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Begin New Search Publishing Institution Arms Control Association Author Greg Thielmann

11. The Breakout Option: Raising the Bar for the Supreme Leader

Author:
Greg Thielmann
Publication Date:
04-2012
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
The U.S. intelligence community still assesses that Tehran has not yet actually decided to build a nuclear weapon. Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei would be the one to give that order and the one who would control the weapons. It is therefore worth pondering what steps could discourage him from proceeding down the nuclear weapons path. If Khamenei's foremost goals are the survival of the Islamic Republic with himself as supreme leader, developing nuclear capabilities may be seen an asset, even with the damaging sanctions that result. By positioning himself as a defiant defender of Iranian nuclear progress against foreign bullying, he can reinforce the domestic legitimacy of the clerical regime. If he came to believe that Iran could forestall continuing economic punishment and eventual military attack only by abject capitulation, he might decide that breaking out of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to build a bomb would be the preferred path for restoring Iran's international position and securing the Islamic revolution. The challenge for the United States is to devise policies that would make it as difficult as possible for Khamenei to retain domestic support and international sympathy if he were to go for a bomb.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Intelligence, Nuclear Weapons, and History
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

12. Long-Range Ballistic Missile Development: A Tale of Two Tests

Author:
Greg Thielmann
Publication Date:
05-2012
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
North Korea's failed attempt to launch a satellite from its Unha-3 space rocket on April 13 and India's successful flight test of the Agni-5 long-range missile on April 19 marked significant events in the ballistic missile development programs of the two countries. These two ballistic missile test events not only reveal technical information about system performance, but also invite reflection on U.S. policy responses. The demonstration of North Korean failure and Indian success is only the most readily accessible feature of the story. The broader implications for U.S. nonproliferation and security policies are more complicated and less obvious. Both cases imply U.S. failure to accurately assess threats and to adopt appropriate responses for mitigating those threats.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Weapons
Political Geography:
India, North Korea, and United States of America

13. Iran Nuclear Negotiations: What's Next After Moscow?

Author:
Greg Thielmann
Publication Date:
06-2012
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
On June 19, Iran concluded the third round of talks on its nuclear program in as many months, this time in Moscow, with senior officials of the six powers - the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia, and China. Although there were strong incentives for the six to secure limits on Iran's most worrisome stockpiles of enriched uranium and for Iran to avoid an impending tightening of economic sanction, no breakthrough was achieved by the end of the latest round. But neither did diplomatic dialogue come to an end. The sides reached agreement to meet again at a technical level within two weeks in Istanbul, to be followed by renewed contact between the senior negotiators. With perseverance from the parties, the ongoing talks can mark the end of the beginning rather than the beginning of the end of chances for ultimate resolution.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, and Sanctions
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, Eurasia, and Middle East

14. Submarine Nuclear Reactors: A Worsening Proliferation Challenge

Author:
Greg Thielmann
Publication Date:
07-2012
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
A long submerged flaw in the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) surfaced conspicuously in June when Iran announced it intended to build a nuclear-powered submarine. The treaty does not ban a non-nuclear weapons state's production of weapons-grade uranium if it is to be used to power a naval reactor. What many now consider a proliferation loophole in the NPT was first seen as theoretical because only nuclear weapons states had nuclear-powered submarines when the treaty was negotiated. Now, as more and more countries initiate or announce intentions to initiate nuclear-powered submarine programs, this excuse for enriching uranium to levels beyond the needs of civilian power reactors intensifies the challenge of achieving U.S. nonproliferation goals. The United States should adjust its policy by: 1) choosing a reactor for the Ohio-class SSBN follow-on that does not require weapons-grade fuel and 2) pushing for multilateral action to close or at least narrow the NPT loophole that allows for non-nuclear weapons states to produce highly enriched uranium for naval reactors.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Submarines, and Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

15. Strategic Missile Defense: A Threat to Future Nuclear Arms Reductions?

Author:
Greg Thielmann
Publication Date:
01-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
With Russia’s ratification of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), the stage is now set for new discussions between Washington and Moscow on further steps toward reducing the two states’ enormous nuclear arsenals that together comprise more than 90 percent of total nuclear weapons worldwide. Based on statements in Russia’s ratification documents and the statements of Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, continued U.S.-Russian disagreements on missile defenses threaten to undermine those future talks. U.S. policymakers need to consider ways to prevent strategic missile defense system development and deployment from becoming an obstacle to progress in enhancing stability and reducing nuclear dangers. In his latest Threat Assessment Brief, ACA’s senior fellow Greg Thielmann analyzes the nature of the U.S.-Russian missile defense challenge.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:
Russia, North America, and United States of America

16. Assessing Iran's Nuclear Program Without Exaggeration or Complacency

Author:
Greg Thielmann
Publication Date:
10-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
Shortly after the early September release of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s report on Iran’s nuclear program, the Arms Control Association assembled a panel of top experts to assess the status of Iran’s nuclear effort and examine strategies to address it. The September 19 briefing for Congressional staffers was part of an ongoing series of briefings organized by ACA and its partners on “Solving the Iranian Nuclear Puzzle.” Along with nuclear terrorism, the potential acquisition of nuclear weapons by states not yet in possession of them is at the forefront of U.S. national security concerns. Iran dominates the field. The following Iran Nuclear Brief by Mark Fitzpatrick, Director of the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Program at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London, is based on his presentation at the September 19 briefing. It provides a status report on Iran’s nuclear and missile programs and an evaluation of their potential as a nuclear weapons threat.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, National Security, Nuclear Weapons, Terrorism, and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

17. The IAEA’s November Report on Iran: More Confirmation than Revelation

Author:
Greg Thielmann and Benjamin Loehrke
Publication Date:
12-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
The release of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s latest report on Iran’s nuclear program in early November attracted intense media interest and stimulated strong political reactions in the United States and around the world. The IAEA report and its 14-page annex represented a milestone for the Vienna-based agency in terms of its willingness to present detailed information to the public on activities of concern in Iran’s nuclear program. The Arms Control Association provided an in-depth assessment of the IAEA report on November 8, 2011. Yet much of the subsequent press coverage has been inaccurate in its comparison of the IAEA’s latest report with past characterizations of Iran’s nuclear activities – most notably, the public summary of the 2007 U.S. National Intelligence Estimate. The following Iran Nuclear Brief elucidates the similarities and differences in those two documents, incorporating an earlier article by ACA’s senior fellow, Greg Thielmann, and Benjamin Loehrke, senior policy analyst for the Ploughshares Fund, which was published in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists on November 23, 2011.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

18. New START Verification: Fitting the Means to the Ends

Author:
Greg Thielmann
Publication Date:
02-2010
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) promises to lock in significant reductions in U.S. and Russian strategic arsenals by establishing lower ceilings on deployed weapons. The treaty’s verification provisions are means to that end--providing confidence that the sides are complying with those lower limits. Although the goal is to establish the high confidence levels maintained during the 15 years of the original START (1994-2009), the successor agreement will achieve that goal with more focused and up-to-date methods, including innovative verification provisions for deployed warhead ceilings. START’s multilayered limits and the elaborate verification measures flowing out of them were born of the Cold War. New START verification can be streamlined in accordance with the new, simplified limits and in response to post-Cold War realities. In assessing the new treaty, it is critical that verification provisions be judged by how well they fulfill their core function.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START)
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, North America, and United States of America

19. New START Verification: Up to the Challenge

Author:
Greg Thielmann
Publication Date:
05-2010
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
The multilayered limits of the original Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and the elaborate verification measures flowing out of them were born of the difficult negotiations conducted in the waning days of the Soviet Union. The streamlined verification measures in the New START agreement, finalized in April 2010, are an appropriate response to the replacement treaty’s specific limits, which are designed to address post-Cold War realities. Combining proof-tested measures from 15 years of START implementation with new approaches to contemporary challenges, New START verification provisions are well suited to fulfill their core function. These provisions promise to permit the same high confidence in compliance achieved when the original START was in force, but will do so with more focused and up-to-date methods, including innovative verification provisions for monitoring deployed warhead ceilings.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Cold War, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START)
Political Geography:
Global Focus

20. To Curtail the Iranian Nuclear Threat, Change Tehran's Threat Perceptions

Author:
Greg Thielmann
Publication Date:
04-2009
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
Iran’s pursuit of nuclear technology, and possibly nuclear weapons, stems from its complicated threat environment and the historical grievances it harbors concerning the United States. Tehran now faces large numbers of U.S. troops in its neighbors to the west and east with few regional allies. The most productive path for averting nuclear weapons development in Iran is for Washington to seek to alter Iran’s threat perceptions.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, National Security, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, and United States of America