Search

Begin New Search Author David Albright

51. Unprecedented Projected Nuclear Growth in the Middle East: Now Is the Time to Create Effective Barriers to Proliferation

Author:
David Albright and Andrea Scheel
Publication Date:
11-2008
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
Large civil plutonium stocks are set to accumulate for the first time in the wider Middle East over the next two decades. Countries in this conflict-prone region are planning the construction of at least 12 to 13 new nuclear power reactors (Table 1). Using a simple calculation to determine the expected plutonium discharge annually from these reactors, ISIS estimates that regional civil plutonium production could total more than 13,000 kilograms, or 13 tonnes by 2020, and nearly 45 tonnes by 2030 (Table 2). Given that just 8 kg of plutonium is enough to fabricate a nuclear weapon, this figure is significant. These quantities indicate that by 2020 the region may possess enough plutonium for almost 1,700 nuclear weapons. To be usable in a nuclear weapon, this plutonium must first be separated from the irradiated fuel in reprocessing plants. Middle Eastern countries may seek to purchase civil reprocessing plants from suppliers or build them using their domestic capabilities and equipment purchased from abroad. To reduce the risk of proliferation in the Middle East and help lay the basis for a regionwide nuclear weapon free zone (NWFZ), the United States must ensure that plutonium is not separated from irradiated reactor fuel, insist on adequate international inspections of these countries, including the adoption of the Additional Protocol, and develop mechanisms to remove spent fuel from the region.2 Absent such conditions, the incoming administration should discourage the development of nuclear power.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Nuclear Energy
Political Geography:
Middle East

52. Disabling DPRK Nuclear Facilities

Author:
David Albright and Paul Brannan
Publication Date:
10-2007
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
The October 3, 2007 Six-Party Talks accord outlines a roadmap for the disablement of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK) core nuclear facilities. While an agreement on “Second-Phase Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement” has been secured, the specific details of the nuclear disablement process are still being developed. The primary goals of this Working Paper are twofold. First, to establish a definition for the term “disablement” which has only recently achieved widespread usage in the disarmament and nonproliferation community. Second, to outline the types of steps that will or could be taken at key facilities in the DPRK to achieve various disablement objectives. This Working Paper was commissioned by the Korea Working Group (KWG) at the U.S. Institute of Peace. The KWG brings together the leading North Korea watchers from the government and think tank communities to discuss pressing policy issues in the political, security, social, and economic fields.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

53. Disabling DPRK Nuclear Facilities

Author:
David Albright and Paul Brannan
Publication Date:
10-2007
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
During the February 2007 Six-Party Talks in Beijing, negotiators reached agreement on a series of actions aimed at starting the process of verifiably dismantling the nuclear weapons program of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). A key part of this agreement stipulated that after the DPRK shuts down its nuclear facilities, it would “disable” them. The February agreement did not state which facilities would be disabled or how they would be disabled, except to imply that these issues would be subject to further negotiations.
Topic:
International Relations and Regional Cooperation
Political Geography:
Beijing, North Korea, and Korea

54. Dismantling the DPRK’s Nuclear Weapons Program: A Practicable, Verifiable Plan of Action

Author:
David Albright and Corey Hinderstein
Publication Date:
01-2006
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
Verified dismantlement of the nuclear weapons program of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) can be accomplished successfully. Although difficulties abound in reaching an agreement with the DPRK to achieve this goal, the methods and steps involved in the dismantlement process are well understood. Because this goal remains vital to U.S. and international security, the United States has joined with China, Japan, Russia, and South Korea in working toward verified denuclearization of the Korean peninsula with the cooperation of the DPRK. These six nations have launched a series of negotiations, called the Six-Party Talks, aimed at resolving the crisis over the DPRK’s nuclear program. These nations are also attempting to create a plan to dismantle the DPRK’s program in a manner with which all the nations can feel secure.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, International Security, and Disarmament
Political Geography:
Russia, Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

55. Dismantling the DPRK's Nuclear Weapons Program

Author:
David Albright and Corey Hinderstein
Publication Date:
01-2006
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
Verified dismantlement of the nuclear weapons program of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) can be accomplished successfully. Although difficulties abound in reaching an agreement with the DPRK to achieve this goal, the methods and steps involved in the dismantlement process are well understood.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, International Cooperation, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
Korea

56. Middle East Weapons Proliferation: Lessons from Iraq and Beyond

Author:
Michael Eisenstadt and David Albright
Publication Date:
06-2004
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
The culmination of Operation Iraqi Freedom has given rise to much debate concerning the exact nature of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs. Similarly, ongoing negotiations with Iran regarding its nuclear activities have also been dogged by imprecise intelligence and unclear strategies. Both of these cases have led many to realize that noncompliance with weapons inspections does not automatically indicate the existence of hidden weapons programs. Although the Senate Intelligence Committee has yet to issue its report on Iraqi WMD, one could reasonably argue that the situation in Iraq during the 1990s served as an example of how inspections can provide a powerful deterrent against covert WMD activity. At present, it is too early to establish with any certainty the exact nature of Iraqi WMD prior to the invasion. Just as some prewar analyses were mistaken when they claimed to know precisely where Iraq's weapons stockpiles were, it would now be erroneous to declare that the country possessed no WMD before the war or that such weapons are not present there today. One must remain open to various possibilities until history comes down conclusively on either side.
Topic:
Security and Religion
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, and Arab Countries

57. Special Policy Forum Report: Iran's Nuclear Program -- Countdown?

Author:
Michael Eisenstadt and David Albright
Publication Date:
06-2003
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
On June 4, 2003, David Albright and Michael Eisenstadt addressed The Washington Institute's Special Policy Forum. Mr. Albright is president of the Institute for Science and International Security and has also served as an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) weapons inspector in Iraq. Michael Eisenstadt is a senior fellow at The Washington Institute specializing in military and security affairs. His publications include Iranian Military Power: Capabilities and Intentions (The Washington Institute, 1996) and "Living with a Nuclear Iran?" (Survival, Autumn 1999).
Topic:
Security and Religion
Political Geography:
Iraq, Washington, Middle East, and Arabia

58. A New Equation: U.S. Policy toward India and Pakistan after September 11

Author:
Lee Feinstein, David Albright, James C Clad, and Lewis A Dunn
Publication Date:
06-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The shifting geopolitical furniture on the subcontinent since last September's terrorist attacks has placed the United States in the unaccustomed position of having good relations with India and Pakistan at the same time. This has helped to forge a consensus in the United States on some of the core challenges India and Pakistan face, and on the approach Washington must pursue to advance its long-term goals for the region.
Topic:
Foreign Policy
Political Geography:
Pakistan, United States, South Asia, and Asia

59. India and Pakistan’s Fissile Material and Nuclear Weapons Inventory, end of 1998

Author:
David Albright
Publication Date:
10-1999
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
Estimating the size of India and Pakistan’s inventory of separated weapon-grade plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) has become more difficult following their nuclear tests in May, 1998. Both countries treat these numbers as highly classified, partly because such estimates provide a direct indication of the number of nuclear weapons they possess. In the case of Pakistan, what can be surmised is that it has resumed full-scale production of HEU, following a declared moratorium on such production since 1991. Abdul Q. Khan, the father of Pakistan’s uranium enrichment program, announced soon after the Pakistani tests that his country had never stopped making HEU. Although his comment has been greeted skeptically, it indicates that Pakistan may have resumed making weapon-grade uranium well before its tests in May, 1998.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Weapons, Uranium, and Plutonium
Political Geography:
Pakistan, South Asia, and India

60. Fact Sheet: India and Pakistan—Current and Potential Nuclear Arsenals

Author:
David Albright
Publication Date:
05-1998
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
The decision by India to conduct five nuclear tests in May 1998 threatens to spark an all-out nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan. Both India and Pakistan have developed the capability to produce unsafeguarded weapon-grade plutonium and weapon-grade uranium (WGU) for nuclear weapons. However, until now, both countries have constrained their nuclear competition, preferring to keep their arsenals undeployed. In addition, Pakistan decided in the early 1990s to stop producing weapon-grade uranium, in essence capping its stock of material for nuclear weapons. India is widely perceived to have a significantly larger nuclear arsenal than Pakistan. The following estimate shows that if a nuclear arms race developed between India and Pakistan and Pakistan decided to resume WGU production, India’s overwhelming advantage could disappear.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Weapons, and Competition
Political Geography:
Pakistan and India