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Begin New Search Political Geography Europe Author David Wheeler

1. Unity in Diversity: A Global Consensus on Choosing the IMF's Managing Director: Evidence from CGD's Online Survey

Author:
David Wheeler
Publication Date:
09-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Global Development
Abstract:
On May 19, 2011, the Center for Global Development launched an online survey of the global development community on three issues: the selection process for the IMF's managing director, criteria for rating the candidates, and actual ratings for 15 candidates who had been named by the international media. Between May 19 and June 23, CGD received 790 responses from people whose characteristics reflect the diversity of the international finance and development community. Survey participants represent 81 nations, all world regions, high-, middle-, and low-income countries, and all adult age groups. In this working paper, David Wheeler analyzes the survey results, incorporating the diversity of the respondents by dividing participants into four mutually exclusive assessment groups: Europeans, who have a particular interest in this context; non-European nationals of other high-income countries; and nationals of middle- and low-income countries. Although the participants are diverse, their responses indicate striking unity on all three survey issues. First, both European and non-European participants reject Europe's traditional selection prerogative by large margins, with equally strong support for an open, transparent, competitive selection process. Second, participants exhibit uniformity in the relative importance they ascribe to CGD's six criteria for selecting candidates. Third, the participants exhibit striking consistency in rating the fifteen candidates.
Topic:
Development, Economics, International Monetary Fund, and Governance
Political Geography:
Europe

2. Confronting the American Divide on Carbon Emissions Regulation

Author:
David Wheeler
Publication Date:
12-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Global Development
Abstract:
The failure of carbon regulation in the U.S. Congress has undermined international negotiations to reduce carbon emissions. The global stalemate has, in turn, increased the likelihood that vulnerable developing countries will be severely damaged by climate change. This paper asks why the tragic American impasse has occurred, while the EU has succeeded in implementing carbon regulation. Both cases have involved negotiations between relatively rich “Green” regions and relatively poor “Brown” (carbon-intensive) regions, with success contingent on two factors: the interregional disparity in carbon intensity, which proxies the extra mitigation cost burden for the Brown region, and the compensating incentives provided by the Green region. The European negotiation has succeeded because the interregional disparity in carbon intensity is relatively small, and the compensating incentive (EU membership for the Brown region) has been huge. In contrast, the U.S. negotiation has repeatedly failed because the interregional disparity in carbon intensity is huge, and the compensating incentives have been modest at best. The unsettling implication is that an EU-style arrangement is infeasible in the United States, so the Green states will have to find another path to serious carbon mitigation. One option is mitigation within their own boundaries, through clean technology subsidies or emissions regulation. The Green states have undertaken such measures, but potential free-riding by the Brown states and international competitors seems likely to limit this approach, and it would address only the modest Green-state portion of U.S. carbon emissions in any case. The second option is mobilization of the Green states' enormous market power through a carbon added tax (CAT). Rather than taxing carbon emissions at their points of production, a CAT taxes the carbon embodied in products at their points of consumption. For Green states, a CAT has four major advantages: It can be implemented unilaterally, state-by-state; it encourages clean production everywhere, by taxing carbon from all sources equally; it creates a market advantage for local producers, by taxing transport-related carbon emissions; and it offers fiscal flexibility, since it can either offset existing taxes or raise additional revenue.
Topic:
Climate Change, Energy Policy, Environment, and Politics
Political Geography:
United States and Europe

3. Desert Power: The Economics of Solar Thermal Electricity for Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East

Author:
David Wheeler and Kevin Ummel
Publication Date:
12-2008
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Global Development
Abstract:
A climate crisis is inevitable unless developing countries limit carbon emissions from the power sector in the near future. This will happen only if the costs of lowcarbon power production become competitive with fossil fuel power. We focus on a leading candidate for investment: solar thermal or concentrating solar power (CSP), a commercially available technology that uses direct sunlight and mirrors to boil water and drive conventional steam turbines. Solar thermal power production in North Africa and the Middle East could provide enough power to Europe to meet the needs of 35 million people by 2020.
Topic:
Climate Change, Energy Policy, and Science and Technology
Political Geography:
Europe, Middle East, and North Africa

4. Moving Toward A Consensus on Climate Policy: The Essential Role of Global Public Disclosure

Author:
David Wheeler
Publication Date:
11-2007
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Global Development
Abstract:
Among climate scientists, there is no longer any serious debate about whether greenhouse gas emissions from human activity are altering the earth' s climate. There is also a broad consensus on two issues related to reducing emissions. First, developing countries must be full participants in global emissions control, because they will be most heavily impacted by global warming, and because they are rapidly approaching parity with developed countries in the scale of their emissions. Second, efficient emissions control will require carbon pricing via market-based instruments (charges or cap-and-trade). These points of consensus are sufficient to establish a clear way forward, despite continued disagreements over the choice of specific instrument and the appropriate carbon charge level. Since all market-based systems that regulate emissions sources require the same emissions information, the international community should immediately establish an institution mandated to collect, verify and publicly disclose information about emissions from all significant global carbon sources. Its mandate should extend to best-practice estimation and disclosure of emissions sources in countries that initially refuse to participate. This institution will serve four purposes. First, it will lay the necessary foundation for implementing any market-based system of emissions source regulation. Second, it will provide an excellent credibility test, since a country's acceptance of full disclosure will signal its true willingness to participate in globally-efficient emissions reduction. Third, global public disclosure will itself reduce carbon emissions, by focusing stakeholder pressure on major emitters and providing reputational reward s for clean producers. Fourth, disclosure will make it very hard to cheat once market-based instruments are implemented. This will be essential for preserving the credibility of an international agreement to reduce emissions.
Topic:
Environment, Industrial Policy, International Cooperation, and Markets
Political Geography:
Europe