Search

Begin New Search Topic Arms Control and Proliferation Author Matthew Kroenig

1. Arms racing under nuclear tripolarity: Evidence for an action-reaction cycle?

Author:
Matthew Kroenig
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
Conventional wisdom suggests that the world is approaching a tripolar arms race among the United States, Russia, and China. As Russia attempts to dramatically revise the post-Cold War security environment in Europe, China is expected to increase its nuclear arsenal to at least 1,500 warheads by 2035. In 2021, the then-commander of US Strategic Command, Admiral Richard, laid out the challenge of nuclear tripolarity before Congress testifying that: “for the first time in our history, the nation is on a trajectory to face two nuclear-capable, strategic peer adversaries at the same time.” In this issue brief, the Scowcroft Center’s Matthew Kroenig challenges the evidence for action-reaction arms races in the post-Cold War period but warns we may be facing one in this new tripolar nuclear environment.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Missile Defense, Deterrence, and Multipolarity
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, North America, and United States of America

2. Why Nuclear Deterrence Still Matters to NATO

Author:
Walter B. Slocombe and Matthew Kroenig
Publication Date:
08-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
NATO's Strategic Concept (SC), adopted at the Lisbon Summit in November 2010, includes a number of propositions that define NATO's nuclear policy. Most fundamentally, NATO's most important strategy document declares that "[d]eterrence, based on an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional capabilities, remains a core element of" the Alliance's "overall strategy."
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and International Security

3. Beyond Optimism and Pessimism: The Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation

Author:
Matthew Kroenig
Publication Date:
11-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
What is the effect of the spread of nuclear weapons on international politics? The scholarly debate pits proliferation optimists, who claim that “more may be better,” against proliferation pessimists, who argue that “more will be worse.” These scholars focus on the aggregate effects of nuclear proliferation, but never explicitly consider the differential effects of the spread of nuclear weapons. In other words, they do not examine whether nuclear proliferation may threaten some states more than others. I propose a theory of nuclear proliferation that examines the differential effects of nuclear proliferation. I argue that the threat nuclear proliferation poses to a particular state depends on that state's ability to project military power. The spread of nuclear weapons is worse for states that have the ability to project conventional military power over a potential nuclear weapon state primarily because nuclear proliferation constrains their conventional military freedom of action. On the other hand, nuclear proliferation is less threatening to, and can sometimes even improve the strategic environment of, states that lack the ability to project power over a potential nuclear weapon state, because the spread of nuclear weapons disproportionately constrains other, more powerful states. This article contributes to our understanding of the consequences of nuclear proliferation and contains important implications for nuclear nonproliferation policy.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and International Affairs