Search

Begin New Search Topic Financial Crisis Author Paul De Grauwe

1. What Germany should fear most is its own fear: An analysis of Target2 and current account imbalances

Author:
Paul De Grauwe and Yuemei Ji
Publication Date:
09-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for European Policy Studies
Abstract:
This paper analyzes two claims that have been made about the Target2 payment system. The first one is that this system has been used to support unsustainable current account deficits of Southern European countries. The second one is that the large accumulation of Target2 claims by the Bundesbank represents an unacceptable risk for Germany if the eurozone were to break up. We argue that these claims are unfounded. They also lead to unnecessary fears in Germany that make a solution of the eurozone crisis more difficult. Ultimately, this fear increases the risk of a break-up of the eurozone. Or to paraphrase Franklin Roosevelt, what Germany should fear most is simply its own fear.
Topic:
Economics, Regional Cooperation, Monetary Policy, and Financial Crisis
Political Geography:
Europe and Germany

2. Mispricing of Sovereign Risk and Multiple Equilibria in the Eurozone

Author:
Paul De Grauwe and Yuemei Ji
Publication Date:
01-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for European Policy Studies
Abstract:
This paper finds evidence that a significant part of the surge in the spreads of the PIGS countries (Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain) in the eurozone during 2010-11 was disconnected from underlying increases in the debt-to-GDP ratios, and was the result of negative market sentiments that became very strong since the end of 2010.
Topic:
Economics, Monetary Policy, and Financial Crisis
Political Geography:
Europe, Greece, Spain, Portugal, and Ireland

3. In Search of Symmetry in the Eurozone

Author:
Paul De Grauwe
Publication Date:
05-2012
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Centre for European Policy Studies
Abstract:
One of the major problems of the eurozone is the divergence of the competitive positions that have built up since the early 2000s. This divergence has led to major imbalances in the eurozone where the countries that have seen their competitive positions deteriorate (mainly the so - called ' PIIGS ' – Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain ) have accumulated large current account deficits and thus external indebtedness, matched by current account surpluses of the countries that have improved their competitive positions (mainly Germany).
Topic:
Economics, Markets, Regional Cooperation, Global Recession, and Financial Crisis
Political Geography:
Europe, Greece, Germany, Spain, Italy, Portugal, and Ireland

4. Self-Fulfilling Crises in the Eurozone: An Empirical Test

Author:
Paul De Grauwe and Yuemei Ji
Publication Date:
06-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for European Policy Studies
Abstract:
This paper tests the hypothesis that government bond markets in the eurozone are more fragile and more susceptible to self-fulfilling liquidity crises than in stand-alone countries. We find evidence that a significant part of the surge in the spreads of the PIGS countries (Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain) in the eurozone during 2010-11 was disconnected from underlying increases in the debt-to-GDP ratios and fiscal space variables, and was the result of negative self-fulfilling market sentiments that became very strong since the end of 2010. We argue that this can drive member countries of the eurozone into bad equilibria.
Topic:
Economics, Monetary Policy, and Financial Crisis
Political Geography:
Europe

5. Governance of a Fragile Eurozone

Author:
Paul De Grauwe
Publication Date:
05-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for European Policy Studies
Abstract:
When entering a monetary union, member countries change the nature of their sovereign debt in a fundamental way, i.e. they cease to have control over the currency in which their debt is issued. As a result, financial markets can force these countries' sovereigns into default. In this sense, the status of member countries of a monetary union is downgraded to that of an emerging economy. This makes the monetary union fragile and vulnerable to changing market sentiments. It also makes it possible that self-fulfilling multiple equilibria arise.
Topic:
Debt, Markets, Regional Cooperation, and Financial Crisis
Political Geography:
Europe

6. Only a more active ECB can solve the euro crisis

Author:
Paul De Grauwe
Publication Date:
08-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Centre for European Policy Studies
Abstract:
The biggest threat for the eurozone is the contagion of the Greek sovereign debt crisis to the rest of the system. If the Greek crisis could be isolated, it would barely matter for the eurozone as a whole. After countless crisis meetings of the European Council, however, it has to be admitted that the European leaders have failed to isolate the Greek crisis and to stop the forces of contagion. The latest meeting of the heads of state or government of the euro area on July 21st is no exception.
Topic:
Debt, Markets, Regional Cooperation, and Financial Crisis
Political Geography:
Europe

7. The Banking Crisis: Causes, Consequences and Remedies

Author:
Paul De Grauwe
Publication Date:
11-2008
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Centre for European Policy Studies
Abstract:
The paradigm that financial markets are efficient has provided the intellectual backbone for the deregulation of the banking sector since the 1980s, allowing universal banks to be fully involved in financial markets, and investment banks to become involved in traditional banking. There is now overwhelming evidence that financial markets are not efficient. Bubbles and crashes are an endemic feature of financial markets in capitalist countries. Thus, as a result of deregulation, the balance sheets of universal banks became fully exposed to these bubbles and crashes, undermining the stability of the banking system. The Basel approach to stabilise the banking system has as an implicit assumption that financial markets are efficient, allowing us to model the risks universal banks take and to compute the required capital ratios that will minimise this risk. I argue that this approach is unworkable because the risks that matter for universal banks are tail risks, associated with bubbles and crashes. These cannot be quantified. As a result, there is only one way out, and that is to return to narrow banking, a model that emerged after the previous large-scale banking crisis of the 1930s but that was discarded during the 1980s and 1990s under the influence of the efficient market paradigm.
Topic:
Economics, Markets, and Financial Crisis
Political Geography:
Europe