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41. Performance of the IR-1 Centrifuge at Natanz

Author:
David Albright and Christina Walrond
Publication Date:
10-2011
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
During the past year, the performance of the IR-1 centrifuges at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) has faltered. Although the average monthly production of 3.5 percent low enriched uranium (LEU) has increased to about 150 kg/month, the number of centrifuges needed to produce this LEU has increased disproportionately compared to the previous year. During the last year, Iran has needed 5,860 IR-1 centrifuges to produce this amount of LEU. In the previous year, it would have needed only about 4,820 IR-1 centrifuges to make this quantity of LEU.
Topic:
Nuclear Power, Uranium, and Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP)
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

42. Stuxnet Malware and Natanz: Update of ISIS December 22, 2010 Report

Author:
David Albright, Paul Brannan, and Christina Walrond
Publication Date:
02-2011
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
In the December 22, 2010 ISIS report on Stuxnet, 1 ISIS found that this malware contained important evidence indicating that its target was the IR-1 centrifuges at the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) at Natanz. ISIS focused on the attack sequences generated by a Siemens S7-315 programmable logic controller (PLC) connected to frequency converters of a particular type. The ISIS analysis centered on the rotational frequencies listed in these detailed attack sequences. These frequencies matched, in two cases identically, key frequencies characteristic of the IR-1 centrifuge at the FEP. A further analysis of another attack sequence has revealed that this code contains a description of what appears to be an exact copy of the IR-1 cascade at the FEP. The attack is titled “Sequence C” by Symantec, the computer security company that has conducted the most thorough and reliable open analysis of the malware’s code, or “417 code” after the advanced Siemens S7-417 programmable logic controller that Stuxnet targets. 2 However, the 417 code is not activated and thus unable to launch an attack. 3 Moreover, key data is missing from the code available to Symantec that would define exactly what is affected or sabotaged. 4 Symantec has assessed that the 417 code is likely unfinished, perhaps a work in progress. Additional analysis also lends more support to the conclusion that the Stuxnet malware is aimed principally at destroying centrifuges, not manipulating parameters of the centrifuge cascades so as to lower the production of low enriched uranium (LEU) on a sustained basis. To date, Stuxnet is known to have had at least one successful attack. It is increasingly accepted that, in late 2009 or early 2010, Stuxnet destroyed about 1,000 IR-1 centrifuges out of about 9,000 deployed at the site. The effect of this attack was significant. It rattled the Iranians, who were unlikely to know what caused the breakage, delayed the expected expansion of the plant, and further consumed a limited supply of centrifuges to replace those destroyed. Nonetheless, Iran took steps in the aftermath of the attack that likely reduced further damage by Stuxnet, principally shutting down many centrifuge cascades for months. The shutdown lasted long enough for the malware to be discovered publicly, by which time Iran could have found Stuxnet on the Natanz control systems.
Topic:
Cybersecurity, Nuclear Energy, and Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP)
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

43. Fukushima Crisis: Unmonitored Releases Preliminary Assessment of Accident Sequences and Potential Atmospheric Radiation Releases

Author:
David Albright, Paul Brannan, and Christina Walrond
Publication Date:
03-2011
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
The following chronology details events at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear reactor station in Japan from March 11-25, 2011. It includes notable radiation spikes and corresponding wind patterns, as well as satellite imagery of the plant. All reported times correspond with local time in Japan.
Topic:
Natural Disasters, Fukushima Disaster, Nuclear Energy, and Radiation
Political Geography:
Japan and Asia

44. Characterizing the Crisis at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station

Author:
David Albright and Christina Walrond
Publication Date:
04-2011
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
During the crisis at the Fukushima nuclear power reactors following the earthquake and tsunami on March 11, 2011, the Japanese Safety Authority issued ratings for the accident on the International Nuclear Events Scale (INES). Initially, it stated that the incident was a level 4, but it subsequently raised the levels assigned to each reactor, with the majority receiving a level 5. Table 1 indicates the latest ratings issued March 18 by the Japanese authority, where it has parsed the ratings based on accidents at individual reactors. Although the radioactivity is emitted from different reactor buildings, it represents a collective hazard to public health. As such, the accident should be judged comprehensively, not only in component parts. Simply because some aspects of the crisis were not as catastrophic as others does not lessen the overall severity of the accident. ISIS continues to assess that the accident is a level 6. The INES system exists to communicate with the public about the severity and extent of a nuclear event. It is meant to provide a guide, such as the Richter scale for earthquakes, to qualify a nuclear accident. As such, it is important to accurately rate a radiological event in order to afford the public the time and information needed to take necessary precautions.
Topic:
Natural Disasters, Nuclear Power, and Fukushima Disaster
Political Geography:
Japan and Asia

45. After the 2010 NPT Review Conference: Advancing the Non-Proliferation Pillar

Author:
David Albright and Andrea Stricker
Publication Date:
07-2010
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
Adoption of a consensus final document action plan at the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference on May 28 was a significant achievement for the parties to the NPT. It is a particular achievement for the United States, which fought hard for consensus against great odds. Success was even more important because the last review conference in 2005 ended in acrimony and without a final document. The document demonstrates and reinforces international commitment to the global nonproliferation and disarmament agenda. The parties to the NPT have agreed to implement a set of specific actions that cover a wide variety of areas in support of the three pillars of the NPT: nonproliferation, disarmament, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. These actions are measurable and will provide accountability at the next review conference. The unfortunate news is that the document does not substantially strengthen the nonproliferation pillar of the Treaty, the more urgent priority with regard to the three pillars in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The conference was unsuccessful in significantly advancing support for universal application of the Model Additional Protocol, dealing with noncompliant states such as Iran, addressing withdrawal while a state is noncompliant, and preventing illicit nuclear trade in the wherewithal to make nuclear weapons.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
Global Focus and United States of America

46. IAEA Iran Safeguards Report: Shutdown of Enrichment at Natanz Result of Stuxnet Virus?; Downgrade in Role of Fordow Enrichment Site; LEU Production May Have Decreased

Author:
David Albright, Andrea Stricker, and Christina Walrond
Publication Date:
11-2010
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) released on November 23, 2010 its latest report on the implementation of NPT safeguards in Iran and the status of Iran’s compliance with Security Council Resolutions 1737, 1747, and 1803. The following analysis highlights the IAEA’s key findings, including 1) a mysterious halt to enrichment at Natanz resulted in centrifuges not enriching for up to one week during November 2010, which ISIS speculates could have been the result of the Stuxnet virus; 2) fewer P1 centrifuges are planned for the Fordow enrichment site; and 3) the average monthly rate of low enriched uranium production increased but many additional centrifuges enriching by end of reporting period; and 4) monthly production rates of 20 percent enriched LEU remain steady.
Topic:
Cybersecurity, Uranium, Nuclear Energy, and Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP)
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

47. Did Stuxnet Take Out 1,000 Centrifuges at the Natanz Enrichment Plant?

Author:
David Albright, Paul Brannan, and Christina Walrond
Publication Date:
12-2010
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
In late 2009 or early 2010, Iran decommissioned and replaced about 1,000 IR-1 centrifuges in the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) at Natanz, implying that these centrifuges broke. Iran’s IR-1 centrifuges often break, yet this level of breakage exceeded expectations and occurred during an extended period of relatively poor centrifuge performance. Although mechanical failures or operational problems have often been discussed as causing problems in the IR-1 centrifuges,1 the crashing of such a large number of centrifuges over a relatively short period of time could have resulted from an infection of the Stuxnet malware.2 This malicious code seeks to take over an industrial control system in order to destroy equipment while hiding its presence.3 Given Stuxnet’s much greater prevalence in Iran compared to other countries, it is likely that this malware was aimed at Iran. Stuxnet covertly changes the frequencies of certain types of frequency converters, which control the speed of motors. The frequencies listed in Stuxnet’s attack sequences, including the nominal frequency of a motor, imply that a target is the IR-1 centrifuge.4 However, Stuxnet’s exact purpose or its overall effect on the FEP remains hard to assess. If Stuxnet’s goal was the destruction of all the centrifuges in the FEP, Stuxnet failed. But if its goal was to destroy a more limited number of centrifuges and set back Iran’s progress in operating FEP while making detection of the malware difficult, it may have succeeded, at least for a while.
Topic:
Cybersecurity, Nuclear Energy, Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP), and Centrifuges
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

48. Unprecedented Projected Nuclear Growth in the Middle East: Now Is the Time to Create Effective Barriers to Proliferation

Author:
David Albright and Andrea Scheel
Publication Date:
11-2008
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
Large civil plutonium stocks are set to accumulate for the first time in the wider Middle East over the next two decades. Countries in this conflict-prone region are planning the construction of at least 12 to 13 new nuclear power reactors (Table 1). Using a simple calculation to determine the expected plutonium discharge annually from these reactors, ISIS estimates that regional civil plutonium production could total more than 13,000 kilograms, or 13 tonnes by 2020, and nearly 45 tonnes by 2030 (Table 2). Given that just 8 kg of plutonium is enough to fabricate a nuclear weapon, this figure is significant. These quantities indicate that by 2020 the region may possess enough plutonium for almost 1,700 nuclear weapons. To be usable in a nuclear weapon, this plutonium must first be separated from the irradiated fuel in reprocessing plants. Middle Eastern countries may seek to purchase civil reprocessing plants from suppliers or build them using their domestic capabilities and equipment purchased from abroad. To reduce the risk of proliferation in the Middle East and help lay the basis for a regionwide nuclear weapon free zone (NWFZ), the United States must ensure that plutonium is not separated from irradiated reactor fuel, insist on adequate international inspections of these countries, including the adoption of the Additional Protocol, and develop mechanisms to remove spent fuel from the region. Absent such conditions, the incoming administration should discourage the development of nuclear power.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
Middle East and United States of America

49. North Korea’s Plutonium Declaration: A Starting Point for an Initial Verification Process

Author:
David Albright, Paul Brannan, and Jacqueline Shire
Publication Date:
01-2008
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
On December 27, Japan’s Tokyo Shimbun newspaper quoted U.S. and North Korean officials saying that North Korea had declared a plutonium stockpile of about 30 kilograms. The report was subsequently picked up by several wires, including AFP and UPI. Based on discussions with a knowledgeable official, this roughly 30 kilograms of plutonium apparently refers to a stock of plutonium that North Korea separated from irradiated fuel produced in the five megawatt-electric reactor at Yongbyon. The separation of the plutonium occurred at the Radiochemical Laboroatory at Yongbyon. If this quantity refers to separated plutonium (and not the total quantity of plutonium produced in the spent fuel of several reactor cores), it does fall inside the lower bound of the range of the amount of separated plutonium that ISIS has assessed North Korea could now possess.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Nonproliferation, and Plutonium
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

50. North Korea’s Plutonium Production Declaration: A Starting Point for an Initial Verification Process

Author:
David Albright, Paul Brannan, and Jacqueline Shire
Publication Date:
01-2008
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
On December 27, Japan’s Tokyo Shimbun newspaper quoted U.S. and North Korean officials saying that North Korea had declared a plutonium stockpile of about 30 kilograms. The report was subsequently picked up by several wires, including AFP and UPI. Based on discussions with a knowledgeable official, this roughly 30 kilograms of plutonium apparently refers to a stock of plutonium that North Korea separated from irradiated fuel produced in the five megawatt-electric reactor at Yongbyon. The separation of the plutonium occurred at the Radiochemical Laboroatory at Yongbyon. If this quantity refers to separated plutonium (and not the total quantity of plutonium produced in the spent fuel of several reactor cores), it does fall inside the lower bound of the range of the amount of separated plutonium that ISIS has assessed North Korea could now possess.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Plutonium, and Nuclear Energy
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea