1. How Bargaining Alters Outcomes: Bilateral Trade Negotiations And Bargaining Strategies
- Author:
- Deborah Elms
- Publication Date:
- 06-2005
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
- Abstract:
- This article considers bargaining strategies used by government negotiators in the context of bilateral trade disputes. I argue that trade officials reach the most durable agreements by using an integrative, or value creating, strategy and avoiding the use of threats. By contrast, a highly distributive, value claiming strategy coupled with loud public threats is unlikely to result in a durable agreement and frequently leads to deadlocked negotiations. The irony, however, is that American officials use the latter approach more frequently in bilateral trade disputes, rather than the former. These strategies are usually chosen unconsciously in response to perceptions of losses that drive negotiators to select risky approaches to resolve disputes
- Topic:
- International Relations, Government, and International Trade and Finance
- Political Geography:
- Asia