Search

Begin New Search Publishing Institution Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM) Author Nilsu Gören

1. The NATO/US-Turkey-Russia Strategic Triangle: Challenges Ahead

Author:
Nilsu Gören
Publication Date:
01-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:
Turkey and NATO are experiencing a mutual crisis of confidence. Turkish policy makers lack confidence in NATO guarantees and fear abandonment—both prominent historical concerns. At the same time, policy makers within the alliance have begun to question Turkey’s intentions and future strategic orientation, and how well they align with NATO’s. One important factor contributing to this mistrust is Turkey’s recent dealings with Russia. Turkey is trying to contain Russian military expansion in the Black Sea and Syria by calling for a stronger NATO presence at the same time that is seeking to diversify its security strategy by improving ties with Russia and reducing its dependence on the United States and NATO. Turkey’s contradictory stance is no more apparent than in its evolving policy regarding the Syrian civil war. The threat topography of NATO’s southern flank reflects a complex web of state and non-state actors involved in asymmetric warfare. The Turkish shoot down of a Russian jet in 2015 highlighted the complexity and helped to precipitate military dialogue between NATO and Russia in Syria. Since then, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan seem to have overcome their strategic differences in their preferred outcome for Syria and have de-escalated the tensions following several rounds of peace talks headed by Russia, Turkey, and Iran and involving some, but not all, factions involved in the Syrian conflict. Yet several important questions about Turkish security policy and its impact on Turkish-U.S./NATO relations remain. What are the security implications of Turkey’s military actions on the southern flank? How is the continued fight against extremism in the region, including ISIS, likely to affect relations? And how should the West respond to Turkey’s security ties with Russia, including the Russian sale of advance military equipment to Ankara? The answers to all of these questions depend in part on whether Turkey’s behavior with Russia in Syria is a tactical move or a strategic shift away from NATO. Understanding these dynamics is key to devising policies and actions to minimize security risks between the U.S., NATO, and Russia. This paper argues that Turkey has economic and political interests in developing closer relations with Russia, but that these interests are not as strong as Turkey’s strategic alliance with the West, and NATO in particular. Turkish policymakers, who lack confidence in NATO, are pursuing short-term security interests in Syria as a way to leverage Western acquiescence to their interests regarding the Kurdish populations in Syria and Iraq. These objectives, however, are not aligned with Russia’s security objectives and do not add up to a sustainable long-term regional security strategy. In the short term, Turkey’s contradictory approaches to relations with NATO and Russia are likely to lead to ambiguity and confusion in the regional security architecture, with Syria being the most visible example of this disarray. To combat this approach, U.S. leadership and NATO should work to convince Turkey that the alliance takes Turkish security concerns in Syria seriously and to minimize the risks of Turkey’s acts as a spoiler in the region. For instance, addressing Turkish concerns over Washington’s arming of the Kurdish rebel group, the YPG, in northern Syria, will go a long way to resolving the key issue motivating Turkey’s decision to partner with Russia.
Topic:
NATO, National Security, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, Turkey, and Syria

2. Turkey’s Turbulent Journey with the EPAA and Quest for a National System

Author:
Nilsu Gören
Publication Date:
01-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:
This paper provides an overview of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) missile defense debate from a Turkish perspective. While Turkey participates in the EPAA by hosting a U.S. early-warning radar in Kurecik, Malatya, its political and military concerns with NATO guarantees have led to the AKP government's quest for a national long-range air and missile defense system. However, Turkish decision makers' insistence on technology transfer shows that the Turkish debate is not adequately informed by the lessons learned from the EPAA, particularly the technical and financial challenges of missile defense.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:
United States, Europe, Turkey, and Asia

3. International Cybersecurity Information Sharing Agreements

Author:
Nilsu Gören and Theresa Hitchens
Publication Date:
10-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:
Cybersecurity transcends national boundaries in many ways: The internet’s technical infrastructure is global in scope; threat actors based in one country can disguise their identities by taking control of computers in other countries; global businesses sell software, hardware, and security services that may introduce or combat vulnerabilities; and the consequences from a disruptive attack can spread far beyond the initial victim. Even the most cyber-savvy country cannot protect itself completely unless it wants to disconnect from the global internet and strictly limit who can use information technology and for what purposes inside its own borders. And this course of action is infeasible because it would result in dire consequences for the national economy, military, and all other systems that depend on advanced information technology. International cooperation to improve cybersecurity is a much more realistic and viable path. Information sharing is the most commonly promoted type of international cooperation, but very little is known about what type of cybersecurity information is currently being shared with whom, for what purposes, and under what conditions. As a first step towards answering this larger question, the International Cybersecurity Information Sharing Project undertook to survey, catalog, and analyze publicly available government-to-government cybersecurity-related sharing agreements to determine what types of information various governments have committed to share, and to identify gaps in information sharing. The ultimate aim of the larger project is to assess how multilateral cybersecurity sharing practices can be encouraged and improved in order to strengthen global cybersecurity. The project team started from the assumption that formal cyber sharing agreements and memoranda of understanding (MoU) are an important part of the foundation for the development of norms on cyber cooperation. Over the past several years, various international fora have reiterated that sharing information about cyber threats and vulnerabilities, national approaches to cyber protection, best practices, incidents of concern, and response mechanisms could increase mutual cybersecurity while reducing risks of misunderstandings and conflict. Different types of information sharing can be used to improve cybersecurity in various ways. By sharing threat perceptions and national policies, states can better understand each other’s concerns and priorities. By conducting multilateral exercises and sharing best practices for protection of networks, critical infrastructure, and software/hardware, states can help each other ensure safe data transfer across borders. Cooperation to build capacity in states with weaker infrastructure for managing the use of information and communications technologies (ICTs) can help in identifying threats and responding to crises. This research found that cybersecurity information agreements are more numerous, but less specific than anticipated. The project documented and analyzed 196 agreements involving 116 different countries and 2,349 signatures. Extensive signature of agreements and associated commentary shows widespread accord on the principle that information sharing is necessary. However, it is unclear how much and what type of information sharing occurs in practice. Few agreement texts are public, and those that are often use vague language. And, despite the potential benefits of sharing more cyber-security information, many disincentives and logistical barriers remain. This project collected as much information as possible, not only about what states have agreed to do, but also what they actually do, and why they make those choices. After a brief summary of the approach taken and some limitations encountered, the study provides summary statistics about international cyber information sharing agreements. It then looks in more detail at sharing agreements and behaviors by some of the most active and/or important countries in regional organizations, and in multilateral fora that have focused on this topic. A summary of key findings, conclusions, and next steps is followed by annexes with more methodological information and texts for some of the most important agreements.
Topic:
Science and Technology and Cybersecurity
Political Geography:
Global Focus

4. Turkey's Nonnuclear Decisions on Nuclear Issues

Author:
Nilsu Gören
Publication Date:
09-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:
Beyond its history of military coups and incomplete civilian oversight of its armed forces, Turkey has struggled with defining an independent international security policy. Its perception of U.S./NATO security guarantees has historically shaped its decision to either prioritize collective defense or seek solutions in indigenous or regional security arrangements. As part its domestic political transformation during the past decade, Turkey has decreased its reliance on NATO, leading to questions among observers about Turkey’s future strategic orientation away from the West. This brief argues that Turkey’s strategic objectives have indeed evolved in the recent past and that this is apparent in the mismatch between the country’s general security policy objectives and the outcomes of its policies on nuclear issues. At present, nuclear weapons do not serve a compelling function in Turkish policymakers’ thinking, beyond the country’s commitment to the status quo in NATO nuclear policy. Since nuclear deterrence is secondary to conventional deterrence, Turkey’s policies on nuclear issues are predominantly shaped by non-nuclear considerations. These decisions, in the absence of careful consideration of nuclear weapons, increase nuclear risks. This brief explores how Turkey could formulate more effective and lower risk nuclear policies than it currently does by employing cooperative security measures and how such a reorientation could strengthen to its overall security policy in the process.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Nuclear Weapons, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
United States, Europe, Turkey, and Asia