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1. WMD Capabilities Enabled by Additive Manufacturing

Author:
Christopher Daase, Grant Christopher, Ferenc Dalnkoki-Veress, Miles A. Pomper, and Robert Shaw
Publication Date:
09-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
Additive Manufacturing (AM)—also known as 3D printing—is a rapidly emerging technology with growing relevance for the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery. The rapid pace of AM development makes it increasingly difficult to keep track of AM’s potential effect on proliferation pathways. So far, studies addressing the issue have mainly focused on nuclear proliferation. This has created two major problems for policy makers. First, by the time governments are able to respond to specific AM-induced proliferation risks, those risks might already have been overtaken by newer developments. Second, by focusing on nuclear proliferation pathways, governments can fail to recognize AM’s relevance to other proliferation modalities, including chemical and biological weapons and, especially, the means of WMD delivery. This report addresses these shortcomings. As an innovative pilot study, this report provides a more comprehensive approach toward explaining latest AM developments and mitigating the risk of WMD proliferation. Effectively, this report is the first beyond-the-horizon assessment of the impact of AM developments not only on potential nuclear-weapons programs, but also on other WMD modalities and their delivery systems. For this project, Negotiation Design & Strategy (NDS) assembled an expert team of well-known AM and nonproliferation specialists from Germany, the United States, and the United Kingdom—three countries at the forefront of AM development. The research team’s contextual knowledge of AM facilities in Europe and the United States allowed for in-depth, on-the-ground interviews with US and European experts from the private sector, national laboratories, and research institutions. Interviews were augmented with an analytical deep dive into the latest AM developments, based on open-source technical literature, including academic papers and patents. The final report allows us to better forecast technological developments and raise awareness for the critical role that AM plays in international security. This report also demonstrates the importance of emerging technologies in the nonproliferation field and underscores the need for further research of this kind. Studies such as this are crucial to inform the broader examination of the relationship between technology and international security.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, Manufacturing, and Emerging Technology
Political Geography:
Global Focus

2. Improving the Security of All Nuclear Materials

Author:
Mark Fitzpatrick, Elena Sokova, Miles A. Pomper, Laura Rockwood, Ferenc Dalnkoki-Veress, and Matthew Cottee
Publication Date:
09-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
About four-fifths of the weapons-usable nuclear materials in the world are in non-civilian programmes. This means not only as the explosive core in active or reserve nuclear weapons, but also as fuel in naval and military research reactors, highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium at production sites, in storage, or declared excess to military uses, but not yet transferred to other programmes or eliminated. Yet coordinated global efforts to enhance the security of nuclear materials have been almost exclusively concentrated on the estimated 17% of such nuclear materials in the civilian sector. Ideally, all HEU and plutonium of the same grade should have at least the same level of adequate security regardless of the possessor or purpose, since the materials pose the same threat. In practice, however, the security of materials can vary depending on whether they are used in the civilian or military sectors. The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (CPPNMNF – as the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material was renamed after the 2005 amendment came into force in May 2016), as well as International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) security guidelines such as INFCIRC/225/Rev.5, describe how civilian materials should be secured. No such explicit guidelines exist on how to secure materials outside of the civilian sector. Nor is there comprehensive public knowledge about the state of security of such materials in all countries with nuclear weapons programmes. It has often been asserted that nuclear materials in non-civilian use are well protected because they are under military control. However, the number of troubling security breaches involving nuclear material in military use, as well as some examples involving civilian nuclear facilities, belies this casual assumption, underscoring why the world should not simply accept the unsubstantiated ‘solemn word’ of authorities that security is as tight as needed. The list of incidents includes insider threats, peaceful incursions for demonstration purposes, theft, armed attack, and, most recently, over-flights by drones and computer hacking. Our report includes a number of examples of incidents at civilian facilities as well because they demonstrate areas of vulnerability that may also apply to the noncivilian sector. The record offers a compelling case for why security must be enhanced for all nuclear material.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Military Affairs, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
Global Focus

3. Mind the Gap: Regimes & Strengthening Radiological Security

Author:
Miles A. Pomper
Publication Date:
08-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
According to a new paper from CNS Senior Research Associate Miles A. Pomper, inadequate liability and insurance regimes mean that users of high-risk radiological sources have insufficient incentive to protect those sources from terrorists or substitute less risky alternatives. Such sources are used in medicine, oil and gas exploration, and industry, among other fields, and can be used in “dirty bombs” or other forms of radiological terrorism. Since the 9/11 attacks, governments, including the United States, have taken it upon themselves to institute emergency measures to improve source security, often using public funds. However, these measures are less than optimal and are expected to take many more decades. Moreover, even the United States—the lead country in spending on these efforts—routinely sacrifices radiological security to other budget priorities. Pomper therefore recommends two potential options to improve liability and insurance regimes governing radiological sources in order to incentivize users to reduce the risk of radiological terrorism.
Topic:
Security, Terrorism, Budget, Radiological Weapons, and Medicine
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

4. Reducing and Regulating Tactical (Nonstrategic) Nuclear Weapons in Europe

Author:
Nikolai Sokov, Miles A. Pomper, and William Potter
Publication Date:
12-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
Control of tractical nuclear weapons (TNW) has remained an elusive goal since the early 1990s when the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia adopted a set of unilateral parallel political obligations to reduce and store at central locations the larger part of their TNW forces. Efforts by the international community to nudge the two countries to give these unilateral statements a legally binding, verifiable character did not succeed, and one can point to little headway with respect TNW arms control in the intervening 18years.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, and Soviet Union

5. Four Emerging Issues in Arms Control, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation: Opportunities for German Leadership

Author:
Nikolai Sokov, Dennis M. Gormley, Miles A. Pomper, Patricia M. Lewis, Lawrence Scheinman, Stephen Schwartz, and Leonard S. Spector
Publication Date:
06-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
In late April 2009, the Policy Planning Staff of the Foreign Ministry of the Federal Republic of Germany requested that the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) undertake studies on four emerging issues in the fields of arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation, to be completed by June 15, 2009. The four issues were: The need to address the interrelationship between nuclear and conventional arms reduction, if the United States wants to entice others to go along the path to Global Zero. The world after drastic nuclear arms reductions, including the fear of U.S. conventional superiority/global strike capabilities;  The need (and promising areas) to make (nuclear) arms control and disarmament a strong component of NATO's new strategic concept;  Missile Defense, also covering a possible threat from others than Iran and the need to bring missile defense into the NATO-Russia Council; and Substrategic nuclear weapons, with a description of a way to achieve mutual transparency, reduction, and elimination in Europe.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Germany