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Begin New Search Publishing Institution Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies Author Jack Snyder

1. Ukraine As A Buffer Zone? History Lessons For The New Geopolitics Of Eurasia

Author:
Thomas Graham, Rajan Menon, and Jack Snyder
Publication Date:
09-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies
Abstract:
Amidst calls for containing an assertive Russia, politicians and pundits have been debating whether Ukraine should serve as a “buffer zone” between the Russian and Western spheres of influence. Based on a survey of the history of buffer zones in Ukraine and elsewhere, we argue that buffer strategies are most likely to succeed in promoting international stability when three mutually reinforcing conditions obtain. First, the buffer state has the material strength, defensible geography, and social cohesiveness necessary to resist penetration, annexation, or partition. Second, states that may contemplate using war as a means to annex or dominate the buffer zone anticipate high risks and costs. Buffers survive when flanking powers are relatively weak, satisfied, skeptical that “offense is the best defense,” and chary of commitments to reckless allies and clients. Third, whether the major powers have agreed, implicitly or explicitly, on rules to regulate their rivalry in the buffer region may also affect the likelihood of a collision. Based on these findings, we are doubtful that Ukraine can serve as a reliable buffer.
Topic:
International Relations, International Organization, International Security, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Russia and Ukraine

2. The Cost of Empty Threats: A Penny Not A Pound

Author:
Jack Snyder and Erica Borghard
Publication Date:
12-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies
Abstract:
A large literature in political science takes for granted that democratic leaders would pay substantial domestic political costs for failing to carry out the public threats they make in international crises, and consequently that making threats substantially enhances their leverage in crisis bargaining. And yet proponents of this audience costs theory have presented very little evidence that this causal mechanism actually operates in real—as opposed to simulated—crises. We look for such evidence in post-1945 crises and find hardly any. Audience cost mechanisms are rare because (1) leaders see unambiguous committing threats as imprudent, (2) domestic audiences care more about policy substance than about consistency between the leader's words and deeds, (3) domestic audiences care about their country's reputation for resolve and national honor independently of whether the leader has issued an explicit threat, and (4) authoritarian targets of democratic threats do not perceive audience costs dynamics in the same way that audience costs theorists do. We found domestic audience costs only as secondary mechanisms in a few cases where the public already had hawkish preferences before any threats were made.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Government, Politics, Political Theory, and Public Opinion

3. Free Hand Abroad, Divide And Rule At Home

Author:
Jack Snyder, Robert Y. Shapiro, and Yaeli Bloch-Elkon
Publication Date:
03-2008
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies
Abstract:
Under unipolarity, the immediate costs and risks of war are more likely to seem manageable for a militarily dominant power like the U.S. This does not necessarily make the use of force cheap or wise, but it means that the costs and risks of the use of force are comparatively indirect, long-term, and thus highly subject to interpretation. Unipolarity, combined with the opportunity created by September 11, opened a space for interpretation that tempted a highly ideological foreign policy cohort to seize on international terrorism as an issue to transform the balance of power in both the international system and American party politics. This cohort's response to the terrorist attack was grounded in ideological sincerity, but also in the routine practice of wedge issue politics, which had been honed on domestic issues during three decades of partisan ideological polarization and then extended into foreign policy.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Government, International Political Economy, and Terrorism
Political Geography:
United States and America

4. Democratization and Civil War

Author:
Jack Snyder and Edward Mansfield
Publication Date:
02-2008
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies
Abstract:
Many observers have argued that promoting democracy abroad promotes peace. Mature, stable democracies have not fought wars against each other, and they rarely suffer from civil wars. But the path to the democratic peace is not always smooth. We argue that during the initial phase of a democratic transition, states face a heightened risk of civil war. When authoritarian regimes break down, a panoply of elite factions and popular groups jockey for power in a setting in which repressive state authority has been weakened, yet democratic institutions are insufficiently developed to take their place. This can lead to civil war through the lack of institutional means to regulate or repress factional strife. We test this argument by conducting a statistical analysis. The results indicate that countries in the initial stages of democratization are more than twice as likely to experience civil war as are stable regimes or regimes undergoing a transition to autocracy. Then we discuss the causal mechanisms linking democratization and civil war in cases drawn from the statistical analysis. These findings underscore the risks in trying to promote peace through democratization in countries that lack the institutions to contain factional and communal conflicts.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, International Relations, and Democratization