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11. In Support of Market-Driven Standards

Author:
Matthias Bauer, Fredrik Erixon, Oscar Guinea, and Vanika Sharma
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
The EU published its new Standardisation Strategy in 2022. The strategy contains some good ideas to improve the way European standards are set. However, in its attempt to gain more control over technical standards, the EU risks killing the goose that lays the golden egg. The primary motivation behind the strategy is the belief that the process governing the way CEN, CENELEC, and ETSI – the three European Standardisation Organisations – take decisions over EU standards favours non-EU multinationals. To address this perceived imbalance, EU National Standardisation Bodies will have the exclusive power to accept standardisation requests, and adopt, revise and withdraw European technical standards. These changes are particularly significant for ETSI, Europe’s Standardisation Body in charge of telecommunication standards and one of Europe’s most successful organisations. ETSI is a prime example of EU normative power since it hosts companies from more than 60 countries, while retaining a large membership of EU firms. The regulatory changes included in the strategy are not risk-free. There could be unintended consequences that may undermine a standardisation system that has delivered significant economic benefits for the EU and the world. First, giving more responsibility to EU’s National Standardisation Organisations will turn a European discussion into 30 (EU and EEA) national debates. As a consequence, small companies will not be able to contribute to each and every one of the National Standardisation Organisations, diluting their contribution, while multinational companies, with the resources needed to cooperate with a larger number of bodies, will benefit from an expanding role in the EU standard setting process. Second, if standards are fragmented along national borders and companies must multiply their efforts to take part in several Standardisation Development Organisations, there will be less resources for Research and Development spending. Finally, if each and every National Standardisation Organisation needs to have a position with regards to the acceptance of a standardisation request, or adoption, revision and withdrawal of European technical standards, the time period required to adopt a technical standard may be extended rather than shortened, which is the exact opposite of what the European Commission wants to achieve. The regulatory changes included in the EU Standardisation Strategy are akin to cracking a nut with a sledgehammer. If the European Commission is concerned about the influence of non-EU companies in European Standardisation Bodies, it does not need to overhaul their governance systems. Supporting greater participation of European firms in the European standard system will ease EU’s concerns without the downside risks associated with changing the rules of the game that govern Europe’s Standardisation Bodies. The success of the European standardisation system, which is market-driven and based on consensus, has had significant economic benefits in the development of specific industries, like the European Information and Communication Technologies (ICT). Technical standards in ICT have shaped a European industry that is not only dynamic and international but also enjoys some of the highest levels of wages and Research and Development spending. Moreover, if technical standards are not developed through an open, consensus-based, and industry-led voluntary process, they will be developed in different ways. For instance, governments and private companies can develop standards by themselves. Both solutions are inferior to the current market-driven approach that governs European standards. However, the European market-driven approach to set standards is voluntary, and its success and continuation must not be assumed. European policymakers should be worried about tinkering with a European standardisation system which has produced economic specialisation and innovation to the benefits of EU firms and consumers.
Topic:
Markets, European Union, Regulation, Economy, and Standardization
Political Geography:
Europe

12. Reforming Standard Essential Patents: Trade, Specialisation, and International Jurisprudence

Author:
Fredrik Erixon and Oscar Guinea
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
The European Commission is considering a radical overhaul of the system governing Standard Essential Patents (SEPs). A leaked proposal suggests that the Commission wants to take control over the registration of SEPs, take efforts to regulate their essentiality, and intervene in negotiations over royalty rates if parties do not come to an agreement. The underlying assumption is that such a system will benefit SEP implementers and the European economy, and that the common holders of SEPs will be cut down a size or two. The logic behind this policy is that, since there are more SEP implementers than holders, any change in favour of implementers will have a net positive effect on the EU economy. However, this is doubtful. The EU is a R&D powerhouse for many of the technologies protected under SEPs and since most of the global production of the goods using these technologies is done outside Europe, the EU is a net exporter of innovation and a receiver of revenues from the licensing of these technologies. Using data on trade, specialisation, and market revenues, this paper comes to a different conclusion: the EU economy is likely to be a net loser if the balance between holders and implementers is changed. Moreover, there is a general and fundamental interest for Europe to preserve a system of standards and SEPs that allows it to punch above its weight in international policies and practices in standards and patents.
Topic:
Reform, European Union, Trade, Patents, Specialization, European Commission, and Jurisprudence
Political Geography:
Europe

13. Strategic Autonomy and the Competitiveness of Europe’s Innovative Pharmaceutical Sector: A Wake-up Call

Author:
Fredrik Erixon and Oscar Guinea
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
It is high time for Europe to break its relative decline in the pharmaceutical sector. Europe used to be the preeminent region in the world for Research and Development and innovation in the sector – being the location for a majority of R&D and the development of new medicines. However, its competitiveness has been going down for several decades – and, in more recent time, the pace of the decline is now accelerating. Europe is not just outpaced by the United States. Unless there is a new direction, China will soon be ahead of Europe too. Europe is behind the global frontier in innovation and new product development in medicines. It is not just Europe’s share of global R&D that is going down. Of all the new chemical and biological entities that are developed, Europe is contributing a falling share. There is a similar development in the drug pipeline – medicines that are in the regulatory approval process. The location of clinical trials for Advanced Therapy Medicinal Products – an area of new frontline drug development – is moving out of Europe. If Europe is to improve its strategic autonomy and restore competitiveness in the pharmaceutical sector, better policies are needed to incentivise innovation and attract R&D investment. A new strategy for the pharmaceutical industry should include – among other things – better protection of intellectual property, more and focused R&D expenditures, and streamlined regulatory and reimbursement processes.
Topic:
European Union, Pharmaceuticals, Strategic Autonomy, Research and Development, and Competition
Political Geography:
Europe

14. If the EU was a State in the United States: Comparing Economic Growth between EU and US States

Author:
Fredrik Erixon, Oscar Guinea, and Oscar du Roy
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
This Policy Brief is a warning call about Europe’s poor economic growth and its consequences for prosperity. The long-term trend of Gross Domestic Product per capita is crucially important but not always easy to grasp. While it’s common to compare levels of growth between countries in a single year, the reality is that it is the long-term trend that matters. An economy that grows at 3 percent per year will double in 24 years but an economy that grows at 1 percent per year will double only in 48 years. For a long time now, the average growth rate in mature and developed European economies has been closer to 1 than 3 percent. The EU has had positive economic growth but it has been slow in comparison with other developed economies. If European countries were states in the United States, many of them would belong to the group of poorest countries. In this Policy Brief, we rank GDP per capita in EU countries and US states, and the result is dispiriting. The ranking of GDP per capita in 14 EU member states, which together represented 89 percent of EU GDP, was lower in 2021 than in 2000. For instance, France and Germany were as rich as the 36th and the 31st US states in 2000, but twenty-one years later, French GDP per capita was lower than the 48th poorest US state, Arkansas, while German GDP per capita had fallen to become as prosperous as the 38th US state, Oklahoma. GDP per capita in Central and Eastern European countries have grown considerably but their relatively small size and lower starting point stop them from reverting the trend of relative European economic decline. The result of this economic divergence between EU member states and US states is a growing wedge of GDP per capita between the EU and the US, which in 2021 was as large as 82 percent. If the trend continues, the prosperity gap between the average European and American in 2035 will be as big as between the average European and Indian today. This Policy Brief tells a story about the EU’s unfulfilled economic potential but also offers a ray of hope. If the US states have managed to sustain robust rates of economic growth, the EU member states can do it too. However, to do so the EU must bring back economic growth and competitiveness to the centre of its economic policy. If Europe is to face the challenges presented by climate change and the digital transition, the growing burden of an aging society and defence budgets, higher economic growth is not an option but a necessity.
Topic:
European Union, GDP, and Economic Growth
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

15. A Compass to Guide EU Policy in Support of Business Competitiveness

Author:
Fredrik Erixon, Oscar Guinea, Philipp Lamprecht, Vanika Sharma, Elena Sisto, and Erik van der Marel
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
The EU agenda for improving competitiveness is missing in action. Economic competitiveness has been a central plank in the development of the European Union – a relentless quest for policies that lead to more prosperity and that make European companies in world markets more successful. However, since the end of the Lisbon Agenda in 2010, economic competitiveness seems to have fallen off the EU map. This Agenda had its flaws, but it rightly sought to make Europe “the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-economy in the world”. The impression now is that Europe is on the retreat and the current European Commission is the first without a strategy to strengthen competitiveness at the EU level since the early 1990s. Hopefully, a course correction may now be on its way. Ursula von der Leyen has promised a “competitiveness check” on new EU policy. With the strong economic headwinds facing Europe and the world, the EU needs to pursue structural economic reforms that raise productivity and growth.
Topic:
European Union, Business, Regional Economy, and Competition
Political Geography:
Europe

16. The EU Digital Markets Act: Assessing the Quality of Regulation

Author:
Matthias Bauer, Fredrik Erixon, Oscar Guinea, Erik van der Marel, and Vanika Sharma
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
The proposed Digital Markets Act (DMA) is an opportunity to prevent and remedy anti-competitive conduct by large digital platforms. If the Act is designed in an adequate manner to target specific problems, it can improve the contestability of platform services markets and markets that rely substantially on digital services. However, the DMA takes a novel approach to regulation, and novelty in concepts and regulatory requirements can lead to outcomes that later have to be corrected. Fortunately, the EU is not alone in experimenting with new regulations that specifically target the market power of large digital platforms. There is a great scope for policymakers to learn from similar frameworks in Europe and the United States. In this study, we compare key parts of the DMA proposal with similar legislation implemented or proposed in Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States –– in light of established principles for good regulatory design. We analyse the structure and quality of these regulations, not if they go in a certain ideological, political or commercial direction. We find that there are some areas where the EU could learn from other proposals to make the DMA more fit for purpose, and avoid unintended consequences on Europe’s economy.
Topic:
European Union, Regulation, Digital Economy, and Digital Markets Act (DMA)
Political Geography:
Europe

17. After the DMA, the DSA and the New AI regulation: Mapping the Economic Consequences of and Responses to New Digital Regulations in Europe

Author:
Fredrik Erixon, Oscar Guinea, Erik van der Marel, and Elena Sisto
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
The European Union (EU) has pursued an ambitious agenda for regulating the digital economy, and it is now planning to establish a new package of regulations, including the Digital Markets Act (DMA), the Digital Services Act (DSA), and a new regulation of Artificial Intelligence (AI). These regulations build on an already established structure of digital and business regulations in Europe that is comparatively restrictive but that varies substantially between EU member states. In this study, we take stock of the new incoming regulations and review their effect on EU member states’ economies. More precisely, the paper considers how different countries in Europe will be affected by the regulations and how they should balance these effects with policies that help the economy to prosper. The European Commission’s economic analyses and impact assessments of the new regulations are thin. In fact, they are grossly inadequate for the purpose at hand: to better understand how the economy will change because of these regulations. The Commission identifies some benefits – for instance, positive competition outcomes from reduced network effects and more trust in AI-based goods and services. There are good reasons to think that these benefits are real. However, these regulations will also lead to new costs and have broader consequences for firms and resource allocation in the economy. Remarkably, the only costs identified in the impact assessments are direct compliance and administrative costs. Obviously, for far-reaching regulations such as the DMA, the DSA and the AI regulation, the main costs will not be the direct compliance burden, but the dynamic and downstream economic effects spurred by their implementation. This is because these regulations will prompt firms and markets to change their current and future behaviour: these changes are likely to define the most important costs. Furthermore, it is important to get a better idea of the distribution of these costs. It is highly unlikely that all sectors and countries will be affected equally. Some sectors will be more affected than others just as some countries will experience economic consequences that are bigger than in other countries. The question is: what factors will lead to the expected variation in the costs and consequences of the three new regulations? In this paper, we argue that two factors are important for grasping the distributive patterns of costs from digital regulations. First, the industry structure of a country is key. In the economy, countries have different endowment structures, and the modern European economy is defined by factor endowments such as data and digital competences. These factor endowments are exploited in the economy by firms and organisations that use them to create different comparative advantages. In turn, these advantages influence how a firm and a country market, sell and trade. Second, the existing structure of a country’s business and digital regulations will influence how an economy will respond to new and additional digital regulations. In fact, the restrictiveness of regulations that we know to impact on the digital economy vary substantially in the European Union – both between countries and between sectors. This variation will have consequences for the distribution of the costs of the three new regulations that are going to be implemented. This paper maps countries and country groups in the digital economy: their endowments, advantages, and flows. Especially, it evaluates the digital performance of countries in a number of key indicators and data points, and anchors the analysis in the academic literature. The paper points to some specific consequences of the DMA, the DSA and the AI regulation, and how different regulations will affect endowments structures and advantages. One key finding is that the distributive effects of the regulations will depend on size advantages and disadvantages. In short, small economies and small firms will likely carry a disproportionate part of the cost of new digital regulations. Furthermore, countries that have used their endowments to specialise in the digital economy will be more affected than others. On this score, there is a vast difference between EU countries. For instance, countries in Europe’s North – generally small, competitive, and open economies – will be most affected by these new regulatory burdens. Countries in Central and Eastern Europe will also be negatively affected, especially through risks of market exclusion effects for small firms. It is important for European policymakers to now consider how they can avoid that these new digital regulations continuously reinforce size advantages for big economies and big firms. There are some policy strategies that should be considered. First, regulations can be changed to better fit the overwhelming evidence that young, dynamic, and innovative firms drive a substantial part of productivity growth in the economy. Second, EU and national policymakers can pursue policies that make the transition into a more size-balanced economy easier, for instance by taxing and regulating small firms differently. Smaller economies can also be helped by having corporate taxes that are lower than in big economies. Third, EU and national policymakers can reform other digital and business regulations and make them less burdensome. Fourth, the EU can help to support the build-up of digital advantages in smaller economies.
Topic:
Markets, European Union, Regulation, and Digital Economy
Political Geography:
Europe

18. The New Wave of Defensive Trade Policy Measures in the European Union: Design, Structure, and Trade Effects

Author:
Fredrik Erixon, Oscar Guinea, Philipp Lamprecht, Vanika Sharma, and Renata Zilli
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
This study undertakes a comprehensive review of proposed and adopted defensive trade policy instruments in the EU, with the purpose of better understanding their design, functioning, and implications. The study covers eight policy instruments at different stages of development. These are: Anti-Coercion Instrument (ACI), International Procurement Instrument (IPI), Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), Foreign Subsidy Instrument (FSI), Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence (DD), Level Playing Field Provisions in the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement (LPF), Enforcement Regulation (ER), and the Deforestation Initiative (DI). It is understandable that the EU seeks both redressive and retaliatory measures in its trade policy. However, these measures would have the total effect of Europe producing more for itself and being less dependent on imports. This is a significant policy shift, because in their totality the defensive trade policies make the EU more inward-looking. This can lead to major negative consequences. An extensive distortion of trade and markets would reduce the gains from trade and prompt a reallocation of European resources. Notably, the EU is a larger supplier of goods and services than it is a buyer, and an inward-looking policy that leads to retaliation from EU’s trading partners can harm its exports and trade surplus. There are also potential strategic consequences that could follow, and their importance has increased considerable as a result of the Russian war against Ukraine. Under these measures, the EU could introduce new trade frictions with friends and allies, and with countries that the EU seeks closer cooperation with to provide for a safer geopolitical environment. For each of these defensive measures, the study takes an extensive look at the objectives of the instruments, their legality, proportionality, and subsidiarity, the working of the instruments and the division of labour between institutions, as well as their enforceability in conjunction with existing multilateral and bilateral rules affecting the EU. It also attempts to capture the impact and potential for retaliation for the EU and its partners as a result of the implementation of the instruments. The study highlights the areas where the instruments lack clarity, particularly in the implementation of the instrument, the division of labour between the EU and EU member states, and the compliance of the instruments with WTO rules and bilateral FTA provisions. The instruments share some general characteristics. Many of the instruments have been created as retaliatory measures against coercion and unfair trade practices by partner countries. Very often, the partner countries most affected by the instruments are also the same. The United States, China, Russia, the UK, and Turkey are likely to be on the receiving end of the instruments due to the significant volumes of trade and economic interdependence with the EU, but also because they either do not follow the same trade rules as the EU, or the EU wants to maintain with them the current level of competitiveness. Most instruments also use restrictions to the EU market as the main policy lever. The objective is not just about creating an equal playing field but also ensuring that the rest of the world follows EU rules. Particularly, the EU aims at regulating non-EU companies directly and unilaterally through EU policies, which increases the risk of retaliation against the EU. At the same time, there are also important areas of departure in the specifics of each instrument, as illustrated by the varying objectives, measures, compatibility with international obligation, affected sectors, and whether the measures apply automatically or at the discretion of the EU.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Political Economy, European Union, and Trade
Political Geography:
Europe

19. The Good, the Bad and the Ugly: Taking Stock of Europe’s New Trade Policy Strategy

Author:
Fredrik Erixon
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
This Policy Brief takes stock of the EU Trade Policy Review – the Commission’s proposed strategy for trade. Despite appearances, the Review doesn’t come close to its billing as a strategy for the new geopolitics of trade. In fact, the Review is weak on key geopolitical developments and rather gives the impression that the EU doesn’t have an ambition to shape outcomes. Obviously, the Review is anchored in Europe’s general economic climate: defensiveness on globalization, competition and digitalization. It follows that Europe is getting increasingly detached from world developments. There are several good parts in the Review. The Commission wants to revive and reform the World Trade Organisation, and it’s clear about what factors that have made the Geneva-based trade body dysfunctional. The Review also acknowledges that the EU will seek a closer alliance with the United States and use that for constructive purposes. Finally, it is welcome that the Commission proposes some new instruments for dealing with market distortions caused by foreign subsidies and protectionism in government procurement. All these initiatives can achieve good outcomes. However, they all require that Europe makes changes in its own policies and positions. The bad parts in the Review are Europe’s weak agenda for getting better market access in the growth regions in the world and its continued passivity on matters related to China. Europe’s main trade-policy challenge in the next decade is to ensure that businesses and consumers in Europe get better integrated with a world-market dynamism that predominantly will come from the Asian region. Absent a realistic and medium-term strategy for dealing with challenges connected to the rise of China, Europe will have difficulties getting the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment approved. Europe needs an actionable agenda for addressing bilateral frictions with China and problems that occur outside bilateral trade. Finally, the ugly part of the trade strategy are all the commercial policies in the EU – with strong effects on trade – that aren’t recognized or only casually mentioned in the Review. The latter category includes the ambition to introduce an autonomous carbon border tax on imports. Such a policy comes at a high political and economic cost, and the measure’s effect on reducing global carbon emissions is at best very negligible.
Topic:
Globalization, International Political Economy, International Trade and Finance, Treaties and Agreements, European Union, Geopolitics, Digital Economy, and Trade
Political Geography:
Europe

20. China’s Public Procurement Protectionism and Europe’s Response: The Case of Medical Technology

Author:
Fredrik Erixon, Anna Guildea, Oscar Guinea, and Philipp Lamprecht
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
This paper concerns China’s market for medical technologies and how the Chinese state is assisting its own companies to gain greater sales at the expense of producers from Europe and other advanced manufacturing economies. The medical technology sector captures a variety of products, services and solutions which are essential to the provision of healthcare to citizens. Examples range from fairly simple technologies such as sticking platers, to complex ones, such as coronary stents, orthopaedics and pacemakers. In the last decades, Europe’s exports of medical devices to China have grown robustly. On the back of vibrant innovation, firms from Europe and elsewhere have not just followed the growth of Chinese demand for medical devices – they have also increased their share of Chinese imports. Now, however, this market is at risk of being gradually closed off for European firms as China doubles down on various policies that advantage local firms, while ultimately harming innovation and Chinese patients. China has recently introduced a new element in its industrial policy for its medical technology sector – a policy that builds on its long-term ‘made-in-China’ ambition to have local firms taking up the lion’s share of the market for medical devices by 2030. Beijing and provincial governments are using many different policies to provide support to the domestic industry and are in effect pursuing a policy for import substitution. Accessing the Chinese market for medical devices has never been easy but it has become increasingly challenging in recent years. Direct financial support, tax benefits, R&D support, local content requirements, opaque approval systems and other forms of advantages to domestic MedTech producers are now becoming major sources for the behaviour and development of the Chinese medical device market. China’s Fourteenth Five-Year Plan and the country’s new economic model of ‘dual circulation’ reinforces this trend. The Chinese market is becoming less open. Added to that is centralised state procurement – a new public procurement policy in China that was launched in 2019 for medical devices which has led to a grossly distorted procurement market. While this policy has reduced the price of medical devices in a drastic way, it has also paved the way for Chinese firms to take up a larger market share. This procurement policy is gradually squeezing European firms out of the Chinese market. Competition in China is becoming less fair. These policies follow a pattern. In several sectors, Chinese firms have grown their domestic market share through industrial subsidies and policies that restrict market access for foreign firms – or make it more difficult for foreign firms to compete in China. From their domestic market, these firms have then expanded abroad and taken a more prominent role outside of China. Backed by the Chinese state, these firms can squeeze market opportunities even more for otherwise-competitive European producers. Now this development is happening in the MedTech sector. It is urgent for Europe to respond to China’s procurement protectionism. MedTech manufacturers in Europe are often small and medium-sized enterprises, and they already struggle with getting into the Chinese market. China’s new procurement policy has also had a significant impact on Chinese imports of medical devices: a 1.3 billion euro trade deficit for China in medical technology products in 2019 turned into a 5.2 billion euro surplus in 2020. In Africa, Asia and Latin America, competitive European manufacturers are now confronted with competition from Chinese MedTech companies that have the backing of the Chinese state. The competitive distortions in the Chinese market now spill over to the global market – making European MedTech manufacturers even more disadvantaged. Europe should consider a case at the World Trade Organisation (WTO) against China’s policies which reduce European market presence for medical devices. Once agreed, a new International Procurement Initiative might be a useful instrument to wield pressure against the Chinese government to agree to free and fair competition. Europe can also negotiate with China – for instance in the framework of the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) or through the new initiative on trade and health that Europe proposed to the Ottawa Group in 2020. These responses should focus both on remedying China’s current policy for growing its domestic medical technology industry by distorting its market and setting out the core policies and rules that should guide the future market for medical technologies. Fredrik Erixon and Anna Guildea are Director and Research Associate, respectively, at ECIPE. Oscar Guinea and Philipp Lamprecht are Senior Economists at ECIPE. The authors are grateful to a number of experts in the private sector and from the European Commission, the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy in Germany, China’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology that have taken their time to share their knowledge with us.
Topic:
Health, Science and Technology, European Union, and Public Procurement
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia