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Begin New Search Topic Treaties and Agreements Author Jørgen Mortensen

1. Economic Policy Coordination in the Economic and Monetary Union: From Maastricht via the SGP to the Fiscal Pact

Author:
Jørgen Mortensen
Publication Date:
08-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for European Policy Studies
Abstract:
This paper first takes a step backwards with an attempt to situate the recent adoption of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union in the context of discussions on the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and the 'Maastricht criteria', as fixed in the Maastricht Treaty for membership in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in a longer perspective of the sharing of competences for macroeconomic policy-making within the EU. It then presents the main features of the new so-called 'Fiscal Compact' and its relationship to the SGP and draws some conclusions as regards the importance and relevance of this new step in the process of economic policy coordination. It concludes that the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union does not seem to offer a definitive solution to the problem of finding the appropriate budgetary-monetary policy mix in EMU, which was already well identified in the Delors report in 1989 and regularly emphasised ever since and is now seriously aggravated due to the crisis in the eurozone. Furthermore, implementation of this Treaty may under certain circumstances contribute to an increase in the uncertainties as regards the distribution of the competences between the European Parliament and national parliaments and between the former and the Commission and the Council.
Topic:
Economics, Markets, Regional Cooperation, Treaties and Agreements, and Monetary Policy
Political Geography:
Europe

2. Economic Policy Coordination in EMU: What Role for the SGP?

Author:
Jørgen Mortensen
Publication Date:
06-2004
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for European Policy Studies
Abstract:
The present paper discusses the implications of the recent institutional crisis in the EU provoked by the failure of the Economic and Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN) to impose the sanction on Germany and France provided for in the Stability and Growth Pact, along with Article 104 and the associated protocol of the Maastricht Treaty. The paper situates the debate concerning the application of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) in a broader evolution of the struggle between two schools of thought concerning macroeconomic policy–making in the European Union: the school calling for a strengthening of competences at the EU level (federal economic government) and the school arguing for preserving national competences for budgetary policy even in the face of the transfer of competence for monetary policy to the European Central Bank (ECB). The paper argues that the SGP represents an acceptable comprise between the two views of the schools in so far as it establishes rules to be respected without actually transferring competence to the Council in the field of budgetary policy. Consequently, the SGP has not and does not add to the 'democratic deficit' within the EU institutional framework. The paper argues, nevertheless, that the excessive deficit procedure (EDP) puts too strong an emphasis on the government budget deficit and suggests that emphasis on the sustainable level of public debt would ensure a stronger basis for assessing whether a given budget deficit may be considered excessive or not.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Economics, and Treaties and Agreements
Political Geography:
Europe, France, and Germany