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1. Executive Power and the Role of Congress in the Paris Climate and Iran Nuclear Agreements

Author:
Gwynne Taraska and Hardin Lang
Publication Date:
01-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
In recent months, multilateral efforts have produced two historic agreements aimed at improving global security: the Iran nuclear agreement and the Paris climate agreement. The Iran nuclear agreement, which blocks Iran’s nuclear capacity in exchange for a gradual lifting of economic sanctions, was finalized in July and is expected to be implemented imminently. Before negotiations concluded, Congress passed the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015, which gave Congress a 60-day period in which it could seek to pass a joint resolution of disapproval. On September 10, all but four Democrats in the U.S. Senate voted to filibuster such a resolution. The agreement, which is nonbinding under international law, therefore proceeded without the need for a presidential veto. Concurrently, the country parties to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, or UNFCCC, were negotiating an international agreement to rein in greenhouse gas emissions and improve resilience to the effects of climate change. The agreement, which has force under international law, was finalized in Paris on December 12. It obliges countries to submit and update national climate goals and participate in systems to review national and collective progress. In the run-up to the Paris agreement, Congress held several hearings, but there were no developments akin to the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act. As these two feats of international cooperation were under negotiation, Congress played an unusually involved role in the case of Iran but a more minimal role in the case of Paris. This brief discusses the status of both agreements and explains why the Iran and Paris agreements differ with respect to triggers of congressional intervention.
Topic:
Climate Change, Environment, Multilateral Relatons, and Paris Agreement
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

2. The Flow of Foreign Fighters to the Islamic State

Author:
Hardin Lang and Muath Al Wari
Publication Date:
03-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
Foreign fighters have long been a key element of transnational jihad. In the 1980s, foreigners flocked to South Asia to fight alongside the Afghan mujahedeen. The same thing occurred to a lesser extent in Bosnia and Chechnya in the 1990s and again following the 2003 invasion of Iraq. But the Syrian civil war and the subsequent rise of the Islamic State—also known as IS, ISIS, or ISIL—have broken new ground. Never before have jihadi foreign fighters rallied at the speed and scale as they have in the territory that IS now controls. Today, between 31,000 and 27,000 fighters from more than 86 countries are estimated to have made the journey to join the ranks of IS and other extremist groups, doubling the 2014 numbers. These foreign fighters fill leadership roles within the organization’s hierarchy and seem to be disproportionately responsible for the atrocities and brutality for which IS has become infamous. IS uses this extreme violence to create a climate of impunity and to intimidate both civilian populations and potential enemies. In addition, the recent attacks in Paris vividly demonstrated the international terrorist threat that foreign fighters pose. Finally, these fighters present a long-term challenge to their source countries if and when they return. In response, the U.S.-led Global Coalition to Counter ISIL has prioritized the flow of foreign fighters as one of its five major lines of effort. In 2015, United Nations Security Council Resolution 2178, or UNSCR 2178, was adopted with the specific aim of addressing the foreign fighter threat. Similarly, the coalition has established a working group to coordinate multilateral efforts to impede the flow of foreign fighters to Syria and Iraq and to implement the UNSCR. But much work remains to be done.
Topic:
Terrorism, Islamic State, Multilateralism, and Foreign Fighters
Political Geography:
Global Focus

3. Strengthening the Palestinian Economy to Keep a Two-State Solution Viable

Author:
Hardin Lang and Rudy deLeon
Publication Date:
04-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
It has been more than two decades since the signing of the first Oslo Accord, which set into motion a process that was designed to achieve a lasting peace based on a two-state solution. Subsequent rounds of diplomacy have failed to realize that vision. Growing numbers of Israelis and Palestinians have begun to question the “land for peace” bargain. Yet the strategic logic of a two-state solution, with an independent state of Palestine alongside the state of Israel, remains strong. Without two states—both viable, thriving, secure, and free—Israel faces a difficult dilemma in reconciling its identity as a Jewish state with its tradition of democracy. The stalled peace negotiations have left Palestinians looking for other options to achieve greater control over their own affairs. Former Palestinian Authority Prime Minister Salam Fayyad has called for a long-term nation-building project independent of negotiations with Israel to set the foundations for an eventual Palestinian state. But various crises continue to chip away at the legitimacy of the Palestinian Authority, or PA. Plans for a Palestinian political transition also remain opaque. As one observer in the West Bank town of Ramallah put it, “There is no longer a story that Palestinians can tell themselves about how our lives get better.” In recent years, some Palestinians have shifted their rhetoric toward the pursuit of full economic and political rights as part of a so-called one-state solution. For his part, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas has sought to increase international pressure on Israel to force recognition of Palestinian statehood. This strategy hinges on a campaign to leverage international boycotts, divestment, and sanctions—or BDS—against Israel. But some BDS leaders have conflated opposition to Israeli policy in the West Bank with a challenge to the “legitimacy of the concept of Israel as a democratic and Jewish State”—a stance at direct odds with the objective of a two-state solution. The next U.S. president will enter office facing an unresolved Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The new administration will need to take steps to sustain a two-state solution until a resumption of talks becomes politically feasible. As the Center for American Progress has previously argued, the window on a two-state solution is rapidly closing. Key security, institutional, and economic challenges must be addressed to keep that window open. This report looks at the set of economic challenges that must be tackled in order to maintain a viable Palestinian polity capable of anchoring a future Palestinian state.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and State Building
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Jerusalem

4. After Liberation

Author:
Hardin Lang and Muath Al Wari
Publication Date:
07-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
Two years on, the U.S.-led campaign against the Islamic State, or IS,* has achieved some important gains. This is particularly true in Iraq, where the liberation of Fallujah last month has focused attention on Mosul—the capital of the so-called caliphate. But military victory is only half the battle. As the Islamic State is pushed out of Iraqi cities and towns, the communities it ruled must be integrated back into Iraq. Nature abhors a vacuum; the U.S.-led Global Coalition to Counter ISIL should do more to support the Iraqi government in filling that vacuum. For its part, the Iraqi government itself must display a greater commitment to inclusive governance that reinforces its own legitimacy. Failure to do so would risk squandering hard-won gains by setting the stage for the Islamic State—or its successor—to return. It also could undercut U.S. strategic goals in the Middle East more broadly. The key will be to close the gaps in resources and priority afforded to the different elements of the global coalition’s campaign. That campaign is organized along five lines of effort: military efforts, counter-finance, stopping the flow of foreign fighters, stabilization, and strategic messaging. The military line, otherwise known as Operation Inherent Resolve, has cut the territory controlled by the Islamic State almost in half. Other key coalition lines have yielded less robust results. In particular, efforts to stabilize territory in the wake of combat operations have not kept pace with progress on the battlefield—even as that progress makes stabilization all the more urgent.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Islamic State, Political stability, and State Building
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

5. After Liberation

Author:
Hardin Lang and Muath Al Wari
Publication Date:
07-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
Two years on, the U.S.-led campaign against the Islamic State, or IS,* has achieved some important gains. This is particularly true in Iraq, where the liberation of Fallujah last month has focused attention on Mosul—the capital of the so-called caliphate. But military victory is only half the battle. As the Islamic State is pushed out of Iraqi cities and towns, the communities it ruled must be integrated back into Iraq. Nature abhors a vacuum; the U.S.-led Global Coalition to Counter ISIL should do more to support the Iraqi government in filling that vacuum. For its part, the Iraqi government itself must display a greater commitment to inclusive governance that reinforces its own legitimacy. Failure to do so would risk squandering hard-won gains by setting the stage for the Islamic State—or its successor—to return. It also could undercut U.S. strategic goals in the Middle East more broadly. The key will be to close the gaps in resources and priority afforded to the different elements of the global coalition’s campaign. That campaign is organized along five lines of effort: military efforts, counter-finance, stopping the flow of foreign fighters, stabilization, and strategic messaging. The military line, otherwise known as Operation Inherent Resolve, has cut the territory controlled by the Islamic State almost in half. Other key coalition lines have yielded less robust results. In particular, efforts to stabilize territory in the wake of combat operations have not kept pace with progress on the battlefield—even as that progress makes stabilization all the more urgent.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Islamic State, Political stability, and State Building
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, North America, and United States of America