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1. Fentanyl Precursors from China and the American Opioid Epidemic

Author:
Martin Purbrick
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
The fentanyl epidemic was born in America, rose from the supply of precursor chemicals made in China and is now even more destructive as Mexican drug cartels profit from huge demand. The involvement of suppliers of fentanyl precursors from China is a controversial issue that negatively impacts U.S.-China relations. The U.S. government has claimed that not enough is being done to curtail the production and trafficking of fentanyl precursors from China. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) government has claimed that it has taken strong action while also emphasizing China’s antipathy to illegal drugs by falling back on the historical legacy of the harm wrought by Western merchants’ trading of opium with China in the 19th century.
Topic:
Narcotics Trafficking, Organized Crime, Cartels, Opioid Crisis, and Fentanyl
Political Geography:
China, Mexico, and United States of America

2. Chinese National Security Laws Hinder Foreign Companies’ Operations in China

Author:
Martin Purbrick
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Investigations into alleged misconduct and criminality by companies are to be expected, and welcomed, in any country. However, the problems facing foreign companies in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) depart from normal legal checks and balances. The lack of separation between the judiciary and the state, and the uncertainty around China’s interpretation of the “rule of law,” is a risk factor for companies doing business there (See: China Brief, September 8). In addition, “state secrets” in the PRC are defined widely in relation to national interest. Consequently, a foreign company can inadvertently breach the law by obtaining and using commercial data. This week the US Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) announced updated export controls on advanced computing semiconductors, semiconductor manufacturing equipment, and supercomputing items to the PRC (BIS, October 17). Foreign companies doing business in the PRC are likely to face continued uncertainty as a consequence. The response from the PRC was swift, stating that the United States has constantly “overstretched the concept of national security” and resorted to “unilateral bullying” (China Daily, October 18), which suggests that there is a risk the PRC will take retaliatory measures against foreign companies. Western companies involved in the PRC have long understood that when investing in China they must lose a little bit of money in the short term to win a lot of money in the long term. Doing business in China has always been complex, but with the continued expansive approach to national security, it may now be increasingly untenable (See: China Brief, September 22). After three decades of huge investment in the PRC by international companies, there are growing concerns that the growing emphasis on national security is harming the confidence of overseas investors. As the European Union Chamber of Commerce in China reports, “the politicisation of business, and ambiguous laws and regulations…increases risk for companies operating in Chinas” (EU Chamber, September 20). In recent weeks, this ambiguity has been exacerbated by the growing number of “exit bans,” whereby PRC authorities forbid specific business executives at international companies, such as Kroll and Nomura, from leaving the country (Stratfor, September 29).
Topic:
National Security, Law, and Business
Political Geography:
China and Asia

3. The No Limits Partnership: PRC Weapons Support for Russia

Author:
Martin Purbrick
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Amid the ongoing war in Ukraine, there is growing concern about the possible involvement of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in supplying Russia with weapons, munitions, and various other technology that could have dual-use applications. Notably, no significant provision of large-scale military hardware from the PRC to Russia is evident, as such equipment would have been easily identified on the battlefield amongst the major equipment losses suffered by Russian forces. There are, however, consistent reports substantiating the claim that Chinese companies are providing military and dual-use equipment to Russia. In the PRC’s political system, this type of transaction would be difficult to conduct without the government’s tacit approval or—at the very least—the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) authorities turning a blind eye. In February 2022, following a meeting ahead of the opening ceremony of the Beijing Winter Olympic Games, Chinese leader Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin discussed the dimensions of their two countries’ strategic partnership (Global Times, February 5, 2022). Xi and Putin reiterated that “friendship between the two states has no limits, there are no ‘forbidden’ areas of cooperation, [and the] strengthening of bilateral strategic cooperation is neither aimed against third countries nor affected by the changing international environment and circumstantial changes in third countries” (The Kremlin, February 4, 2022). The closing ceremony for the Beijing Winter Olympics was held on February 20. Four days later, Russia invaded Ukraine. Since then, there has been widespread speculation that the PRC leadership knew about the Russian invasion. Additionally, there have been heightened concerns regarding the extent of Chinese support for Russia since the start of the war in Ukraine. In July, the US Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) reported on the “Support Provided by the People’s Republic of China to Russia”, with indications of increased Russian reliance on the PRC (ODNI, July 2023). In 2022 total Russian imports from the PRC increased by 13 percent to $76 billion. In the same year, PRC chip exports to Russia increased by 19 percent. Many of these transactions were facilitated by shell companies in Hong Kong acting as agents of secondary sales from international suppliers via the PRC to Russia. The ODNI report stated that “the PRC is providing some dual-use technology that Moscow’s military uses to continue the war in Ukraine, despite an international cordon of sanctions and export controls. The customs records show PRC state-owned defense companies shipping navigation equipment, jamming technology, and fighter jet parts to sanctioned Russian government-owned defense companies” (ODNI, July 2023). French diplomats further corroborated this report, notifying the public of intelligence indicating that the PRC has been supplying Russia with dual-use technologies as well as non-lethal assistance equipment, such as helmets and body armor (SCMP, July 22). When asked if the PRC is assisting Russia’s war efforts in Ukraine, French presidential advisor Emmanuel Bonne responded by saying “there are indications that they are doing things we would prefer them not to do” (SCMP, July 22). The PRC government has emphatically denied allegations that it has provided any weapons or military assistance to Russia. Former PRC Foreign Minister Qin Gang was reported by his own ministry as saying that “China does not sell weapons to parties involved in the Ukraine crisis and prudently handles the export of dual-use items in accordance with laws and regulations. Normal exchanges and cooperation between Chinese and Russian enterprises should not be affected” (PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 10). The second part of Qin Gang’s statement is significant, as he clearly states that exchanges between Chinese and Russian enterprises—such as commercial ties—are not be impacted by the war in Ukraine. Upon closer examination, his comments appear to suggest that dual-use technologies and equipment could be subject to the PRC government turning a blind eye.
Topic:
Partnerships, Weapons, Drones, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and Asia

4. The Long Arm of the Law(less): The PRC’s Overseas Police Stations

Author:
Martin Purbrick
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
In April, the FBI charged two Chinese-Americans, both U.S. citizens, with conspiring to act as agents of the government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) by establishing an “overseas police station” on behalf of the Fujian Public Security Bureau in New York. The defendants allegedly organized counter-protests against the Falun Gong, harassed a Chinese fugitive to return to the PRC and hassled a pro-democracy activist living in California. On June 6, the UK Government Minister of State for Security, Tom Tugendhat, made a statement with an update on Chinese “Overseas Police Service Stations” reportedly located in Croydon, Glasgow and Hendon (UK Parliament, June 6). He stated that “the Police have visited each of the locations identified by Safeguard Defenders [the NGO that reported the locations], and carefully looked into these allegations to consider whether any laws have been broken and whether any further action should be taken. I can confirm that they have not, to date, identified any evidence of illegal activity on behalf of the Chinese state across these sites.” The reactive approach in the UK is notably different from the US, where proactive intelligence led investigations by the FBI have led to multiple arrests. International concern regarding the extent of law enforcement activity by Chinese agencies outside of their home country jurisdiction has recently increased. Such activity has been reported as “Chinese Overseas Police Service Centers” (Safeguard Defenders, September 2022), “Chinese Assistance Centers” (China Brief, January 5, 2019), joint patrols in Italy with local police, structured training to local police such as in the Solomon Islands, harassment and intimidation of Chinese dissidents, and extra-judicial action to return fugitives from overseas that effectively constitutes extraordinary rendition. These activities are characterized by their diversity and, as a result, should not be considered part of a single strategy. Rather, the multiple purposes served by Chinese police forces’ expanding overseas activities can be better understood by tracing how these efforts have evolved over the past decade.
Topic:
Security, Law Enforcement, Law, and Police
Political Geography:
China and Asia

5. All the President’s Men – Corruption in the Xi Jinping Era

Author:
Martin Purbrick
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Since the opening up of the Chinese economy by Deng Xiaoping in 1979, China has grown wealthy, but corruption has also become pervasive at all levels of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Corruption has been a part of Chinese business and governance for millennia, but despite the grand pronouncements of the CCP about eradicating corruption, it has not only endured under the current system but grown to extraordinary heights. Due to deeply entrenched corruption across the government, as well as the variable spread of economic benefits, this issue will remain a severe challenge for the CCP as the Xi Jinping era enters its second decade. The necessity for the state security agencies to support political control by Xi will also ensure that anti-corruption purges continue to impact the police and security agencies.
Topic:
Security, Corruption, Economy, and Xi Jinping
Political Geography:
China and Asia

6. Future Global Policeman? The Growing Extraterritorial Reach of PRC Law Enforcement

Author:
Martin Purbrick
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
The recently signed security agreement between the Solomon Islands and the People’s Republic of China (PRC), along with the support of Chinese police to the Solomon Islands government to suppress social unrest in November 2021, highlight the increasing international deployment of PRC law enforcement (China Daily, April 2). This deployment follows several decades of expanding PRC international law enforcement activity, which is intended for extraterritorial enforcement action, seeking the return of fugitives, and as part of China’s engagement with other countries. The 2021 violence in the capital, Honiara, led to destruction in the local Chinatown and the subsequent deployment of Chinese police officers, who have previously provided equipment and training to the Solomon Islands. The China Police Liaison Team is led by Zhang Guangbo, an officer of the rank of Commissioner third class, who stated that the deployment is intended to protect the safety of Chinese communities in the Solomon Islands as well as to contribute to the overall stability in the islands (Embassy of the PRC in the Solomon Islands, March 4). There has been considerable unease in wider region over the expanded deployment of Chinese police officers to the Solomon Islands. The governments of Australia, Japan, and the United States have all criticized the security pact, and have raised concerns that the deployment of Chinese police officers could lead to a future military presence. Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs Marise Payne stated on March 25 that “Australia is aware of the proposed draft Security Cooperation agreement between China and Solomon Islands…We would be particularly concerned by any actions that undermine the stability and security of our region, including the establishment of a permanent presence such as a military base” (Australian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, March 2022). In response to these concerns, the Solomon Islands High Commissioner to Australia has said that if Chinese police officers were called on for assistance they would be under the command of the Royal Solomon Islands Police and stated that “We will try and do our best in terms of dealing with them to make sure that what is happening in other countries where, like Hong Kong, doesn’t happen in our country” (Solomon Times, 6 May 2022).
Topic:
Security, Politics, Law Enforcement, and Economy
Political Geography:
China and Asia

7. Organized Crime on the Belt and Road

Author:
Martin Purbrick
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
The continued rapid economic growth of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the past decade has brought greater commerce and investment to Asia through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). However, as China’s overseas economic footprint has grown, Chinese organized crime groups have also expanded their activities to become a regional problem. President Xi Jinping first introduced the BRI in 2013 when he proposed to Asian leaders jointly building the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road, both of which PRC officials later commonly came to call the BRI. The expansion of Chinese organized crime across Asia encompasses multiple areas of activity: online fraud (including pyramid schemes), online gambling, human trafficking (for slavery and prostitution), animal or animal parts trafficking (for use in traditional Chinese medicine), and money laundering (of the proceeds of crime from the PRC).
Topic:
Infrastructure, Economic Growth, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Organized Crime
Political Geography:
China, Malaysia, Asia, Philippines, Cambodia, and Myanmar

8. City of Vice: Macau, Gambling, and Organized Crime in China

Author:
Martin Purbrick
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
In November 2021 and January 2022, the Macau Special Administrative Region (SAR) Judiciary Police arrested 13 individuals involved in operating two separate casino VIP customer “junkets” for engaging in illegal gambling activities, running a criminal syndicate, and money laundering (Macau Judiciary Police, November 29, 2021; January 31). The criminal groups used their VIP junket business in Macau casinos to recruit mainland Chinese residents to engage in illegal online gambling on overseas platforms, and illicit side-betting. The proceeds of the syndicate were then laundered and transferred through the junket accounts of the casinos using underground banks. These developments underscore how gambling in Macau has grown from small beginnings, as tolerant Portuguese administrators did not want to unduly antagonize local Chinese, to a multi-billion dollar business that has been infiltrated by organized crime groups for much of its modern history. During Portuguese rule (1557–1999) Macau was described as the “city of the name God,” hosting the religious orders of St. Augustine, St. Dominic, and St. Francis, as well as convents and Catholic churches (Cultural Affairs Bureau, Macau Government). In the 20th century, Macau became a city of vice as casino gambling emerged as the dominant business, supported by related prostitution, money lending, and money laundering from mainland China. After the return of sovereignty and administration from Portugal to China in 1999, Macau has had extraordinary economic success and relative political stability compared to the neighboring Hong Kong SAR. Macau’s gross domestic product (GDP) rose from $6.458 billion in 1999 to $45,103 billion in 2016 at average annual growth rate of 12 percent. This economic growth, however, has been increasingly dominated by the gambling sector, which in 2013 accounted for over 60 percent of GDP. Casino “gross gambling revenue” in Macau has surpassed Las Vegas and the city is effectively the world’s largest gambling center. [1] However, as the gambling sector has grown, so has the organized crime long associated with that business that has become a domestic problem for China and has impacted other countries in Asia. A particular concern for Beijing is the Macau gambling industry’s role in facilitating capital flight.
Topic:
Law Enforcement, Borders, Gambling, and Organized Crime
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Macau