Search

Begin New Search Topic United Nations Author Ryan Liss

1. Historical Examples of Unauthorized Humanitarian Intervention

Author:
Julia Brower, Ryan Liss, Tina Thomas, and Jacob Victor
Publication Date:
08-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Global Legal Challenges, Yale Law School
Abstract:
In December 1971, India sent troops into what was at the time known as East Pakistan. For the preceding months, Pakistani forces had been engaged in a violent conflict with a Bangladeshi separatist group.1 The Indo-Pakistani conflict was sparked by the Bangladesh Liberation War, a conflict between the West Pakistanis and the East Pakistanis, who were mainly of Bengali ethnicity.2 In the 1970 Pakistani election, the East Pakistani Awami League secured a simple majority in the Parliament of Pakistan.3 The West Pakistani leadership, however, stalled in relinquishing power.4 The Awami League declared the independence of East Pakistan as Bangla Desh on April 10, 1971.5 West Pakistani forces engaged in violent attempts to end the insurrection, committing widespread atrocities against the Bengali population of East Pakistan.6 Over a million Bengalis were killed.7 And, an estimated 8 million refugees fled to India.8 In December 1971, fighting broke out between India and Pakistan when India sent armed troops into East Pakistan.9 U.N. debates over the conflict took on a distinctly Cold War tone, stalling any action on the part of the United Nations.10 The military conflict between India and Pakistan lasted only thirteen days before Pakistani forces in East Pakistan surrendered.11 By January 4, 1972, the Secretary-General was able to report that the cease-fire between the two states “appeared relatively stable.”12 As a result of India’s intervention, East Pakistan ultimately achieved independence and became modern-day Bangladesh.13 In justifying its unauthorized intervention, India framed the issue as mainly one of self-defense and regional security. Citing the millions of refugees flowing from East Pakistan into India, the Prime Minister of India wrote to the U.N. Secretary General that Pakistan’s actions “pose a serious threat to our security” and that the resulting military action taken against Pakistan was “entirely defensive.”14 The Indian Ambassador to the Security Council argued that Pakistan had committed a crime of “refugee aggression,” that is, its aggression came from the strain its actions placed on India’s social structure and finances.15 India also argued that it had a right to intervene in light of the humanitarian catastrophe engulfing East Pakistan. The Indian Ambassador to the U.N. claimed that India had “absolutely nothing but the purest of . . . intentions: to rescue the people of East Bengal from what they are suffering.”16 India also maintained that its authority to intervene to end the humanitarian catastrophe was based in part on the consent of Bangladeshi people, even though Bangladesh was not yet an independent state.17 In making this argument, India argued that the rule of self-determination might be applied to the Bengali people.18
Topic:
United Nations, Military Strategy, Legal Theory, and Humanitarian Intervention
Political Geography:
Pakistan, India, and Asia

2. UNCLOS Dispute Settlement in Context: The United States’ Record in International Arbitration Proceedings

Author:
Julia Brower, Christina Koningisor, Ryan Liss, and Michael Shih
Publication Date:
12-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Global Legal Challenges, Yale Law School
Abstract:
The United Nations Convention for the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) establishes a compulsory dispute settlement regime for resolving disagreements between member states. Critics of the Convention have argued that the mandatory dispute resolution provisions force member states to cede too much control over the dispute resolution process to an international body. They have also argued that the dispute resolution process is biased against the United States, and that the United States tends to fare poorly in international arbitration proceedings. This report addresses the first criticism by examining possible exceptions to mandatory dispute resolution provisions. At least one Annex VII tribunal has interpreted Article 281(1) of UNCLOS to permit states to contract around the mandatory dispute resolution provision through regional agreements. However, a subsequent tribunal applied a much more constrained interpretation of the Article 281 exception. Ultimately, the impact of this exception will depend upon which interpretation is applied. The report also examines the scope of the Article 298(1)(c) exception, which exempts from binding resolution “disputes in respect of which the Security Council . . . is exercising the functions assigned to it by the [U.N.] Charter.” This exception is not confined to specific subject matters, but it is limited by the procedural difficulties of adding or removing an item from the Security Council’s agenda, as well as by the political costs that such an effort entails. Finally, the report notes that UNCLOS’s compulsory dispute settlement regime is not accompanied by similarly robust enforcement provisions. The report addresses the second criticism by examining the United States’ record in arbitration proceedings under eighteen multilateral treaties containing mandatory dispute resolution provisions, as well as a series of bilateral aviation agreements that provide for mandatory dispute resolution. Fifteen of those agreements have yielded very few readily identifiable arbitration proceedings involving the United States.
Topic:
International Law, United Nations, Legal Theory, and Arbitration
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America