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1. The Future of NATO’s Nuclear Posture and Arms Control in Today’s More Dangerous World

Author:
Miles Pomper, David Santoro, and Nikolai Sokov
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
Since the late 1960s, NATO has sought to balance two objectives—maintaining a strong nuclear deterrent while supporting efforts to buttress strategic stability through arms control and advance nonproliferation and disarmament through the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty process. The success of this strategy was most evident in the dual-track strategy of deployments and negotiations that led to the signing and implementation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 1987. The end of the Cold War also led to substantial cuts in U.S. and Russian strategic systems. Since then, NATO Allies have regularly voiced their support for continuing to pursue these two objectives, including supporting the goal enunciated by U.S. President Barack Obama in 2009 “to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.”1 In the last decade, however, Russia’s malign behavior has undermined NATO arms control efforts to the point that it appears traditional arms control will be effectively dead when the New START agreement—already suspended by Russia—expires in 2026. Russian’s invasion of Ukraine, its repeated nuclear saber-rattling in that conflict, and the deployment of non-strategic nuclear weapons to Belarus has also forced the alliance to look to ways to enhance its deterrence, including its nuclear deterrence. Meanwhile, the massive increase in China’s nuclear arsenal and its growing partnership with Russia, is generating additional pressure to increase U.S. nuclear forces as well as questions about the ability of the U.S. to provide extended deterrence simultaneously to Allies in Europe and Asia. Those doubts have been reinforced by political developments in the United States—and in the war in Ukraine—that have raised anxieties about a decoupling of European and U.S. deterrence and defense and led to fresh discussion of a potential “Eurodeterrent.” Meanwhile, developments in North Korea and Iran—and their increasingly close ties with Moscow—further threaten the viability of the already shaky nuclear and missile nonproliferation regimes and have eroded longstanding cooperation between Washington and Moscow to manage nuclear nonproliferation risks in third countries. In response to these developments, Allies and experts, such as the Congressional Strategic Posture Commission, have proposed various adaptations to the alliance’s nuclear posture, including to its nuclear sharing arrangements. This report examines these deterrence proposals, particularly considering how they support the alliance’s other longstanding objectives of arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation. The paper begins with some background on US/NATO nuclear policy from the end of the Cold War to the further invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. It then delves into changes in Russian nuclear doctrine, Moscow’s nuclear behavior during the Ukraine War, and the Kremlin’s views on future arms control. The report next discusses China’s nuclear modernization and views on arms control and the reaction among NATO and Asian Allies and the international community to these changes. It then discusses potential future U.S. and NATO posture options, including those already being undertaken by NATO or proposed by the US. Congressional Strategic Posture Commission and the State Department’s International Security Advisory Board. It concludes with an analysis of the potential impact of various options on arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation and offers some policy recommendations.
Topic:
NATO, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, and United States of America

2. Nuclear China in the Twenty-First Century: Status and Implications for the World and Europe

Author:
David Santoro
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
In August 2021, shortly after new evidence surfaced that China might be expanding its nuclear arsenal much more extensively and rapidly than previously assumed, Admiral Charles Richard, Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, described Beijing’s military investments as a “strategic breakout.” He underscored that the “explosive growth and modernization of [China’s] nuclear and conventional forces can only be what I describe as breathtaking,” adding that “that word, breathtaking, may not be enough.” Since then, several senior officials in the United States, Europe, and elsewhere have echoed that message and the final report of the bipartisan Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States published in October 2023 concluded that at its current pace, China “will reach rough quantitative parity with the United States in deployed nuclear warheads by the mid-2030s.” The result has been the emergence of work, including by this author, to understand this unprecedented development. This work is in its infancy, however, and more is needed to grasp the scale and scope of Chinese nuclear modernization (especially given that much of it is shrouded in secrecy) as well as its implications for strategic stability, deterrence, and arms control and risk reduction. Existing work has focused primarily on the implications for the United States and, to some extent, the United States and Russia. Yet it is also important to grapple with the implications for Europe, especially the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and reflect on actions that Europeans, individually or with others, should take in response.
Topic:
NATO, Nuclear Weapons, Nonproliferation, and Modernization
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

3. Charting a roadmap for multiparty confidence and security building measures, risk reduction, and arms control in the Indo-Pacific

Author:
David Santoro and Miles Pomper
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
The practice of strategic dialogue, confidence-building measures (CBMs), risk reduction, and arms control has its roots in the nuclear revolution and the Cold War. It thus developed in the Euro-Atlantic because of the realities of the US-dominated, Eurocentric security environment of the time; recall that the United States had just fought the Second World War with a Europe-first strategy. That practice developed primarily in two directions: between the United States and its allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and between the United States and the Soviet Union, the two superpower enemies. The goal of strategic dialogue between the United States and NATO, still in place today, has been to build deterrence of adversaries and defense of the “free world,” and an important by-product has been reassurance of weaker NATO allies by the much stronger United States. To do so, Washington and allied capitals have engaged at many levels, including in the strategic nuclear domain, where they have established shared roles and responsibilities over forward-deployed US nuclear weapons.1 Strategic dialogue between the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia, meanwhile, developed in the context of bilateral arms control discussions. After they built the nuclear capabilities to assure their mutual destruction, and after the Berlin and Cuban crises of 1961 and 1962 when they flirted with nuclear confrontation, the United States and the Soviet Union sought to stabilize their relationship by preserving mutual deterrence. This was achieved through negotiations, which began in the early 1960s and first culminated in a hotline agreement in 1963. This agreement created a direct communication link between Washington and Moscow for use in time of emergency. It was followed by several rounds of talks that led to agreements imposing limits and, later, reductions on US-Soviet/Russian nuclear arsenals. In the late 1990s, US-Russia arms control discussions expanded into the NATO context. Under the auspices of the NATO-Russia Council, at least until the 2010s, the United States, other NATO allies, and Russia explored the requirements of strategic stability in an ongoing dialogue and worked to improve the relationship between the West and Russia.
Topic:
NATO, Arms Control and Proliferation, Dialogue, Confidence Building Measures, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
United States of America and Indo-Pacific