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1. Iran-Russia Defense Cooperation: Current Realities and Future Horizons

Author:
Hanna Notte and Jim Lamson
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
Key Takeaways: (1) Big leap forward. Against the backdrop of Russia’s war against Ukraine, the Iran-Russia defense relationship has moved past the previous client-patron dynamic, with Iran emerging as an important provider of defense technology to Russia. Bilateral cooperation has expanded both in degree and in kind. In pre-existing areas of cooperation—such as electronic warfare, space, cyberspace, and military-to-military contacts—engagement has accelerated or deepened. Since 2022, Iran and Russia have also cooperated in entirely new areas. Those have included Iran’s provision of uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs), UAV production technology, and UAV training to Russia, alongside Iran’s multifaceted support for Russia’s ground war and assistance with expertise on evading sanctions. (2) The gloves are off. Since February 2022, what were historically key drivers of defense cooperation—a shared animosity toward the United States and the international order it promotes (including in the Middle East), and each side’s interest in military technology that the other side can offer—have increased in importance. Key constraints—Russia’s susceptibility to U.S. or Western pressure, causing it to limit cooperation with Iran; Russian concerns with adhering to nonproliferation norms and export control regimes; Russian reputational concerns over collaborating with Iran; Iran’s inability to pay for Russian technology; or historical mistrust—have become less relevant with Moscow’s growing dependence on Iran and its increased enmity toward the United States and Europe. (3) Growing institutionalization. Amid a general increase in numbers of mutual visits and high-level engagements among military and defense officials, Iran and Russia have taken steps to further institutionalize their defense relationship. Those have included work on a new strategic cooperation agreement to replace the one from 2001, forays into joint production of some weapon systems, and joint efforts to develop the International North-South Transport Corridor and other infrastructure that should provide a further boost to defense cooperation. (4) Thinking about the future in three steps. We propose a three-step methodology to think through the contours of bilateral defense cooperation over the next three to five years. It involves a) extrapolating from current trend lines, drivers, and constraints; b) drawing up inventories of future military needs for each country and identifying the areas in which the other country could help meet those needs; and c) accounting for potential high-impact scenarios and developments that may trigger dramatic shifts in cooperation. The latter include various scenarios of war in the Middle East, the end of Russia’s military campaign against Ukraine, and regime change in either Russia or Iran. (5) Neither a transactional relationship nor a military alliance. Present trend lines and drivers suggest that the relationship is no longer purely transactional and will probably not lapse back into the patron-client dynamic that characterized it prior to 2022, even once the war in Ukraine ends. Iran and Russia each have specific military-technical needs that the other might help meet. That said, beyond Russia’s campaign against Ukraine, Iranian needs from Russia will be greater than Russian needs for advanced technology from Iran. Other constraints—chiefly both countries’ challenges in procuring advanced components because of sanctions, Russia’s aversion to antagonizing the Gulf Arab states, and Russia’s enduring technological superiority in key areas—will also likely continue to act as brakes on the defense relationship, precluding it from developing into a full-fledged military alliance.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Nonproliferation, Russia-Ukraine War, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, Eurasia, and Middle East

2. Russia, The Global South and Multilateral Nuclear Diplomacy after the Invasion of Ukraine

Author:
Hanna Notte
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 had a detrimental impact on multilateral nuclear diplomacy. The war caused an earthquake in procedure, paralyzing processes at the International Atomic Energy Agency, the United Nations First Committee, and meetings dealing with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. This was the case even as Russia’s nuclear saber-rattling and occupation of Ukrainian nuclear power plants, and Europe’s recommitment to nuclear weapons, demonstrated the ongoing need for nuclear dialogue. States from the Global South tended to navigate cautiously vis-à-vis Russia across the multilateral nuclear negotiating forums. Amid greater difficulties in forging common positions on nuclear issues related to the Ukraine war, these states were also frustrated with what they perceived as a deprioritization of their interests in multilateral nuclear diplomacy. Western states, especially during the first year of the war, were seen as exercising unwelcome pressure on the Global South to take sides against Russia. Russia, meanwhile, pursued a dual strategy, undermining nonproliferation efforts and chipping away at trust in legacy institutions, while also leveraging these forums in pursuit of greater alignment with states in the Global South. The implications of these different dynamics for the health of the nuclear order may take some time to fully play out, but will likely be profound.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Nonproliferation, Multilateralism, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Global Focus, and Global South

3. Strategic Empathy: Examining Pattern Breaks to Better Understand Adversaries’ Acquisition, Threat, and Use of Strategic Weapons

Author:
Sarah Bidgood, Robert Carlin, Siegfried S. Hecker, Jim Lamson, and Hanna Notte
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
Drawing from the work of Zachary Shore and others, we define strategic empathy as “the sincere effort to identify and assess the genuine patterns of an adversary’s acquisition, threat of use, and use of strategic weapons and the underlying drivers and constraints that shape them.” This concept encapsulates a mindset, a lens, and an approach that help us to understand an adversary’s strategic thinking. In the context of this study, we apply strategic empathy as a tool to examine U.S. adversaries’ policies and actions concerning the acquisition, threat, and use of strategic weapons. It is important to clarify that strategic empathy is not synonymous with sympathy or agreement with the adversary’s viewpoint, nor does it seek to excuse or justify its actions. Instead, it operates on a policy “agnostic” basis, facilitating a more holistic, nuanced understanding of the adversary that can inform strategies of coercion, cooperation, or a mix of both, depending on the circumstances. In this study, our approach for conducting case studies was primarily rooted in Zachary Shore’s book, A Sense of the Enemy: The High Stakes History of Reading Your Rival’s Mind, which focuses on examining what Shore terms “pattern breaks.” These pattern breaks encompass surprising or shocking, high-impact occurrences, and can be either events that affect an adversary or behaviors by the adversary itself. We apply this approach to examining eight pattern breaks for Russia, North Korea, and Iran related to their acquisition, threat, and use of strategic weapons. The aim of these case studies is to shed light on the adversaries’ patterns related to strategic weapons and the underlying drivers and constraints that shape them. Through this approach, strategic empathy offers a valuable tool, but it is not intended as a stand-alone approach. Rather, it offers a complementary perspective to other analytical approaches. It is also not intended as a causal theoretical framework but rather an alternative lens that can contribute to a more holistic and nuanced understanding of the adversary.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Nuclear Weapons, Nonproliferation, and Strategic Empathy
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, North Korea, Global Focus, and United States of America

4. Dangerous Decline: Russia’s Military and Security Influence in the Global South and the Implications for the United States

Author:
Hanna Notte
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
This study argues that Russia seeks to boost its military and security influence in the Global South in light of what it considers a protracted, systemic confrontation with Western states. Russia’s capacity to accrue such influence will vary considerably by domain and country. The war against Ukraine and its effects on Russia’s economy, technology base, and reputation are shaping demand and supply side factors—what states in the Global South want from Russia, and what Russia can offer. Though Russian power projection in the Global South will be limited, the impact of Moscow’s actions on U.S. strategic interests will not be trivial.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Nonproliferation, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, United States of America, and Global South

5. An Oral History of the Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) Working Group

Author:
Hanna Notte and Chen Kane
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
The full research report on the Oral History of the Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) Working Group is now available to read and download. The report, authored by Dr. Hanna Notte and Dr. Chen Kane, draws on archival documents and interviews with working group participants to piece together a comprehensive account of the series of ACRS multilateral and bilateral meetings which took place in the early 1990s between states and entities in the Middle East. Dr. Notte and Dr. Kane conducted and compiled dozens of oral history interviews with diplomats and officials who participated in the ACRS multilateral meetings in the early 1990s, following on the heels of the Madrid Conference of 1991. Transcripts of these oral history interviews, the transcript of a critical oral history roundtable on ACRS (convened in November 2021), and previously-unpublished documents on ACRS from US Presidential archives and private collections of American diplomats, are all freely available in a new digital archive, ACRS Oral History Project, hosted on the Wilson Center’s website.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nonproliferation, Oral History, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America