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Begin New Search Topic Defense Spending Author Justin Logan

1. Uncle Sucker: Why U.S. Efforts at Defense Burdensharing Fail

Author:
Justin Logan
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
In 2022, the United States counted 50 of the world’s 195 countries as formal treaty allies, not including dozens more informal security relationships. U.S. allies do not carry a proportionate share of the burden of their defense; Washington’s allies account for roughly 36 percent of world economic output but only 24 percent of world military spending. In every alliance, the United States is the most important member and gives more than it gets in return. American politicians and the American public regularly express frustration with allies’ behavior. In 1959, for example, President Dwight D. Eisenhower lamented that the insufficient defense efforts of U.S. allies in Europe meant that the Europeans were close to “making a sucker out of Uncle Sam.” Things have gotten worse since 1959. Today, America’s alliances act as transfer payments from U.S. taxpayers to taxpayers in allied countries. History and theory both suggest that hectoring allies is unlikely to produce much change. Allies know that they can pocket the gains from U.S. commitments, then spend their own money in the ways they believe benefit them most. Policymakers should evaluate alliance commitments in the context of the net contributions of U.S. allies to U.S. defense, weighed against the costs and benefits of a non‐​alliance. The only way to produce more equitable burdensharing is to make allies doubt the strength of the U.S. commitment: the stronger the belief in the U.S. commitment, the harder it is to get allies to defend themselves. Unless policymakers fundamentally change their approach to alliances, there is little hope that defense burdens can be spread more equitably.
Topic:
History, Alliance, Defense Spending, Military, and Burden-sharing
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

2. The Case for Withdrawing from the Middle East

Author:
Justin Logan
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
The Middle East is a small, poor, weak region beset by an array of problems that mostly do not affect Americans—and that U.S. forces cannot fix. The best thing the U.S. can do is leave. The immense cost and evident fruitlessness of U.S. wars in the Middle East are widely lamented in American politics, but not enough to extricate U.S. troops. And even beyond the wars, U.S. policy in the region is an expensive and unnecessary disaster. The cost of maintaining forces to protect the Middle East from itself is extraordinary, even in peacetime. Conservatively, attempting to control the Middle East costs Americans on the order of $65–70 billion each year, apart from the trillions spent on wars there. The number should be closer to zero. Nothing about the Middle East warrants the U.S. investment there over the past 30 years. The few important interests there—preventing major terrorist attacks, stopping the emergence of a market-making oil hegemon, curbing nuclear proliferation, and ensuring no regional actor destroys Israel—do not require American troops. The roughly 60,000 U.S. troops in the region should leave. American efforts to manage the Middle East make nothing about oil, Israel, or terrorism better. The U.S. would be better off withdrawing all forward-deployed troops from the region, while maintaining access agreements for naval ports with the consent of host countries. Withdrawing ground forces from the Middle East will make it harder for the U.S. to start or join any wars there. Shrinking the U.S. armed forces to reflect the lack of threat from the Middle East will free up resources for any number of higher priorities at home or abroad.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and Defense Spending
Political Geography:
Middle East, North America, and United States of America