Search

Begin New Search Topic Diplomacy Author Scott Snyder

1. Strengthening the ROK-US Nuclear Partnership

Author:
Miles A. Pomper, Toby Dalton, Scott Snyder, and Ferenc Dalnkoki-Veress
Publication Date:
02-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
Over the last forty years, South Korea (or the Republic of Korea, or ROK) and the United States have become essential partners on nuclear matters. The United States provided the technology and knowhow necessary for Korea to establish a nuclear sector. Koreans mastered that technology and have worked to improve on it, with the twin goals of expanding their country’s energy independence and becoming a leading exporter of nuclear power production facilities. The two states’ nuclear energy industries have become intertwined. They cooperate on multiple initiatives to strengthen international nuclear security and nonproliferation measures. Collaborative research ties amongst nuclear scientists from both countries run deep. Arguably, each state is the other’s most important nuclear partner. As with all maturing relationships, there remain differences of view and priority that must be managed. Though unlikely, a disruption in ROK-US nuclear relations would have wide-ranging, deleterious effects on both states. For this reason, the conclusion in June 2015 of a new bilateral treaty, the Agreement for Cooperation Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Korea Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (hereafter referred to as the 123 agreement after section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act, the relevant US statute) is a critical milestone. The new agreement establishes the terms for nuclear cooperation for the next twenty years. It is expansive and forward-looking, providing the basis for unusually broad and deep nuclear ties. The 123 agreement will bring predictability to the relationship at a time when the global nuclear energy outlook remains in flux. However, the new nuclear agreement only managed to partially resolve several deep-seated differences between the two sides that were illustrated by the fact that negotiations on a new agreement lasted more than four years and required an extension to complete. The agreement creates a new political framework for managing divergent views over how to cooperate most effectively, but differences may yet re-emerge and frustrate cooperation. The challenge before the two governments now is to implement the new agreement in ways that can either resolve or remove these differences and solidify existing ties. In other words, the two countries should seek to build a nuclear partnership in deed, not just in word. This report articulates a vision for ROK-US nuclear partnership for the next two decades, a period which aligns with the duration of the new agreement for cooperation. It highlights challenges and opportunities and provides recommendations intended to deepen and expand the range of existing cooperation in ways that will support a stable and sustainable nuclear partnership. The objective of the report is to describe a desirable and stable end-state for the relationship—an enduring partnership—and to identify steps along the path to achieve it. It discusses multiple areas of cooperation, assesses strengths and weaknesses of existing ties, and identifies practical activities both parties can pursue toward building the partnership.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Energy Policy, International Cooperation, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America

2. Economic Interdependence, Alliance Cooperation, and Sino-U.S. Complex Interdependence

Author:
Scott Snyder
Publication Date:
12-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
China’s rising economic strength has highlighted a need to understand in greater detail the impact of complex economic interdependence on prospects for alliance cohesion, especially when an ally comes to depend on a potential adversary as its leading trading partner and engine for economic growth. This is an issue that did not come into play to any significant degree in analyzing alliance dynamics during the cold war era precisely because the development of security and economic relationships during that period were aligned with and served to reinforce each other, and the level of economic ties among potential cold-war adversaries was minimal. Analysis of trade relationships among security allies from that period shows a clear correlation of preferences for trading relationships with security partners versus adversaries, but it is not clear based on that data alone that there was necessarily causality between economic trade patterns and security alliances. In fact, structural differences between market economies (that tended to be allied with each other) and non-market economies were a significant deterrent to the development of economic relations with non-security partners during the cold war. In the post-cold war era, economically interdependent trade and investment relationships have been relatively unconstrained by political and security considerations, resulting in a situation where non-security partners such as China, a potential challenger to U.S. power, have become actively integrated in global supply chains as a leading manufacturer of goods for the global market. In considering this question, Dong Sun Lee and Sung Eun Kim have attempted to provide an empirical analysis of the influence of bilateral economic relations as a factor in shaping America’s Asian alliances, concluding that “economic ties do not markedly reinforce the security alliances of East Asia, because they have an asymmetrical structure”(Lee and Kim 2010, 4). But in making the argument that asymmetry matters, Lee and Kim assume that the economic consequences of interdependence are negative for dynamics within the alliance and that these negative consequences may cancel out positive effects of economic interdependence, even though the main argument of that the paper proves is that economic ties do not necessarily reinforce security alliances. The authors’ assertions regarding asymmetrical economic relations as having an impact on alliance dynamics are unproven and not dealt with to any significant degree by the evidence presented in the paper.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Alliance, and Economic Cooperation
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

3. Keeping an Eye on an Unruly Neighbor: Chinese Views of Economic Reform and Stability in North Korea

Author:
Scott Snyder, Bonnie Glaser, and John Park
Publication Date:
01-2008
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
Beijing viewed North Korea's explosion of a nuclear device in October 2006 as not only an act of defiance to the international community and a threat to regional stability, but also an act of defiance toward China. Chinese officials admit that their toolbox for managing the North Korean nuclear weapons challenge must now include a combination of pressure and inducements. Three considerations underpin Beijing's aid policy toward North Korea: 1) protecting China's military-strategic environment; 2) maintaining security and stability along the Sino-DPRK border; and 3) sustaining economic development and political stability in the three Chinese northeastern provinces that border North Korea. There are intense debates among Chinese analysts over: 1) whether North Korea will give up its nuclear weapons; 2) the strategic value of the DPRK to China; 3) whether the Sino-DPRK treaty should be revised, abandoned, retained and its ambiguity stressed to enhance deterrence; and 4) the likelihood of a rapid improvement in U.S.-DPRK relations and how such a development would affect Chinese interests. Chinese analysts are generally less concerned with North Korea's immediate economic prospects than they were last year, reporting severe but stable conditions. Inflation has subsided and market mechanisms have largely replaced government rations as the primary means for securing a livelihood. In contrast to last year, when Chinese analysts were consumed by the seeming zero-sum choice between stability and reform facing the North Korean leadership, North Korea's slightly improved economic situation seems to have allayed the immediacy of Chinese concerns about North Korea's economic stability. Chinese experts report no fundamental change in North Korea's economic policies following the 2002 reforms. Chinese analysts provide conflicting assessments of whether government attempts to prohibit selling of grain in markets are succeeding and the extent to which the grain rationing system is working. Chinese DPRK specialists are encouraged that the DPRK has haltingly adopted some agricultural and market reforms and allowed greater autonomy to individual factories and enterprises. But they acknowledge that North Korea has not yet allowed farmers to act independently of their work teams, a step China took as early as the late 1970s that raised productivity sharply. Chinese analysts anticipate that reforms will continue as long as they do not threaten central government control. Chinese analysts widely assert that the North Korean system remains stable and they are confident that it will remain so for at least several years absent the sudden death of Kim Jong Il or external interference aimed at destabilizing the regime. In the long run, however, sustainable development through economic reform remains an essential prerequisite for stability, and North Korea's ability to move down that path is not yet assured. There are numerous indicators that the Chinese examine to assess stability trends in North Korea. These indicators are grouped in the following manner: 1) factionalism in the regime and potential challenges to Kim Jong Il's leadership; 2) political controls and ideological education; 3) influences from the outside; 4) the general public's loyalty to the Kim family; 5) crimes and illicit activities; 6) the economy, food supply, and economic reform; and 7) Kim Jong Il's health and the leadership succession. Chinese analysts see few signs of immediate instability in any of these areas at present, but they worry that the potential for instability may grow. In the event of instability in North Korea, China's priority will be to prevent refugees from flooding across the border. If deemed necessary, PLA troops would be dispatched into North Korea. China's strong preference is to receive formal authorization and coordinate closely with the United Nations (UN) in such an endeavor. However, if the international community did not react in a timely manner as internal order in North Korea deteriorated rapidly, China would seek to take the initiative in restoring stability. Contingency plans are in place for the PLA to perform at least three possible missions in the DPRK: 1) humanitarian missions such as assisting refugees or providing help after a natural disaster; 2) peacekeeping or “order keeping” missions such as serving as civil police; and 3) “environmental control” missions to clean up nuclear contamination resulting from a strike on North Korean nuclear facilities near the Sino-DPRK border and secure “loose nukes” and fissile material. There is apparent new willingness among Chinese institute analysts and PLA researchers to discuss the warning signs of instability in North Korea and how China might respond if the situation gets out of control and threatens Chinese security. Some Chinese experts say explicitly that they favor holding a discussion on stability in North Korea in official channels with the United States, including possible joint responses in support of common objectives such as securing nuclear weapons and fissile material. Other analysts maintain that such discussions are premature.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Regional Cooperation, and United Nations
Political Geography:
United States, China, Beijing, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea