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11. Future-proofing the EU’s Investment Attractiveness: A Bold Reform Agenda for Competition Enforcement, Taxation and Digital Policy

Author:
Matthias Bauer, Dyuti Pandya, and Oscar du Roy
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
Reducing the deterrent effects from EU and Member State laws in three key cross-sector policy areas – competition policy, business taxes and VAT, and digital policies – could significantly enhance the business environment within the Single Market and boost the EU’s attractiveness to both domestic and foreign investors. The EU’s future competitiveness is at risk due to a significant disparity in investments, particularly in technological innovation, compared to the US. Despite having a larger population and labour force, the EU lags behind in large business activities, with US firms consistently outspending their European counterparts in key tech-intensive sectors such as software, computer services, pharmaceuticals, and biotechnology. Moreover, China and other emerging nations are rapidly catching up, dramatically diminishing the EU’s relative economic and political influence on the global stage. The urgency for the EU to bridge these gaps is more critical than ever (Section 2). The EU’s profound investment gap highlights a systemic advantage for the US in fostering innovation and economic growth. The EU’s regulatory complexity, largely driven by legal fragmentation in horizontal policies, further exacerbate the situation, deterring cross-border activities reducing the region’s attractiveness to global investors (Section 3).
Topic:
Markets, Reform, European Union, Digital Economy, Investment, and Digital Policy
Political Geography:
Europe

12. Enhancing Technology Diffusion in the EU amid Tough Structural Challenges

Author:
Matthias Bauer, Elena Sisto, and Oscar du Roy
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
To remain globally competitive, the EU must empower firms to adopt the best technology solutions available on global markets. Building on a strong tradition of innovation, the EU relies on corporations across industries to drive the diffusion of technology through the commercialisation of technological innovations. Technology diffusion is crucial for embedding new technologies into society and is essential for sustaining industrial competitiveness. EU and Member State governments must prioritise enhancing the EU’s “diffusion capacity” – the ability to effectively spread and adopt innovations across Member States.
Topic:
Science and Technology, European Union, Digital Economy, and Services
Political Geography:
Europe

13. Shared Liability: The European Parliament’s Misstep in Fighting Financial Fraud

Author:
Matthias Bauer, Andrea Dugo, and Dyuti Pandya
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
The rise in financial fraud has prompted regulatory proposals under the Payment Services Regulation in the form of a shared liability model provisioned under Article 59. The potential proposal by the European Parliament could now extend liability beyond Payment Service Providers to Electronic Communications Service Providers and online platforms. While the intent to address fraud is commendable, this model misallocates responsibilities by requiring non-financial entities to oversee fraudulent activities, despite their lack of visibility and technical control over financial transactions. Extending liability to non-financial entities risks undermining consumer vigilance and diluting payment services providers’ efforts to maintain fraud awareness. A shared liability regime covering non-financial entities would also disproportionately burden smaller “digital” firms, leading to legal uncertainties, costly legal disputes, and market exits. This would not only drive market concentration and reduce competition in digital services but also undermine EU and Member State efforts to support Europe’s lagging digital start-ups and scale-ups. The resulting harm to innovation and entrepreneurship would be a significant setback to the EU’s broader digital ambitions.
Topic:
European Union, Regulation, Services, European Parliament, Fraud, and Liability
Political Geography:
Europe

14. Building Resilience? The Cybersecurity, Economic & Trade Impacts of Cloud Immunity Requirements

Author:
Matthias Bauer
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
EU Member States should call on the EU’s Cybersecurity Agency (ENISA) and the European Commission to abandon immunity requirements in the proposed EU Cloud Certification Scheme (EUCS). With immunity requirements in the EUCS, the EU risks opening a Pandora’s box, paving the way for data localisation, foreign ownership restrictions, and local establishment requirements in digital industries globally leading to rising trade tensions. ENISA’s current proposal could increase policymakers’ appetite for data localisation in the EU. It would empower the European Commission and Member State authorities to exclude foreign businesses from domestic cloud services markets and set a dangerous precedent for any data-intensive sector. The list of “sectors of high criticality” could be logically extended to both existing services (e.g., financial services) and to new technologies and business models, such as IoT in the energy and healthcare sectors, and autonomous driving in the transport sector. Non-EU jurisdictions would be pressured to respond in kind. EUCS immunity requirements would increase cloud adopters’ exposure to cybersecurity risks. Data localisation often creates obstacles to an integrated management approach towards cybersecurity risks. Country of headquarter and foreign ownership restrictions in the proposed EUCS risk removing global frontier cybersecurity technologies from Member State markets. Excluding these and other EU and non-EU companies from EU Member States could result in a long-lasting security deficit of EU cloud adopters vis-à-vis organisations that are still able to use reliable and often best-practice cloud services offered by providers from outside EU Member States. Immunity requirements in the EUCS are discriminatory by design. They could provoke retaliatory measures by EU trading partners, either unilaterally or through WTO or bilateral FTA (e.g., UK-EU) Dispute Settlement. Local establishment requirements and foreign ownership restrictions would by design discriminate against foreign cloud providers. US-headquartered companies, which currently serve more than 75% of the EU market, would be most affected by EU immunity requirements.[1] Depending on US preferences and the scope of the proposed EUCS, the EU could be subject to retaliatory tariffs of up to USD 12 billion worth of EU goods exports or equivalent restrictions for EU services exports to the US. Other governments could lodge complaints via the WTO as well (e.g., Singapore, Japan, Canada and others, where cloud development is advancing rapidly). EU suppliers are currently in no position to manage a broad-based transition to cloud, and thus such requirements would delay significant efficiency and security gains that current foreign suppliers could offer. A blanket exclusion of non-EU cloud vendors would also likely undermine Europe’s objective to achieve a 75% cloud adoption rate for EU enterprises. Sensitive European businesses and public sector organisations would have to delay migration and make do with legacy systems for a very long time. Contrary to large countries, these negative impacts would be much more pronounced for smaller EU Member States, which lack the presence of large domestic incumbents and generally rely much more on an open international trading regime for digital services. ENISA’s cloud certification scheme should be limited to technical and transparency requirements. Immunity requirements for non-personal data should be addressed in bilateral initiatives such as the EU-US Trade and Technology Council (TTC) or agreements requiring a company that sought to offer services of the highest level of sensitivity to be headquartered in a country granted adequacy with EU data protection rules, or a country that is an adherent to the OECD’s Trusted Government Access principles, or (concerning the US) a participant in the upcoming Trans-Atlantic Data Privacy Framework. Excluding foreign companies from operating in the EU would have far-reaching consequences. If that is the intent, it should require a sound legal analysis and the decision should be taken through a formal legislative procedure at the EU level.
Topic:
Economics, Markets, European Union, Cybersecurity, Digital Economy, Trade, and Resilience
Political Geography:
Europe

15. In Support of Market-Driven Standards

Author:
Matthias Bauer, Fredrik Erixon, Oscar Guinea, and Vanika Sharma
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
The EU published its new Standardisation Strategy in 2022. The strategy contains some good ideas to improve the way European standards are set. However, in its attempt to gain more control over technical standards, the EU risks killing the goose that lays the golden egg. The primary motivation behind the strategy is the belief that the process governing the way CEN, CENELEC, and ETSI – the three European Standardisation Organisations – take decisions over EU standards favours non-EU multinationals. To address this perceived imbalance, EU National Standardisation Bodies will have the exclusive power to accept standardisation requests, and adopt, revise and withdraw European technical standards. These changes are particularly significant for ETSI, Europe’s Standardisation Body in charge of telecommunication standards and one of Europe’s most successful organisations. ETSI is a prime example of EU normative power since it hosts companies from more than 60 countries, while retaining a large membership of EU firms. The regulatory changes included in the strategy are not risk-free. There could be unintended consequences that may undermine a standardisation system that has delivered significant economic benefits for the EU and the world. First, giving more responsibility to EU’s National Standardisation Organisations will turn a European discussion into 30 (EU and EEA) national debates. As a consequence, small companies will not be able to contribute to each and every one of the National Standardisation Organisations, diluting their contribution, while multinational companies, with the resources needed to cooperate with a larger number of bodies, will benefit from an expanding role in the EU standard setting process. Second, if standards are fragmented along national borders and companies must multiply their efforts to take part in several Standardisation Development Organisations, there will be less resources for Research and Development spending. Finally, if each and every National Standardisation Organisation needs to have a position with regards to the acceptance of a standardisation request, or adoption, revision and withdrawal of European technical standards, the time period required to adopt a technical standard may be extended rather than shortened, which is the exact opposite of what the European Commission wants to achieve. The regulatory changes included in the EU Standardisation Strategy are akin to cracking a nut with a sledgehammer. If the European Commission is concerned about the influence of non-EU companies in European Standardisation Bodies, it does not need to overhaul their governance systems. Supporting greater participation of European firms in the European standard system will ease EU’s concerns without the downside risks associated with changing the rules of the game that govern Europe’s Standardisation Bodies. The success of the European standardisation system, which is market-driven and based on consensus, has had significant economic benefits in the development of specific industries, like the European Information and Communication Technologies (ICT). Technical standards in ICT have shaped a European industry that is not only dynamic and international but also enjoys some of the highest levels of wages and Research and Development spending. Moreover, if technical standards are not developed through an open, consensus-based, and industry-led voluntary process, they will be developed in different ways. For instance, governments and private companies can develop standards by themselves. Both solutions are inferior to the current market-driven approach that governs European standards. However, the European market-driven approach to set standards is voluntary, and its success and continuation must not be assumed. European policymakers should be worried about tinkering with a European standardisation system which has produced economic specialisation and innovation to the benefits of EU firms and consumers.
Topic:
Markets, European Union, Regulation, Economy, and Standardization
Political Geography:
Europe

16. What is Wrong with Europe’s Shattered Single Market? – Lessons from Policy Fragmentation and Misdirected Approaches to EU Competition Policy

Author:
Matthias Bauer
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
What is wrong with Europe’s Single Market? The brief answer to that question is that it does not really exist – it is unsingle. The Single Market is in many ways a political illusion. It exists only nominally. Any company doing business in Europe faces significant barriers to cross-border exchanges within the EU, and it is these barriers that hamper companies’ ability to scale and compete internationally on the back of innovation and economic integration. We outline that Brussels and national governments need to beat the drum for eliminating policy fragmentation in Europe’s internal market and at the same time change course in competition policy to sufficiently support investments in innovation, business growth, and the adoption of advanced technologies across industries. Major economic indicators show that Europe is caught in a protracted corporate and technology crisis. The EU has for a very long time now been tailing US corporate and innovation leadership. At the same time, competition with technology-intensive imports from China is getting increasingly intense. Europe’s underperformance is rooted in a legally fragmented internal market which is disincentivising business growth and innovation. On top of that, an outdated approach to competition policy is discouraging businesses from adopting innovation and scaling across national borders, risking that EU companies continue to lose clout and international competitiveness. 30 years have passed since the formal establishment of Europe’s Single Market. Data reveals that regulatory convergence has reversed or come to a halt in most policy areas. Recent policies for technologies and digital business models, which are key sources of cross-industry competitiveness, created new layers of regulation and legal uncertainty in EU and Member State law. Overall, EU policies have not significantly helped European companies, large and small, to do business in another Member State or use advanced technology-enabled services. EU competition policy does not live up to its promise to “enable the proper functioning of the EU’s internal market”. Europe’s competition policy is still fragmented along national borders and largely ignorant to dynamic effects of competition, especially investments in innovation. Due to mixed legal competences, competition rules are often enforced differently by Member States’ national authorities and can be appropriated to support protectionist industrial policy ambitions. The recently enacted Digital Market Act (DMA) demonstrates that the European Commission and Member State authorities favour protection and discretionary enforcement over innovation and economic disruption, without providing solid evidence of abusive business behaviour and consumer harm. With the DMA, the EU introduced legislation with serious ambiguities in objectives, concepts, and rules, and explicitly allows national Member States to regulate competition at their own discretion. A recent attempt by Germany’s competition authority, the Bundeskartellamt, to enforce its own rulebook for large digital companies (Section 19a of the German Competition Act) risks creating a patchwork of competition rules for large providers of advanced digital services across the EU. Local adopters of advanced digital services, particularly small businesses, that use advanced technology services to compete in their markets would be confronted with less choice and quality. Recently imposed policies under the umbrella of European Strategic Autonomy will hardly help policymakers in their ambition to achieve “innovation and technology leadership”. The paramount task for the EU and national governments is to eliminate policy fragmentation in Europe’s internal market, accompanied by an approach to competition policy that embraces investments in innovation and business growth while accounting for the substantial value created through the adoption of innovative technologies and disruptive business models across industries in the EU.
Topic:
Markets, European Union, Economy, and Competition
Political Geography:
Europe

17. Increasing Systemic Legal Risks in the EU: The Economic Impacts of Changes to the EU’s Product Liability Legislation

Author:
Matthias Bauer and Elena Sisto
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
The EU’s Product Liability Directive (PLD) determines the rules for strict product liability in the EU. It establishes a framework in which manufacturers’ liability is determined solely based on the presence of defects in the product, regardless of the manufacturer’s fault. The PLD is intended to serve as a “safety net” when fault-based or contractual liability rules do not offer sufficient compensation to consumers. It operates independently from contractual arrangements between businesses and consumers, and it cannot be weakened by contractual agreements between businesses and consumers. The PLD is a horizontal regulation that applies to a wide range of industries in the EU because it applies to all products available on the EU market. The recently proposed changes by the European Commission would increase systemic legal uncertainty for producers and sellers of technology-intensive goods and services in the EU. The impact assessment of the European Commission does not sufficiently account for changes to the PLD proposed in 2022. Nor does it sufficiently account for the major impacts of increased legal uncertainty for European businesses. Legislators in the Council and the European Parliament should slow negotiations to allow time for policymakers to collect more evidence on the impacts on businesses, insurers, and courts we detail in this paper. This would be an opportunity to improve regulatory quality in light of the high levels of legal uncertainty associated with the changes proposed by the Commission.
Topic:
Economics, European Union, Legislation, and Risk
Political Geography:
Europe

18. Online Platform Regulation and Investment Attractiveness: A Look at the EU, the UK and Impacts on Small Open Economies

Author:
Matthias Bauer, Vanika Sharma, and Oscar du Roy
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
Small trade- and investment-oriented economies like the United Kingdom (UK) should carefully consider whether to regulate online platform services based on presumptions rather than evidence that consumers are being harmed. Flimsily enforced platform regulation can have a chilling effect on investments in business expansion and innovation, particularly in technology-adopting industries. Several countries around the world are designing new competition policies that specifically target large digital platforms. The theory behind these policies is grey. There are political concerns about the impact of various aspects of platforms on society, especially regarding the collection and safety of data. However, practices that harm consumers – traditionally a key motivation of competition enforcement – are very rare. Indeed, the success stories of large tech platforms demonstrate that they offer strong benefits and conveniences to millions of business users across a wide range of industries. Marginal costs of supply, high-quality services, continuous technological advancements, and platforms’ ability to drive productivity growth have enabled especially small businesses to thrive and compete in domestic and international markets. Against this background, it is highly questionable why some governments, with the backing of power-seeking competition regulators, are aiming to legally interfere in services provided by large technology companies. An important consequence that has so far received little attention from policymakers and competition authorities is the impact of platform regulation on a country’s investment attractiveness. It is obvious that bans and restrictions on corporate conduct cause regulated companies to abstain from investments and establish new business elsewhere. What is less clear is the effect of regulation on investments by companies that extensively adopt platform services to reduce costs, speed-up innovation, and expand market opportunities. In this policy brief, we argue that access to integrated and internationally traded platform services is increasingly important for a country’s investment attractiveness, even more so for smaller countries. Access to advanced technologies and the utilisation of network effects create a virtuous cycle of economic opportunities, investments, value creation, and trade. Discretionary and presumption-based competition enforcement, as adopted in the EU, risks hurting smaller countries in particular. The EU has chosen the path of proscriptive and protective policymaking with the DMA to achieve industrial and trade policy goals rather than defending competition in the Single Market. UK competition policy risks being driven by institutional interests and ideological considerations, which could potentially lead to the adoption of a regulatory landscape that is even more restrictive than that of the EU, undermining Britain’s ambitions for economic and innovation leadership.
Topic:
Markets, European Union, Regulation, Economy, Investment, Trade, and Online Platforms
Political Geography:
United Kingdom and Europe

19. Merger Policy, Competition and Innovation Leadership: Implications for the UK’s Investment Attractiveness

Author:
Matthias Bauer, Oscar du Roy, and Vanika Sharma
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
The UK’s competition regulator has adopted hard-sitting views in its assessment of transnational mergers and acquisitions. Since 2019, the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) has blocked a historic 59% of all mergers that were under investigation, which is double compared to the previous five years. With increased competence to set conduct requirements for large technology companies, aggressive enforcement by the CMA risks undermining Britain’s ambitions to become a leader in global trade, technology, and innovation.[1] Acquisitions in the technology sector have increasingly been scrutinised by competition authorities over the past decade, often based on the hypothesis that transactions involving large multinational companies tend to be anti-competitive. Authorities’ concerns are based on theories about post-acquisition market structures and the impacts of “killer acquisitions”. While their theories lack empirical justification, competition authorities have increasingly quoted them to assess cases through an ideological lens. Indeed, investigations into acquisitions show that competition authorities can come to markedly distinct conclusions when assessing the impacts on competition over time, especially in technology-intensive industries. The premise that acquisitions of small rivals by large tech companies inherently result in decreased competition lacks solid empirical evidence. Competition authorities often fail to adequately consider efficiency criteria and the resultant benefits for consumers. The proposed acquisition of Activision Blizzard, a video game maker, by Microsoft is a case in point. The UK CMA had initially found that the acquisition would reduce competition in gaming markets. EU and US competition regulators, by contrast, have cleared the transaction, highlighting the uncertain nature of merger review results for international transactions. Large multinational technology companies are major sources of innovation and productivity growth. The services they provide are increasingly pervasive across developed market economies, promising large productivity gains. Small, medium, and young companies in high-tech sectors are also important sources of innovation and productivity growth and, therefore, major targets for investment. Ideologically charged competition enforcement would have a negative impact on the UK’s investment attractiveness. The prospect of an innovative and commercially successful company being taken over by another company is an important precondition for investors to make early-stage and continued seed capital investments. Acquisitions also play an important role in driving investments in business growth and internationalisation. By contrast, there is no hard evidence to support the presumption that acquisitions by major tech companies result in decreased competition. A continuation of aggressive merger enforcement by the UK CMA would undermine investments in innovation-driven UK businesses and reduce access to funding for British venture capital-backed start-ups.
Topic:
Digital Economy, Leadership, Investment, Innovation, and Economic Competition
Political Geography:
United Kingdom and Europe

20. The Economic Impacts of the Proposed EUCS Exclusionary Requirements: Estimates for EU Member States

Author:
Matthias Bauer and Philipp Lamprecht
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
The EU Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA) is proposing a far-reaching “European Cybersecurity Certification Scheme for Cloud Services“ (EUCS) to be established in the European Union (EU). According to the latest draft of August 2023, leaked by Politico in September 2023, the proposed EUCS would by design prevent non-European vendors from providing “high assurance level” cloud services in the EU. In this study, we show that the proposed “immunity” requirements, i.e., foreign ownership and headquarter restrictions, local staff requirements, and data localisation would lead to significant losses in Member States’ aggregate economic activity and drive a big wedge between economic growth in the EU and the growth of non-EU economies. The projected losses in annual EU GDP will vary from EUR 610 billion to EUR 29 billion within approx. two years of implementation, contingent upon the specific sectoral coverage of high-assurance use cases under the cloud service evaluation level CS-EL4. The results fit into the overall picture of EU digital policy, which has weakened rather than strengthened the competitiveness of EU industries in the past. Our findings align with the broader impacts of EU digital policy, which runs the risk of exacerbating the growth gap and technology disparity between the EU and other advanced economies. Cloud services have become increasingly popular and integral to Europe’s economy. Cloud services are granting businesses of all sizes equal access to global data and resources, stimulating collaboration, and bolstering competitiveness. Advanced cloud services are levelling the playing field in domestic commerce and international trade. Smaller enterprises can harness advanced IT capabilities, particularly cloud-based supply chain management, to streamline their operations. Cloud computing solutions are also playing a crucial role in modernising public services, offering transformative potential for government administrations and service quality. Cloud services adoption is expected to grow substantially in the years ahead, driven by data analytics, AI applications as well as quantum and edge commuting solutions. The global cloud computing market is on a rapid growth trajectory and is expected to reach some EUR 2,080 billion by 2030. Industry forecasts indicate that cloud services and transversal cloud-based technologies like AI applications, quantum, and edge computing will experience consistent growth in innovation and are increasingly finding broader applications across various industries. Overall, the global market for IT services is highly competitive and dynamic, with global cloud service providers competing against a broad range of IT service providers of varying scale, including on-premises hardware vendors, private and co-located data centre providers and software providers. Despite showing a trade deficit in international cloud services trade, trade in ICT and digitally enabled services is not a one-way-street for the EU. Recent trade data reveals that the total value of EU exports in digital and digitally enabled services to the rest of the world is roughly equivalent to the total value of EU imports from the rest of the world. This balance in trade is also observed in EU digital trade with the US, where EU exports of ICT services to the US nearly match US exports of digital services to the EU. The proposed EUCS exclusionary requirements entail various negative consequences. As recognised by the European Commission’s latest progress report on digitisation in the EU, European companies have yet to reach the “Digital Decade” targets, especially when it comes to embracing cloud-supported technologies such as AI and big data, as the adoption of digital technologies remains significantly below these objectives.[1] Exclusionary requirements would create operational inefficiencies and increased production costs for cloud services providers and cloud adopters. They would undermine investments in the domestic economy, resulting in reduced international trade, competition, and innovation. The imposition of exclusionary requirements by the EU could create a domino effect of restrictions caused by retaliation and protectionism. Data localisation and nationality requirements stifle innovation and competition, particularly in data-driven industries. The creation of redundant capacities in the EU would have adverse environmental impacts, including increased energy consumption, land use, and electronic waste. Immunity requirements would increase rather than mitigate cybersecurity risks, creating a security deficit for EU cloud adopters that lose access to proven global risk detection and prevention solutions. This study provides estimates of potential GDP and industry output effects from the implementation of exclusionary requirements under the proposed EUCS framework.[2] It is shown that the strict “immunity” requirements in the EUCS cybersecurity certification framework would severely limit European customers’ access to advanced technologies, innovation and global ICT industry growth trends. The study’s findings highlight the significant economic consequences of potential restrictions on access to global cloud services across three scenarios of different sectoral coverage. It is shown that even in the least restrictive scenario, where “immunity” requirements would only be applied to a narrow spectrum of sectors and highly critical use cases, the reduction in the EU’s annual GDP could be substantial. In scenario 1 (broad critical sector coverage), reflecting political demands of the current French government, the EU’s annual GDP is projected to decrease by 3.9% when accounting for lost cloud capacities and forgone cloud capacity and productivity growth, within 2 years of implementation. For scenario 2 (medium critical sector coverage) and scenario 3 (narrow critical sector coverage), the estimated annual losses in GDP amount to -2% and -0.2%, respectively. In terms of current EU GDP, annual losses would amount to EUR 610 billion, EUR 317 billion, and EUR 29 billion, respectively, underscoring the significant magnitude of the potential impacts. For the broad critical sector coverage scenario, our results also show that the EU’s annual GDP losses accumulate over longer periods of time. After 5 years following the implementation of exclusionary EUCS requirements, the annual growth losses for the EU and its Member States remain significant. This is due to the inability of European businesses and the EU’s public sector to tap into the worldwide innovation and productivity gains offered by globally accessible technologies and services. For the EU, we estimate the annual GDP loss to be -3.6%, with a trend to further accumulate in subsequent years.
Topic:
Science and Technology, European Union, Cybersecurity, Digital Economy, and Digitization
Political Geography:
Europe