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Begin New Search Topic Corruption Author Matthias Krönke

1. Law enforcers or law breakers?

Author:
Matthias Krönke, Thomas Isbell, and Ronald Makanga Kakumba
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
In late 2020, Nigerians gripped the world with massive protests against police brutality and impunity, focusing on the country’s Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS) (Al Jazeera, 2020; George, 2020). Three years after pictures of the #EndSARS demonstrations went viral and the SARS unit was disbanded, at least 15 protesters remain in arbitrary detention, and reports of police abuses continue unabated (Agboga, 2021; Amnesty International, 2021, 2023a; Uwazuruike, 2021). Elsewhere in Africa, and in other parts of the world, the media frequently report on unprofessional behaviour, selective enforcement of the law, unlawful arrests, corruption, use of excessive force, and other human-rights abuses by the police (New York Times, 2022). These violations are not limited to suspected criminals and public protests against the police, as in the case of #EndSARS, but also occur during pivotal moments of democratic accountability (e.g. elections), health emergencies (e.g. COVID-19), and routine citizen police encounters (e.g. traffic stops). For example, recent elections in Zimbabwe (2023), Uganda (2021), and Tanzania (2020) were marred by police repression and brutality targeting opposition politicians and their supporters (Reuters, 2023; Human Rights Watch, 2023a; Kakumba, 2022; Salih & Burke, 2020). During the 2021 election campaign in Uganda, security forces killed at least 54 people (Amnesty International, 2020).
Topic:
Corruption, Public Opinion, Professionalism, Polls, and Police Brutality
Political Geography:
Africa

2. Value for money?

Author:
Ronald Makanga Kakumba and Matthias Krönke
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
Governments rely on tax revenue to finance investments in human capital, infrastructure, and public services for their citizens. The quality of government services and a country’s development can be jeopardized if taxes are not collected, are squandered, or are misappropriated by the government. According to statistics from the Uganda Revenue Authority (URA), about 2.6 million Ugandans were registered taxpayers as of September 2022, but only about 1 million Ugandans are actively paying taxes (Kayiwa, 2022; Oketch, 2021). Analysts attribute the low tax-revenue collections to inadequate administrative capacity, weak checks and balances, and a lack of social norms for tax compliance, among other factors (Lakuma & Lwanga, 2017). Even so, during the 2021/2022 financial year, the URA collected 21.7 trillion Ugandan shillings (UGX) (USD 5.9 billion), its highest-ever revenue collection, reflecting a 12% increase over the previous year. This amount fell just short of the target of UGX 22.4 trillion (Wanyenze, 2022). However, there is little cause to celebrate, for several reasons.
Topic:
Corruption, Public Opinion, Tax Systems, and Revenue
Political Geography:
Uganda and Africa

3. Brutality and corruption undermine trust in Uganda’s police: Can damage be undone?

Author:
Ronald Makanga Kakumba and Matthias Krönke
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
The police are responsible for enforcing the law, preventing crime, maintaining public order and security, and protecting people’s lives and property. Yet Uganda’s police have often been criticized for brutality meted out against the very citizens meant to be under their protection. Since 2008, more than 100 civilians have reportedly been killed by Ugandan security officers, while many more have suffered injury, harassment, and abuse, often during protests and recently during aggressive enforcement of COVID-19 restrictions (Taylor, 2021; Human Rights Watch, 2011, 2021, 2022; Guardian, 2021; 2022). Uganda’s national media also continues to report countless cases of repression by the police, particularly against journalists, political activists, and political opponents. Yet accused officers regularly go unpunished; critics contend that laws and provisions regarding the use of force by police officers in Uganda are lax and protect the police (Kiconco, 2018; The Law on Police Use of Force, 2022), and that internal accountability mechanisms such as the police disciplinary courts, regional police courts, and police council have fallen short of their intended objectives (Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, 2006)
Topic:
Corruption, Public Opinion, and Police Brutality
Political Geography:
Uganda and Africa

4. Unresponsive and corrupt? Ugandan MPs hold key to how citizens perceive them

Author:
Matthias Krönke and Ronald Makanga Kakumba
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
Uganda’s legislature is made up of 556 members of Parliament (MPs) who are meant to represent and serve their constituents and oversee the government’s actions. Since President Yoweri Museveni and the National Resistance Movement (NRM) party came to power in 1986 and appointed all members of Parliament, the country’s legislature has changed in several important ways (Kasfir & Twebaze, 2009). First, today all MPs are either directly elected via a first-past-the-post system or indirectly elected via special electoral colleges. Second, the number of parliamentarians has almost doubled over 25 years, from 295 in the 6th Parliament (1996-2001) to 556 in the current 11th Parliament (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 1996; Parliament of Uganda, 2022).1 This drastic increase can be attributed to the continued creation of new constituencies and the allocation of parliamentary seats for special-interest groups. Proponents of this development say it reflects citizens’ demands, but critics describe it as part of a political strategy to protect and grow the ruling party’s seat share in Parliament by increasing the number of constituencies in NRM strongholds (Nakatudde, 2020; Tumushabe & Gariyo, 2009). This debate has now entered a new phase with the recent ruling by the country’s Constitutional Court that Parliament and the Electoral Commission violated articles 51 and 63 of the Constitution by creating new constituencies that do not meet the population quota, based on data from the 2002 and 2014 census counts. The upshot of this ruling are proposals to downsize Uganda’s Parliament and redraw constituency boundaries (Barigaba, 2022). Third, the operating costs of the growing Parliament (MP and staff salaries, allowances, etc.) have increased drastically over the past two decades. Today Ugandan MPs’ salaries (35 million Uganda shillings, or about USD 9,700, per month) surpass those of most MPs elsewhere in Africa and in the European Union (BusinessTech, 2017; Olukya, 2021; Tumushabe & Gariyo, 2009). The cost of running Uganda’s 11th Parliament was expected to increase by more than 50 billion Ugandan shillings (USD 14.1 million), a substantial increase compared to the previous Parliament (Mufumba, 2021). Fourth, the share of MPs who return to Parliament after their first term in office continues to decrease. While about 50% of MPs did not return for a second term in the 6th (1996-2001) and 7th (2001-2006) Parliaments, this rate has increased to 53% (2006-2011), 55% (2011-2016), and 58% (2016-2021) in subsequent Parliaments. Most recently, of the 457 MPs in the 10th Parliament, 319 were not voted back to the 11th Parliament (2021-2026), while 31 did not contest or chose to run for other offices, and only 107 MPs returned (Kasfir & Twebaze, 2009; Forum for Women in Democracy, 2016; Independent, 2021). How do these changes affect 1) how citizens relate to their elected representatives and 2) how MPs address the needs of ordinary citizens? More broadly, are citizens being served by their MPs? To answer these questions, this policy paper begins by clarifying the foundations of the citizen-MP relationship and outlining the four key roles that MPs are generally expected to fulfil. The subsequent sections assess their performance in these roles against citizen expectations and other indicators. We find that Ugandans are becoming increasingly aware of their role in holding their MPs accountable. Most citizens are dissatisfied with how their MPs are doing their jobs, perceive them as corrupt, and say MPs don’t listen to constituents’ concerns. Residents of the Central region and Kampala are particularly critical of their MPs’ performance, probably due at least in part to high constituent-to-MP ratios in those areas. Citizens’ assessments of MP performance are associated with MPs’ perceived responsiveness and corruption as well as whether citizens have had contact with their MPs. In contrast, citizens’ demographic characteristics and views about democracy do not seem to drive their views of their elected representatives. There are two clear policy implications of these findings. First, at the institutional level, it is important to even out the citizen-to-MP ratios across the country. This is in line with the recent constitutional court ruling to base the creation of constituencies on census data. The second policy implication of our findings is that MPs have it in their own hands to change how citizens view their performance by improving on how they engage with them.
Topic:
Corruption, Politics, Governance, and Leadership
Political Geography:
Uganda and Africa

5. Bounded Autonomy: What Limits Zimbabweans’ Trust in their Courts and Electoral Commission?

Author:
Matthias Krönke
Publication Date:
12-2018
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
After the Constitutional Court upheld the election results of 30 July 2018, Zimbabwe’s leading opposition party ended its online public response with the following message to newly confirmed President Emmerson Mnangagwa: “You can rig the elections. You can capture ZEC [Zimbabwe Electoral Commission]. You can capture [the] judiciary. But you will never capture the people. Their will shall prevail. The people shall govern!” (Movement for Democratic Change, 2018). While some might dismiss it as partisan rhetoric, the MDC statement points to critical issues for Zimbabwe’s democracy – the autonomy, and perceived autonomy, of the country’s courts and electoral commission. This policy paper analyzes public trust in these two institutions. Though intended to act as independent custodians of the Constitution and the electoral process, both the judiciary and the electoral commission are frequently accused of being beholden to political leaders. This year’s election is not the first to be accompanied by allegations of vote rigging, intimidation, and politically tainted court decisions. Allegations of bias are frequently leveled against judges from the High Court and Supreme Court, even between election cycles. Yet previous analysis of Afrobarometer data has shown that Zimbabwe’s courts are among the most trusted on the continent (Logan, 2017). And trust in the ZEC has doubled since 2010. How do these seemingly contradictory views fit together? Our analysis of public opinion data suggests that citizens trust these two institutions within bounds. For court cases involving only ordinary citizens and technical electoral issues such as the rollout of the biometric voter registration (BVR), the judiciary and the ZEC enjoy substantial public confidence. But faced with politically sensitive issues, they no longer find broad popular support. Afrobarometer survey data show clear differences in trust levels among citizens over time and along party lines. Public confidence in the judiciary is heavily dependent on whether it is perceived to hold the president and the powerful elite that surrounds him to account. Similarly, trust in the electoral commission depends less on its ability to handle managerial tasks in preparation for Election Day and more on its ability to ensure an accurate count of ballots and the resolution of post-election conflicts.
Topic:
Corruption, Elections, Democracy, Courts, and Autonomy
Political Geography:
Africa and Zimbabwe