The Korean War was not inevitable. Neither was its scope and impact. Decisions by the U.S. government, and particularly the administration of Harry S Truman, made both division and war likely on the Korean peninsula. Had the U.S. reacted differently during the conflict, combat would have ended much earlier or expanded more widely. As always, hindsight clarifies. Some adverse consequences were more predictable than others. Policymakers operating in real time with limited information will always face a difficult challenge. However, several decisions surrounding the Korean War were based on a deeply flawed understanding of the facts or an equally flawed prediction of the consequences of particular actions. This article considers the merits of ten of the most consequential decisions made by U.S. policymakers affecting the onset and course of the Korean War.
There is no easy answer to the prospect of a nuclear Democratic People's Republic of Korea. A preemptive war against Pyongyang, even if the strikes were initially directed only at the North's nuclear facilities, would create an unacceptable risk of full-scale war on the peninsula. Sanctions would create their own set of risks. Current punitive economic measures have increased the suffering of millions of North Koreans but have not succeeded in altering President Kim Jong-il's behavior. Further sanctions would certainly not work without the support of the surrounding countries.
The U.S. alliance with the Republic of Korea has been America's most consistently dangerous commitment since the end of World War II. Yet South Korea is beginning to look away from the United States for its defense. Newly elected President Roh Moo-hyun campaigned on a plat-form of revisiting the security relationship, and he has attempted to adopt the role of mediator between America and North Korea.
Topic:
Security and Defense Policy
Political Geography:
United States, America, Israel, East Asia, and Korea