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Begin New Search Topic Economic Competition Author Matthias Bauer

1. Competitive Harmonisation: A Collaborative Framework for Intra-EU Reform and Competitiveness

Author:
Matthias Bauer
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
Persistent legal fragmentation, compounded by the EU’s 24 official languages, increases costs and legal uncertainty, deterring meaningful investments in innovation and preventing businesses from scaling across borders. Without bold, comprehensive legal reforms, Europe will fall further behind in global competition and major global technological developments. The EU’s incremental reform approach has failed to address the deep-rooted legal and institutional challenges threatening Europe’s economic future. Competitive Harmonisation offers a pragmatic yet visionary concept to overcome legal fragmentation, tackle the business scale gap, and unlock Europe’s vast economic potential. By embracing “collaborative governance” through coalitions of willing Member States, aligning with global standards, and prioritising innovation and technology diffusion, European governments can enhance the Single Market and restore Europe’s leadership in lawmaking and industrial competitiveness. Amid growing political risks, such as the threat of tariffs, the responsibility to act decisively rests squarely with Europe. By taking bold, pragmatic steps now, Europeans can not only resolve immediate challenges but also lay the groundwork for sustainable, long-term economic development.
Topic:
Markets, Reform, European Union, Regional Economy, and Economic Competition
Political Geography:
Europe

2. EU Export of Regulatory Overreach: The Case of the Digital Markets Act (DMA)

Author:
Matthias Bauer, Dyuti Pandya, and Vanika Sharma
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
The EU’s Digital Markets Act (DMA) exemplifies the “Brussels Effect,” extending the EU’s regulatory influence beyond its borders and shaping global digital competition policies. While intended to curb the market power of large technology platforms and promote fair competition, its broad, rigid, and pre-emptive approach risks stifling technological development, deterring investment, and creating legal uncertainty, particularly in emerging markets still building digital infrastructure and seeking to attract foreign investment. Large technology firms play a pivotal role in global economic development, driving innovation, infrastructure upgrading, and consumer welfare. However, increasing regulatory scrutiny, particularly under DMA-like frameworks, could inadvertently harm the very markets they help grow by imposing compliance burdens that hinder business expansion and technology diffusion. Countries with weaker institutions and regulatory capacity – such as India, Brazil, South Africa, and other emerging market and developing economies (EMDEs) like Indonesia – could face greater risks of regulatory capture, corruption, and enforcement challenges if they replicate the EU’s approach without adapting it to their economic realities (Section 2). A key concern with the DMA is the departure from traditional case-by-case enforcement in competition policy, instead relying on broad, pre-emptive obligations based on ambiguous concepts such as fairness and contestability. This shift reduces legal certainty, increases the risk of inconsistent enforcement, and may inhibit dynamic competition, which is essential for innovation-driven sectors like fintech, e-commerce, ICT, and edtech. By prioritising static over dynamic competition, the DMA could impede technological progress, limiting consumer choice and long-term economic benefits (Section 3). The global adoption of DMA-like regulations risks further regulatory fragmentation and may create unintended consequences, particularly in emerging economies where regulatory frameworks, institutional quality, and market structures differ significantly from the EU. Broad prohibitions on business practices, such as self-preferencing and data-sharing, could limit opportunities for local firms to scale internationally, weaken cybersecurity protections, and reduce incentives for large technology firms to invest in these regions (Section 4). To ensure proportionate and effective competition enforcement, governments outside the EU should prioritise regulatory flexibility and case-by-case assessments over broad, static restrictions. OECD best practices on competition policy emphasise clear objectives, legal certainty, and regulatory proportionality, ensuring that competition enforcement supports, rather than stifles, innovation and investment (Section 5). Moreover, the risks of corruption and regulatory overreach in developing countries make broad ex-ante regulations especially problematic. Excessive discretionary power granted to local authorities could increase the risk of politically motivated enforcement, deter foreign investment, and undermine long-term economic growth. A more effective approach would be to strengthen institutional frameworks, enhance transparency, and adopt supply-side policies that support technology neutrality, free trade, and economic freedom.
Topic:
Science and Technology, European Union, Regulation, Digital Markets Act (DMA), and Economic Competition
Political Geography:
Europe

3. Merger Policy, Competition and Innovation Leadership: Implications for the UK’s Investment Attractiveness

Author:
Matthias Bauer, Oscar du Roy, and Vanika Sharma
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
The UK’s competition regulator has adopted hard-sitting views in its assessment of transnational mergers and acquisitions. Since 2019, the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) has blocked a historic 59% of all mergers that were under investigation, which is double compared to the previous five years. With increased competence to set conduct requirements for large technology companies, aggressive enforcement by the CMA risks undermining Britain’s ambitions to become a leader in global trade, technology, and innovation.[1] Acquisitions in the technology sector have increasingly been scrutinised by competition authorities over the past decade, often based on the hypothesis that transactions involving large multinational companies tend to be anti-competitive. Authorities’ concerns are based on theories about post-acquisition market structures and the impacts of “killer acquisitions”. While their theories lack empirical justification, competition authorities have increasingly quoted them to assess cases through an ideological lens. Indeed, investigations into acquisitions show that competition authorities can come to markedly distinct conclusions when assessing the impacts on competition over time, especially in technology-intensive industries. The premise that acquisitions of small rivals by large tech companies inherently result in decreased competition lacks solid empirical evidence. Competition authorities often fail to adequately consider efficiency criteria and the resultant benefits for consumers. The proposed acquisition of Activision Blizzard, a video game maker, by Microsoft is a case in point. The UK CMA had initially found that the acquisition would reduce competition in gaming markets. EU and US competition regulators, by contrast, have cleared the transaction, highlighting the uncertain nature of merger review results for international transactions. Large multinational technology companies are major sources of innovation and productivity growth. The services they provide are increasingly pervasive across developed market economies, promising large productivity gains. Small, medium, and young companies in high-tech sectors are also important sources of innovation and productivity growth and, therefore, major targets for investment. Ideologically charged competition enforcement would have a negative impact on the UK’s investment attractiveness. The prospect of an innovative and commercially successful company being taken over by another company is an important precondition for investors to make early-stage and continued seed capital investments. Acquisitions also play an important role in driving investments in business growth and internationalisation. By contrast, there is no hard evidence to support the presumption that acquisitions by major tech companies result in decreased competition. A continuation of aggressive merger enforcement by the UK CMA would undermine investments in innovation-driven UK businesses and reduce access to funding for British venture capital-backed start-ups.
Topic:
Digital Economy, Leadership, Investment, Innovation, and Economic Competition
Political Geography:
United Kingdom and Europe

4. Strategic Autonomy and Long-term Innovation Competitiveness: On the Importance of Intellectual Property Rights for the Production of High-Value Medicines in the EU

Author:
Matthias Bauer
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
Europe’s political leaders have in recent months called for “European industrial autonomy”. Notions of dependency, sovereignty and resilience are now also referred to in policy proposals targeted at pharmaceutical companies, with “strategic autonomy” being the ultimate political ambition. The precise meaning of strategic autonomy in biopharmaceutical industries remains yet to be defined, although the current Pharmaceutical Strategy only refers to “open strategic autonomy” in the context of dependencies and supply chains. This is regrettable, as it does not take into account the importance of strategic research and innovation autonomy, allowing the EU to ensure a high degree of autonomy in innovative medicines and therapies. Current policy conceptions fail to account for businesses’ long-term international innovation competitiveness and Europe’s capability to attract investments in pharmaceutical research and cutting-edge production technologies. Present conceptions of strategic autonomy of Europe’s pharmaceutical industry disregard the fact that the EU is substantially lagging the USA and, increasingly, other parts of the word in pharmaceutical innovation. Clinical trials’ pipeline data shows that, in the future, EU Member States will very likely become increasingly dependent on innovative medicines that are temporarily protected by patents and market exclusivity rights held by non-EU rights holders in many therapeutic areas. This gives some urgency to Commission President von der Leyen ensuring that the European industry remains an “innovator” and “world leader” (Mission Letter by Commission President von der Leyen to Commissioner Kyriakides). The European Commission’s current understanding of sovereignty in pharmaceutical industries centres around one core theme: the reduction of dependencies from pharmaceutical suppliers outside the EU. At the same time, in an effort to achieve equitable access to affordable medicines and to foster research into unmet medical needs, it considers changes in the incentive structure for research in medicines for children and rare diseases, and new obligations for companies to achieve a more equitable access to medicines across Member States. While these objectives are generally merited, the Commission has established a narrow perspective about a concept that is aiming for ambitious long-term achievements for Europe’s pharmaceutical industry. The industry’s future innovation competitiveness and the capacity to develop and produce high value-added medicines, which should be at the core of any concept of long-term autonomy, have largely been ignored.
Topic:
Intellectual Property/Copyright, European Union, Innovation, Medicine, Strategic Autonomy, and Economic Competition
Political Geography:
Europe