-up to the 2017 presidential elections. In December 2017, the Australian premier announced a tightening of restrictions on foreign funding of political parties out of concern with alleged and undue Chinese influence on some Australian politicians. Last, but far from least, in the United States the Office of the Director of National Intelligence along with the CIA, FBI, and NSA all take the strong view, backed in part by social media data, that Russian authorities actively sought to undermine Hillary Clinton’s 2016 presidential campaign and to bolster Donald Trump’s.2 Interestingly, however, some of President Putin’s critics are vulnerable to the charge of hypocrisy. To give but two examples, the United States has a long history of interfering in the institutions and elections of its Latin American neighbors and, indeed, at the height of the Cold War, of its European allies. More recently, many believe that, absent U.S.-driven assistance, the Democratic Opposition of Serbia would have lost the 2000 Yugoslavian presidential election to Slobodan Milošević.3 Attempting to subvert the democratic elections of a putatively sovereign country is a time-honored way of bending the latter’s domestic and foreign policy to one’s will. However, it seems to elicit far more condemnation than war and, indeed, other forms of coercive diplomacy. Perhaps this is because, to many people, the rights of democratic participation have primacy over all other rights; or because most often electoral subversion takes place covertly. Either way, given how destructive those other modes of interference are, this is puzzling. I frame my inquiry as follows. I focus on the state-sponsored, nonviolent, nonkinetic subversion of nationwide elections (for short, subversion). Moreover, because I am interested in exploring whether there are any situations in which subversion may be justified, I consider cases in which subversion is used as a means to prevent or end large-scale human rights violations, though my argument also has implications for subversion as a tool of foreign policy in general. In addition, my aim is not to evaluate subversion as an alternative to war or, for that matter, to other measures, such as economic sanctions. Due to space constraints, I simply wish to show that, under certain conditions and subject to certain constraints, subversion is pro tanto justified. Whether it is justified all things considered—and, in particular, once one has taken into account other options—is another matter and one that I cannot settle here. Finally, although subversion affects election candidates, it above all undermines a citizen’s right to vote. Accordingly, in what follows I focus on the latter and not the former. Attempting to subvert the democratic elections of a putatively sovereign country is a time-honored way of bending the latter’s domestic and foreign policy to one’s will. However, it seems to elicit far more condemnation than war. Before I begin, let me outline the overall normative framework on which my arguments rely. I take it for granted that all individuals, wherever they reside in the world, have rights to the freedoms and the resources they need to lead a minimally flourishing life—in other words, human rights. Moreover, they hold those rights against all human beings and their respective governments. Put differently, on this cosmopolitan view, all of us, wherever we reside in the world, are under duties to all other individuals, wherever they reside, to respect their human rights. How precisely we discharge those duties partly depends on the institutional structures under which we live. Be that as it may, I am not under a stronger duty to respect my compatriots’ human rights—for example, not to be killed or to be given means of subsistence—than I am to respect those same rights of noncompatriots, and vice versa
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Human Rights, Sovereignty, Elections, and Election Interference
Political Geography:
Global Focus

7. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights at Seventy: Progress and Challenges

Author:
Ş. İlgü Özler
Publication Date:
12-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Institution:
Carnegie Council
Abstract:
On December 10, 1948, the United Nations General Assembly passed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the most significant statement from the global community regarding what constitutes the ideal human life in any society and the rights to which all people are entitled. On the basis of the principles laid out in the UDHR, the international community has since negotiated a large number of human rights treaties and conventions and has developed plans of action in relation to all aspects of living a dignified life. The UDHR is arguably one of the most important documents in the history of human civilization; and to the extent that words on paper can change the world, the impact of the UDHR has been profound. However, despite providing a solid foundation for our collective understanding of the rights to which human beings are endowed, today we are still far from realizing these goals, and threats to the very principles enshrined in the UDHR continue to emerge. The declaration has now endured for seventy years, roughly the global average human life span. Thus, this occasion presents a good opportunity to take stock of what has been achieved, what has yet to be accomplished, and to consider the future longevity of this seminal declaration. As with any interpretation of something as complex as the impact of a document on the world, assessments of the UDHR and its ongoing role are mixed. Many in the field of human rights see a glass half full, characterizing the UDHR as a powerful tool that has dramatically shaped political and economic development throughout the world.1 Others focus on the space that remains empty, emphasizing the flaws that inhibit the realization of the document’s goals.2 Indeed, it must be admitted that, even given the indisputable progress that has been made over seven decades, there are today growing threats to human rights. These threats are the consequence of a number of global developments, including shifting geopolitical balances, extreme economic and social inequality, climate change, and a weakening of democratic institutions. These threats are very real, and it is important that human rights proponents monitor and respond to them. But here I argue that the threat to human rights is ever present. And thus, rather than focus on the advances and setbacks of this particular moment, this anniversary is an opportunity to consider the overall historical progression toward human rights as embodied in the UDHR and the obstacles that stand in the way of its full realization. Taking this broader view, there are two issues in particular that stand out as barriers to be overcome. The first is tied to the Westphalian state system, which has come to dominate human political organization. State sovereignty presents a fundamental challenge to any effort to establish universal norms. Implementing universal human rights will always be tremendously difficult in a system that affords final authority to state leaders who lack the necessary incentives. This is nothing new or surprising, of course, and it is not unique to human rights. But it nonetheless requires a careful consideration of how international declarations make their way from ideas on paper to practice. A declaration is only significant to the extent to which it is adhered. As a document with universal endorsement, the UDHR does indeed have power, and it can shape the behavior of actors who otherwise risk appearing to stand against history and human civilization. It can also be used as a normative weapon, both by citizens and by the international community, to shame hypocrites who violate the principles to which they and every nation in the world have agreed. But it is, nonetheless, just a document, and without correspondingly strong global institutional mechanisms to ensure implementation and compliance, its impact is limited. The second major issue is the way in which human rights ideals have been segmented. The separation of rights into social/economic and civil/political has enabled states to focus on some rights to the neglect of others. Global power shifts, especially under the hegemony of the post–Cold War United States, have led to exaggerated selective emphasis on just some of the rights embedded in the UDHR, when in fact none can be fully realized without a comprehensive approach. Political rights cannot be effectively exercised by those lacking access to basic economic necessities. And those meeting their economic needs may find that their voices as citizens are meaningless in a system characterized by vast inequality or in which national institutions are infected by mechanisms that leave them politically marginalized. Rights must be recognized as interconnected and they must be advanced in tandem. Emphasis on some principles to the exclusion of others undermines the comprehensive advancement of human rights. Thus, the current state of affairs is a product of the collective failure to address human rights holistically and to implement real monitoring and accountability measures for states, which are directly charged with upholding them within their borders.
Topic:
Human Rights, United Nations, Hegemony, and State Formation
Political Geography:
Global Focus

8. Rethinking the Concept of a “Durable Solution”: Sahrawi Refugee Camps Four Decades On

Author:
Carmen Gomez Martin
Publication Date:
03-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Institution:
Carnegie Council
Abstract:
The Sahrawi people, who have long lived in the western part of the Sahara, have been housed in refugee camps in Tindouf, Algeria, since 1975—the year that Morocco took de facto control of Western Sahara. Their situation poses many questions, including those regarding the status of their state-in-exile, the role of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, and the length of their displacement. The conditions in the Tindouf camps present a paradigmatic case study of the liminal space inhabited by long-term refugees. Over the decades, residents have transformed these camps into a state-like structure with their own political and administrative institutions, which has enabled the international community to gain time to search for an acceptable political solution to the long-term conflict between the Polisario Front (the Sahrawi rebel national liberation movement) and the Moroccan government. The existence of a state-like structure, however, should not itself be understood as the ultimate solution for the thousands of people in these camps, who are currently living in extreme poverty, surviving on increasingly meager international aid, and enduring an exceptionally long wait for the favorable conditions whereby they may return to their place of origin. This essay is divided into three sections. First, it addresses the question of the Western Sahara from a historical point of view. The three major phases of the Sahrawi-Moroccan conflict provide the context for the formation and the current situation of the Sahrawi refugee camps. Second, it touches on the implementation of durable solutions for refugees living in camps and the supposedly transitional role of these spaces in such solutions. Finally, the essay applies an analytical framework to the paradigmatic case of the Sahrawi, demonstrating the contradictions between the theoretical model used to understand protracted refugee situations and the permanent problem regarding the rights of refugees.
Topic:
Poverty, Refugees, Displacement, Conflict, and Humanitarian Crisis
Political Geography:
Africa, Algeria, Morocco, and Western Sahara

9. A Better Process, a Stronger UN Secretary-General: How Historic Change Was Forged and What Comes Next

Author:
Yvonne Terlingen
Publication Date:
06-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Institution:
Carnegie Council
Abstract:
When on October 13, 2016, the General Assembly appointed by acclamation António Guterres of Portugal as the United Nations’ ninth secretary-general, there was a sense of excitement among the organization’s 193 members. For once, so it seemed, they felt they had played an important role not only in choosing the secretary-general but also in appointing a man generally considered to be an outstanding candidate for a position memorably described as “the most impossible job on this earth.”1 The five permanent, veto-wielding members of the Security Council (Perm Five) still exercised the greatest power in the selection process, as they always had in the past. Yet the candidate chosen appears, surprisingly, not to have been the first choice of either the United States or Russia, two of the Perm Five that until then had effectively chosen the secretary-general between them in an opaque and outdated process. It is doubtful that António Guterres would have been appointed if the General Assembly had not embarked on a novel process to select him. All previous secretaries-general were chosen on the basis of a haphazard and secretive process that occurred behind closed doors and was not merit based. The method to select the UN secretary-general is laid down in a few words in the UN Charter. Article 97 allocates responsibility for appointing the secretary-general to all members of the General Assembly acting on the recommendation of the Security Council. However, for the last seventy years—with one circumstance-specific exception2—the General Assembly has had no say in the selection: its member states merely rubber-stamped the decision of the Perm Five, which recommended just one candidate each time for the General Assembly to appoint. All previous secretaries-general were chosen on the basis of a haphazard and secretive process that occurred behind closed doors and was not merit based. The process was geared toward appointing the lowest common denominator candidate,3 but nevertheless produced a few outstanding secretaries-general. There has never been a female secretary-general, and until 2016 only three women had ever made it on a Security Council shortlist.4 The entire process lacked transparency and accountability and fell far short of the UN’s own standards and ideals, let alone the current recruitment practices for top international positions. Selections of all previous secretaries-general were made without appointment criteria, without a call for nominations or for CVs, without a timeline for nominations, and without public hearings or other effective methods of public scrutiny. In recent selections, candidates were often pushed into horse trading with the Security Council’s permanent members to gain their support in exchange for making promises of senior UN posts for their nationals. This has led to some countries holding monopolies over key posts.5 Moreover, the tradition of appointment for a five-year, once-renewable term, with reappointment controlled by the Perm Five, has effectively secured a secretary-general beholden to the Council’s most powerful members. The whole process “would be rejected as a bad joke by any serious institution in the private sector,” noted one senior UN authority who worked under multiple secretaries-general.
Topic:
United Nations, Leadership, Diversity, and Transparency
Political Geography:
Global Focus

10. After Liberal Hegemony: The Advent of a Multiplex World Order

Author:
Amitav Acharya
Publication Date:
09-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Institution:
Carnegie Council
Abstract:
“The dominance of a single great power,” wrote American scholar Robert Keohane in his widely acclaimed book After Hegemony, “may contribute to order in world politics, in particular circumstances, but it is not a sufficient condition and there is little reason to believe that it is necessary.”1 This proposition has never been put to a greater test as it is now. Since the election of Donald J. Trump as U.S. president in November 2016 there has been a vast outpouring of anxiety over the future of the liberal world order.2 But the myths, limitations, and decline of this order have been anticipated and forewarned for some time, even though its proponents have not acknowledged it. The “first myth” about the U.S.-led liberal hegemonic order, as I have written elsewhere, is “how far it extended for much of its history, especially during the Cold War period.” I pointed out that “the Soviet bloc, China, India, Indonesia, and a good part of the ‘third world’ were outside of it . . . . Despite the exalted claims about its power, legitimacy, and public goods functions, that order was little more than the US-UK-West Europe-Australasian configuration.”3 Noting that the liberal order was hardly benign for many countries in the developing world, I argued that it should be seen as a limited international order, rather than an inclusive global order. Joseph S. Nye, one of the staunchest champions of the liberal order, made a similar point when he wrote in the January/February 2017 issue of Foreign Affairs that the liberal order “was largely limited to a group of like-minded states centered on the Atlantic littoral” and “did not include many large countries such as China, India, and the Soviet bloc states, and . . . did not always have benign effects on nonmembers.”4 The liberal order did expand and strengthen with the economic reforms in China and India, and with the end of the cold war. And while the champions of that order celebrated its expansion, they still generally assumed that the main challenge to it would come from the rising powers, led by China. Their assumptions notwithstanding, precisely at a time when many of these powers today are not doing all that well, the liberal order appears to be imploding. Trump’s victory and Brexit suggest that the current challenge to the liberal order is as much, if not more, from within as from without. Precisely at a time when many of the rising powers are not doing all that well, the liberal order appears to be imploding. The domestic challenges to the liberal order led by Trump and his supporters could be overstated, however. After all, Hillary Clinton won a majority of the popular vote, and the Brexit referendum only passed by a slim margin. More importantly, however, the crisis of the liberal order has deeper roots, owing to long-term and structural changes in the global economy and politics. As such, Trump’s ascent to power is a consequence—not a cause—of the decline of the liberal order, especially of its failure to address the concerns of domestic constituents left behind by the global power shift. Given these factors, Trump is unlikely to reverse the decline of the liberal order even if he wanted to. Instead, he may well push it over the precipice. In what follows, I first describe the foundations of the liberal order, and show that the ground on which it was built has been eroding for some time, though Trump’s rhetoric and policies are also damaging. Next, I argue that for now the rising powers are not in a position to overturn the current order completely, and in fact they may wish to preserve some elements of it in the near and medium term. I describe a “multiplex world” in which elements of the liberal order survive, but are subsumed in a complex of multiple, crosscutting international orders. Finally, I offer some suggestions on how scholars and policymakers can manage the transition to such a multiplex world.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Hegemony, Reform, and Liberal Order
Political Geography:
Global Focus