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31. Israel’s Military Plutonium Inventory

Author:
David Albright
Publication Date:
11-2015
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
Israel developed its first nuclear weapon shortly before the 1967 Six Day War, making it the sixth nation to develop nuclear weapons.2 To this day, Israel maintains an ambiguous posture about its nuclear weapons, despite the declassification of formerly secret U.S. government documents which assert the existence of Israeli nuclear weapons. In addition, the revelations of Mordechai Vanunu in 1986 revealed a larger nuclear weapons program than commonly assessed at that time.3 The heart of Israel’s nuclear weapons production complex is the Dimona site near the city of Beersheva. This site contains a number of secret nuclear facilities for the production of plutonium, including a heavy water reactor, a fuel fabrication plant, and a plutonium separation plant, all provided by France in the 1950s and early 1960s. The site also reportedly contains facilities likely involved in tritium extraction and purification (using tritium also produced in the reactor), lithium production, and possibly facilities dedicated to uranium enrichment, at least on a research and development scale.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
Middle East and Israel

32. Additional Taiwan-Based Element of Iranian Military Goods Procurement Network Exposed

Author:
David Albright, Andrea Stricker, David Schnur, and Sarah Burkhard
Publication Date:
09-2015
Content Type:
Case Study
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
On June 25, 2015, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas announced that Kunlin Hsieh (or Xia) of Taiwan pled guilty to conspiring to violate U.S. export control laws and transshipment of dual-use military equipment from the United States to Iran.1 The goods had uses in missile guidance systems, secure tactical radio communications, and military radar networks. According to court documents, between 2007 and 2014, Hsieh, a Taiwanese national and sales manager of JunBon Enterprises of Taiwan, along with his associate Agris Indricevs, who was charged in the same indictment, procured and brokered the purchase of U.S. goods and transshipped them to Iran. They also worked with Ryan Surrena, another employee of JunBon, who was charged in a separate indictment. Hsieh will face up to twenty years in prison at a sentencing hearing scheduled for September 25, 2015. Indricevs’ case was scheduled to go to trial on August 10, 2015. Surrena was arrested in Texas in 2013 and worked with U.S. officials to further their case. He pled guilty to reduced charges in July 2014 under a sealed plea agreement, which likely takes into consideration his believed assistance, and is due to face sentencing in October 2015. This network represents another element of an already known procurement network operating among entities in Taiwan and Iran and targeting goods made in the United States. The network sent U.S. dual-use military equipment to several companies owned by Mehrdad Foomanie in Iran, such as Sazgan Ertebat Co and Moravid Sanant Co, Ltd.2 Foomanie, who remains at large, was indicted by the Texas court in 2011. Another Taiwanese national operating in the United States, Susan Yip, was arrested and sentenced in Texas. ISIS documented the case of Yip and Foomanie here. Yip used her Taiwan based company Hivocal Technology Co to procure goods for Foomanie in Iran.3 She pled guilty in July 2012 to charges and was sentenced to two years in prison. It appears that U.S. officials gathered additional evidence for charges before seeking to indict the other participants in the network.
Topic:
Military Affairs, Military Spending, Trade, and Illegal Trade
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Taiwan, and Asia

33. Daesh Hype about Stealing Nuclear Weapons

Author:
David Albright and Sarah Burkhard
Publication Date:
10-2015
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
With Daesh entrenched in Syria and Iraq and growing in influence in North Africa and Pakistan, the risk is likely to grow that the terrorist group or one of its allies will seek nuclear weapons. Or at least this is what they want the world to think since their publications imply these intentions. But Daesh’s public claims of ways to accomplish that goal are unfounded and mainly seem intended to simply incite fear. At ISIS, we assess that the risk of Daesh acquiring nuclear weapons is low. However, that characterization needs to be carefully considered. The chance of Daesh acquiring a nuclear weapon, either through theft of a functioning nuclear weapon, or of nuclear explosive material followed by the manufacturing of a crude nuclear explosive, is assessed as low, similar to the risk of a major nuclear reactor accident, such as the Chernobyl and Fukishima disasters. However, although the chance of Daesh stealing a nuclear weapon is low, the consequences would be horrible and extraordinary efforts need to be waged to ensure that the risk becomes even lower. A nuclear explosive going off in a major city would have catastrophic consequences, probably far worse than those of Chernobyl or Fukishima. While the threat of Daesh stealing or otherwise acquiring a nuclear weapon needs to be taken seriously, Daesh writings on the subject should be discounted. In a May 2015 article in the Daesh magazine Dabiq, the British journalist John Cantlie warns of Daesh’s rapid global expansion and its capabilities to launch major terroristic attacks – including acquiring a nuclear weapon and smuggling it into the United States. It is uncertain if Cantlie actually penned the article, titled “The Perfect Storm.” However, the sentiments of the piece likely reflect Daesh ambitions.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Terrorism, and Islamic State
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Middle East, and North Africa

34. Daesh Hype about Stealing Nuclear Weapons

Author:
David Albright and Sarah Burkhard
Publication Date:
10-2015
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
With Daesh1 entrenched in Syria and Iraq and growing in influence in North Africa and Pakistan, the risk is likely to grow that the terrorist group or one of its allies will seek nuclear weapons. Or at least this is what they want the world to think since their publications imply these intentions. But Daesh’s public claims of ways to accomplish that goal are unfounded and mainly seem intended to simply incite fear. At ISIS, we assess that the risk of Daesh acquiring nuclear weapons is low. However, that characterization needs to be carefully considered. The chance of Daesh acquiring a nuclear weapon, either through theft of a functioning nuclear weapon, or of nuclear explosive material followed by the manufacturing of a crude nuclear explosive, is assessed as low, similar to the risk of a major nuclear reactor accident, such as the Chernobyl and Fukishima disasters. However, although the chance of Daesh stealing a nuclear weapon is low, the consequences would be horrible and extraordinary efforts need to be waged to ensure that the risk becomes even lower. A nuclear explosive going off in a major city would have catastrophic consequences, probably far worse than those of Chernobyl or Fukishima.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Terrorism, and Islamic State
Political Geography:
Middle East

35. North Korea’s Estimated Stocks of Plutonium and Weapon-Grade Uranium

Author:
David Albright and Christina Walrond
Publication Date:
08-2012
Content Type:
Case Study
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
For years, great controversy has surrounded North Korea’s uranium enrichment program (UEP). How large is it? Has it made weapon-grade uranium (WGU)? How much could it make in the future? But there are also broader questions. What is the role of the UEP in the larger North Korean nuclear program? Is the UEP program strictly oriented to make 3.5 percent low enriched uranium for a civilian light water reactor (LWR) under construction at the Yongbyon nuclear complex, as North Korea says? Is it to make WGU? Or could North Korea intend to further enrich uranium for use in the light water reactor to make plutonium for nuclear weapons? Although LWRs are not typically used to make weapon-grade plutonium, they can do so efficiently if the reactor core is specially designed. Finally, how should the United States respond to the UEP and the associated uncertainties in this program? This ISIS report attempts to answer these questions utilizing plausible scenarios about past and possible future operation of the centrifuge program that could result in the production of WGU and future operation of the LWR that could make weapon-grade plutonium. In doing so, the report seeks to organize the incomplete data and derive answers to the above questions that have policy relevance. The report’s results are necessarily preliminary because significant uncertainties exist about the number of North Korean gas centrifuge plants, their operation, and the amount and enrichment level of the enriched uranium produced in them. In addition, although North Korea has said that its Yongbyon LWR is for civilian purposes, this statement is unverified and doubts about its potential use are justified. This report is designed to be updated if and when additional information is obtained.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, and Weapons
Political Geography:
Asia, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

36. Understanding the IAEA’s Mandate in Iran: Avoiding Misinterpretations

Author:
David Albright, Olli Heinonen, and Orde Kittrie
Publication Date:
11-2012
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
Much attention has focused on Iran's advancing nuclear program, on the peace and security concerns which that program has raised, and on the international policy debate over how to respond to that program. Far less attention has been paid to the various legal-sounding arguments used by Iran and a few academics to call into question the mandate of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to investigate and make determinations about actual or suspected violations of Iran’s legal obligations. Although arguments used by Iran and these academics to undermine the legitimacy of IAEA activities regarding Iran are patently false, they are nevertheless dangerous to both current and future nonproliferation efforts. Unless these arguments are clearly countered, and their fallaciousness clearly demonstrated for all the world to see, these arguments may decrease the chances of Iran agreeing to comply with its international legal obligations, could provide a fig leaf to those countries disinclined to hold Iran accountable, and might undercut the IAEA's and the United Nations Security Council's potentially pivotal roles in facilitating a peaceful resolution to disputes over the nuclear programs of Iran and future proliferators. It is in that light that we have chosen to address the dangerous claim published on September 13, 2012 by Daniel Joyner, a law professor at the University of Alabama, that the IAEA has exceeded its legal mandate in applying safeguards in Iran in accordance with a comprehensive safeguards agreement (CSA) under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In view of the importance of the IAEA's activities regarding Iran, the persistent efforts by Iran to call into question the legitimacy of those IAEA activities, and our concern to ensure that there is no misunderstanding as to the agency's mandates, we are writing to discuss those mandates and explain why Joyner is incorrect.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, and Treaties and Agreements
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

37. Understanding the IAEA’s Mandate in Iran: Avoiding Misinterpretations

Author:
David Albright, Olli Heinonen, and Orde Kittrie
Publication Date:
11-2012
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
Much attention has focused on Iran's advancing nuclear program, on the peace and security concerns which that program has raised, and on the international policy debate over how to respond to that program. Far less attention has been paid to the various legal-sounding arguments used by Iran and a few academics to call into question the mandate of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to investigate and make determinations about actual or suspected violations of Iran’s legal obligations. Although arguments used by Iran and these academics to undermine the legitimacy of IAEA activities regarding Iran are patently false, they are nevertheless dangerous to both current and future nonproliferation efforts. Unless these arguments are clearly countered, and their fallaciousness clearly demonstrated for all the world to see, these arguments may decrease the chances of Iran agreeing to comply with its international legal obligations, could provide a fig leaf to those countries disinclined to hold Iran accountable, and might undercut the IAEA's and the United Nations Security Council's potentially pivotal roles in facilitating a peaceful resolution to disputes over the nuclear programs of Iran and future proliferators.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Nonproliferation, and Nuclear Energy
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

38. North Korea’s Estimated Stocks of Plutonium and Weapon-Grade Uranium

Author:
David Albright and Christina Walrond
Publication Date:
08-2012
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
For years, great controversy has surrounded North Korea’s uranium enrichment program (UEP). How large is it? Has it made weapon-grade uranium (WGU)? How much could it make in the future? But there are also broader questions. What is the role of the UEP in the larger North Korean nuclear program? Is the UEP program strictly oriented to make 3.5 percent low enriched uranium for a civilian light water reactor (LWR) under construction at the Yongbyon nuclear complex, as North Korea says? Is it to make WGU? Or could North Korea intend to further enrich uranium for use in the light water reactor to make plutonium for nuclear weapons? Although LWRs are not typically used to make weapon-grade plutonium, they can do so efficiently if the reactor core is specially designed. Finally, how should the United States respond to the UEP and the associated uncertainties in this program? This ISIS report attempts to answer these questions utilizing plausible scenarios about past and possible future operation of the centrifuge program that could result in the production of WGU and future operation of the LWR that could make weapon-grade plutonium. In doing so, the report seeks to organize the incomplete data and derive answers to the above questions that have policy relevance. The report’s results are necessarily preliminary because significant uncertainties exist about the number of North Korean gas centrifuge plants, their operation, and the amount and enrichment level of the enriched uranium produced in them. In addition, although North Korea has said that its Yongbyon LWR is for civilian purposes, this statement is unverified and doubts about its potential use are justified. This report is designed to be updated if and when additional information is obtained. This report presents and evaluates a wide range of information about North Korea’s plutonium and uranium enrichment programs. It identifies gaps in knowledge of these programs. For this report, ISIS developed a variety of estimates of North Korea’s current and future stocks of WGU and weapon-grade plutonium. Although the numerical possibilities are broad, most of the discussion focuses on the central estimates. These results are presented in terms of kilograms of these materials. This report, and in particular this summary, uses the convention of converting these numbers into nuclear weapon equivalents. Often the term “equivalents” is dropped. Such a conversion is necessary when both plutonium and WGU estimates are discussed, since it allows for a more meaningful discussion of the aggregate amount of both fissile materials.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Uranium
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

39. FUKUSHIMA CRISIS: UNMONITORED RELEASES Preliminary Assessment of Accident Sequences and Potential Atmospheric Radiation Releases

Author:
David Albright, Paul Brannan, and Christina Walrond
Publication Date:
03-2011
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
instances of unmonitored radiation releases to the atmosphere from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear reactors. The radiation readings and ground level wind directions are from the TEPCO web site. ISIS could not validate TEPCO’s information, but the data appear adequate to conduct some scoping analysis of the releases. Using this information, ISIS has sought to understand the fate of the releases and determine whether radiation monitoring stations intersected the plume of released radioactive material. We welcome any input. Since March 11, reactor units 1-4 at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant have experienced hydrogen explosions, fires, partial melting of irradiated or “spent” fuel in the reactors, the uncovering and possible burning of irradiated fuel in spent fuel ponds at reactor 4 and perhaps other reactors. Table 1 lists several known accidents that occurred through March 18. These accidents, and perhaps ones that were not noticed or reported, released significant amounts of radiation into the atmosphere that the winds spread widely. They all require greater scrutiny. From an analysis of the limited data on atmospheric releases, ISIS has developed several key findings. The first is that the limited radiation detection capabilities at the Fukushima Daiichi plant following the earthquake and tsunami eliminated the ability to detect, characterize, or track a release of radiation. Many releases went partially or completely undetected by on-site monitoring. None of the releases from accidents were monitored as to their radioactive contents. Although the amount and type of radionuclides in these releases cannot be estimated from the existing on-site monitoring data, the existing data support that the potential for significant radiation doses to off-site population exists, particularly in sectors northwest and southwest of the reactors.
Topic:
Natural Disasters, Nuclear Power, Nuclear Safety, Disaster Management, Fukushima Disaster, and Earthquake
Political Geography:
Japan and Asia

40. Characterizing the Crisis at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station

Author:
David Albright and Christina Walrond
Publication Date:
04-2011
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
During the crisis at the Fukushima nuclear power reactors following the earthquake and tsunami on March 11, 2011, the Japanese Safety Authority issued ratings for the accident on the International Nuclear Events Scale (INES). Initially, it stated that the incident was a level 4, but it subsequently raised the levels assigned to each reactor, with the majority receiving a level 5. Table 1 indicates the latest ratings issued March 18 by the Japanese authority, where it has parsed the ratings based on accidents at individual reactors. Although the radioactivity is emitted from different reactor buildings, it represents a collective hazard to public health. As such, the accident should be judged comprehensively, not only in component parts. Simply because some aspects of the crisis were not as catastrophic as others does not lessen the overall severity of the accident. ISIS continues to assess that the accident is a level 6.
Topic:
Nuclear Power, Crisis Management, Disaster Management, Fukushima Disaster, and Earthquake
Political Geography:
Japan and Asia