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1. Russia and China in Central Asia: Cooperate, Compete, or De-conflict?

Author:
Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Lisa Curtis, Kate Johnston, and Nathaniel Schochet
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Despite the many proclamations that Russian and Chinese interests would collide in Central Asia, Moscow and Beijing continue to work together in service of their shared objectives. These include, most importantly, keeping the United States and the West—and democracy—out of the region, maintaining stability, and pursuing economic benefits. Fissures between Moscow and Beijing exist, especially in the economic sphere, where China has become the more dominant power, and over the potential development of the Middle Corridor trade route, which could significantly disadvantage Russia. However, Russia and China are managing these divergences, and the overarching imperative to weaken the United States provides a powerful motive for reducing or preventing any friction from derailing their broader partnership. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has heightened the Central Asian states’ apprehensions about Russia, including about its capacity to uphold its security role in the region. However, the Kremlin remains committed to maintaining its influence in the region, and the war in Ukraine is restructuring economic dynamics in ways that will enable the Kremlin to limit the extent of its declining economic influence. Looking forward, the most significant change in Russia-China relations in Central Asia is likely to occur in the security sphere, where China is likely to take on a greater role, especially as Russia’s military and security services are preoccupied in Ukraine and with the domestic challenges the war creates. Any rise in instability in the region—which could result from an uptick in terrorist threats in the aftermath of the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, or from the region’s brittle autocracies—could propel China to step into a sphere where Russia has historically played the primary role but that the Kremlin will struggle to fulfill while the war in Ukraine continues. For Russia and China, Central Asia is also likely to be an important building block in their larger counterorder-building effort. The two countries are likely to sustain—and step up—their efforts to build an alternative order in Central Asia, including by deepening cooperation and broadening the number of countries participating in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) to legitimize and demonstrate the benefits of their collective global leadership. This effort will face resistance from the Central Asian states that object to the concept of a Russia-China condominium of power in their region and have shown an ability to come together to resist attempts to turn the SCO into a forum that would strengthen a collective Russia-China security role in the region. The United States has an opportunity to redouble its engagement in Central Asia. The Central Asian states highly value U.S. political support for their independence and sovereignty, especially following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Washington can encourage greater connectivity and cohesion among the countries, demonstrating its support for their increasing cooperation with one another in ways that could strengthen the region’s economic attractiveness and political agency. This contrasts with the way in which Russia has traditionally dealt with the region, which is to try to capitalize on divisions and disputes among the countries. While it cannot match China dollar for dollar or supplant Russia’s cultural and political influence in the region, the United States can enhance its trade, investment, energy, counterterrorism, and diplomatic ties to these countries. Enhancing U.S. and European investment in Central Asia, especially for development of the Middle Corridor, could help prevent Russia and China from further deepening their grip on the region.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Strategic Interests, Cooperation, Competition, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Central Asia, and Asia

2. Countering Coercion: Managing Chinese Gray Zone Activity in the South China Sea and Indian Ocean Region

Author:
Lisa Curtis and Nilanthi Samaranayake
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
The People’s Republic of China (PRC or China) has been engaging in gray zone activity—coercive behavior that is aimed at changing the status quo but that is below a threshold that would prompt a military response—particularly against the Philippines in the South China Sea (SCS), and these actions are raising tensions in the Indo-Pacific.1 Washington must closely monitor the situation and take steps to help protect the sovereignty of Southeast Asian nations from PRC intimidation and territorial encroachment. China makes ambiguous claims to 90 percent of the 1.3 million square miles of the South China Sea, including waters within the exclusive economic zones of Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam. Projecting power and dominating the South China Sea, with its critical resources and central role in global trade—around $3 trillion worth of commerce transits the seaways annually—is a top national security and foreign policy goal for China.2 PRC maritime bullying is not new, but it has intensified in the past few years, especially against the Philippines. Beijing aims to convince Manila to give up its claim to Second Thomas Shoal, an underwater reef located in the Spratly Islands of the South China Sea. The Philippines makes its claim to the shoal by housing a small contingent of marines aboard a World War II–era ship, the BRP Sierra Madre, that was intentionally grounded there in 1999.3 Philippines-China tensions in the South China Sea threaten to involve the United States, which has been a treaty ally of the Philippines for over 70 years. Despite the risk that tensions could further escalate, Washington continues to stand firmly behind Manila as it employs asymmetric tactics to push back against Chinese behavior.4 PRC maritime activities and goals in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), for the time being, are focused on protecting China’s economic interests (80 percent of its energy imports flow through the Indian Ocean), gathering intelligence, and projecting power, not on asserting maritime claims.5 However, China’s unrelenting aggression in the SCS has raised concern that Beijing will soon begin to demonstrate similar behavior in the IOR. Over the past 15 to 20 years, China has expanded from sporadic to regular presence in the Indian Ocean through its naval ships, research vessels, and fishing fleets, as well as a military base. The United States and its allies and partners must not be complacent about PRC actions in the Indian Ocean Region, especially China’s submarine port visits and docking of dual-use ships such as in Sri Lanka and, more recently, Maldives. Due to the high stakes involved, the United States and its allies and partners must balance the need to deter China with the need to avoid military escalation when responding to PRC gray zone acts. When there are violations of international law and norms or when the lives of official personnel or civilians are threatened, Washington and its allies must respond.
Topic:
Territorial Disputes, Gray Zone, Coercion, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Indian Ocean, and South China Sea

3. India-China Border Tensions and U.S. Strategy in the Indo-Pacific

Author:
Lisa Curtis and Derek Grossman
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
India-China border intrusions and clashes have become more frequent and threaten to lead to all-out conflict between the two Asian giants. In recent years, China has upped the ante in its border disputes with India through infrastructure development, military deployments, capability enhancements, and periodic efforts to encroach into territory controlled by India. The first deadly border clash between the two countries in 45 years occurred on June 15, 2020, in the Galwan River Valley, where 20 Indian troops and at least four Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) troops were killed. More recently, on December 9, 2022, Chinese and Indian forces clashed along the disputed border in the mountains near Tawang in the northeastern Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh after an estimated 300 Chinese PLA soldiers tried to cross the border. While the Chinese and Indian militaries have since pulled back forces from the most contentious standoff sites where the 2020 buildup occurred and established temporary buffer zones, both sides retain high numbers of troops forward deployed along the disputed frontier, and there are several flashpoints that could erupt into another border crisis at any time. The most recent clash that took place near Tawang is a reminder that, even though recent attention has been focused on the Ladakh region, there are multiple trigger points along the 2,100-mile-long Line of Actual Control (LAC) that bear monitoring.1 With both China and India enhancing infrastructure and introducing new and advanced weapons systems on their sides of the disputed border, combined with forward deployments and heightened lack of trust, the chances for continued standoffs that could erupt into local or even full-blown conflict remain high.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, Territorial Disputes, and Borders
Political Geography:
China, India, Asia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

4. Competitive Connectivity: Crafting Transatlantic Responses to China’s Belt and Road Initiative

Author:
Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Lisa Curtis, Jacob Stokes, Carisa Nietsche, Joshua Fitt, and Nicholas Lokker
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Given the uncertain future of BRI, researchers at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) identified the major drivers likely to influence the direction of the program and examined their numerous permutations. The authors selected three scenarios and focused on how conditions of each scenario would play out in Europe and the Indo-Pacific. For each scenario, the report identifies the risks and implications for the United States and its allies. The scenarios are designed to prepare policymakers and planners for the possible futures they could face, including key challenges and opportunities that may arise in the years to come. Lastly, this paper identifies additional policy steps that will prepare the transatlantic allies to both compete with China’s investments and increase their own resilience.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Infrastructure, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Transatlantic Relations, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and United States of America

5. Positive Visions, Powerful Partnerships: The Keys to Competing with China in a Post-Pandemic Indo-Pacific

Author:
Stephen Tankel, Lisa Curtis, and Coby Goldberg
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
The United States was losing ground to China in the Indo-Pacific when the COVID-19 crisis began. China’s growing economic might, military modernization, and aggressive diplomatic efforts were already eroding America’s competitive advantage and shifting the regional balance of power. A year after the virus first spread, it is possible to identify where the pandemic is affecting diplomatic, economic, and defense trends in ways that could accelerate declines for the United States, but also might create opportunities to reverse or mitigate some of them. Restoring U.S. alliances and partnerships in the Indo-Pacific is critical to competing effectively against China, and President Joe Biden has made this a top foreign policy priority. In particular, his administration is making the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue—a strategic forum commonly known as the Quad, which is comprised of the United States, Japan, Australia, and India—a core component of its approach to the Indo-Pacific. Chinese post-outbreak behavior has driven increased cooperation among these four countries in the diplomatic, economic, and defense domains to address shared challenges from China. Seizing the opportunities this cooperation creates is critical for the United States. While expanding U.S. cooperation with Quad countries, the United States cannot neglect Southeast Asia, where competition with China for influence is fiercest. Southeast Asia is at the heart of U.S. and Japanese efforts to promote a free and open Indo-Pacific, and is a region where Australia has played a traditional leadership role. Competing effectively with China requires offering Southeast Asian countries a positive alternative vision to the one Beijing promotes. Whether the United States and its fellow Quad democracies can help Southeast Asian countries recover from the COVID-19 crisis will be a key litmus test of their ability to deliver on such an agenda. This report offers recommendations for the United States to take unilaterally and in close cooperation—bilaterally, trilaterally, and through the Quad—with Japan, Australia, and India to address challenges and seize opportunities created by the COVID-19 crisis along three lines of effort: diplomatic, economic, and defense.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Partnerships, Economy, Strategic Competition, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Japan, China, India, Australia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

6. Advancing a Liberal Digital Order in the Indo-Pacific

Author:
Lisa Curtis, Joshua Fitt, and Jacob Stokes
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
The United States and other regional democracies risk losing ground in the competition to shape Asia’s digital future. China is making rapid inroads in developing the region’s 5G infrastructure and is playing an increasingly expansive role in the broader digital ecosystems of Indo-Pacific countries. Beijing’s position at the center of Asia’s developing digital order poses a series of challenges to the interests of America and its democratic allies and partners—ranging from the potential compromise of critical networks to the development of new technology standards that favor Chinese companies and undermine civil liberties. Policymakers are scrambling to ascertain how to compete effectively with China in the digital space, when Chinese companies and technology are already interwoven into the digital landscape. These Chinese companies are obligated to assist China on national security, intelligence, and cyber security issues, raising the prospect that they could be employed to carry out espionage or sabotage in the service of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) geopolitical goals. In the case of 5G telecommunication network development, the United States will need to expand its campaign to promote additional trusted vendors who can supply safe, reliable, and cost-effective alternatives to Chinese offerings. Shaping the 5G ecosystem now will set the stage for how the broader U.S.-China technology competition will play out over the next decade. Undersea fiber-optic cables represent another area of technology infrastructure that is being contested between China and the United States. With nearly 95 percent of intercontinental internet data flowing through these undersea cables, it is imperative that they be treated and protected like other critical technologies and infrastructure. Washington must recognize that many issues in digital development remain ambiguous, and it must craft policies that account for the field’s complexity. For example, some countries will seek to maintain a relatively liberal political environment while embracing Chinese technology for economic development purposes. Others will seek out alternatives to Chinese suppliers as a means of maintaining their own security and independence but might still employ those technologies in illiberal ways in order to suppress dissent and maintain political control at home. Moreover, the fast-moving nature of innovation in digital technologies means that technological development will often outpace the creation of liberal political, legal, and regulatory regimes—even in the United States. The development of democratic norms and best practices to combat disinformation, restrict surveillance technologies, and give individuals the right to control their own data is still in a nascent stage. In other words, much of what constitutes a liberal digital order is still being defined. The challenges to ensuring a future liberal digital order are immense; to meet them, the United States must develop a multifaceted approach that prioritizes coordination with democratic allies and partners. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue between Australia, India, Japan, and the United States, or the Quad, will play a key role in ensuring protection of emerging and critical technologies through its newly formed working group, announced following the first-ever leaders-level Quad summit in mid-March. Working closely with other technologically advanced Indo-Pacific allies and partners such as South Korea and Taiwan on digital development initiatives will also be important. The degree to which the United States can work with democratic allies and partners to pool resources and capabilities, while also setting mutually agreed standards and guidelines for use of digital technologies, will determine whether those technologies are harnessed in a way that advances free and open societies or contributes to strengthening autocratic regimes.
Topic:
Infrastructure, Geopolitics, and Digital Policy
Political Geography:
China, Asia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific