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21. Transfer of Firearms on U.S. Control Lists Raises Proliferation, Terrorism Concerns

Author:
Andrea Stricker and David Albright
Publication Date:
09-2017
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
On September 19, 2017, Reuters reported that the Trump administration is in the final stages of deciding about the transfer of three categories of items (Categories 1-3) controlled by the United States Munitions List to the Commerce Control List.1 Those categories include firearms, ammunition, and artillery. These items are currently controlled by the International Traffic in Arms Regulations, administered by the State Department’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls, but would be moved to the Commerce Control List under the Export Administration Regulations, which is administered by the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security.2 The planned transfers would finish a proposed Obama administration reform under the Export Control Reform Initiative that was halted due to opposition from U.S. federal law enforcement agencies.3 The transfers are being hailed as an export promotion program, but the potential risks to U.S. national security are dire. There are a few key problems with the proposed transfers that the administration should be aware of, which could contribute to the proliferation of U.S. firearms worldwide to nefarious countries and to terrorists.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Terrorism, Weapons, and Illegal Trade
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

22. Most Nuclear Ban Treaty Proponents are Lagging in Implementing Sound Export Control Legislation

Author:
David Albright, Sarah Burkhard, Allison Lach, and Andrea Stricker
Publication Date:
09-2017
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
Using data compiled from a new index by our Institute, the Peddling Peril Index, which we will soon release, three quarters of the countries that voted in July 2017 in favor of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons lack adequate export control legislation. These countries lack a firm basis to control the export or retransfer of nuclear and nuclear-related commodities that are critical to the production and possession of nuclear weapons. If the UN Ban Treaty proponent countries truly seek a world without nuclear weapons, they should take the lead in ensuring that all countries, including their own, have effective strategic trade control systems able to prevent the spread of dangerous commodities and facilities that are critical to the production, maintenance, and improvement of nuclear weapons.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, United Nations, Exports, and Illegal Trade
Political Geography:
Global Focus

23. A Freeze of North Korea’s Nuclear Program: Finding a Definition More Fitting of Today’s Reality

Author:
David Albright
Publication Date:
06-2017
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
The Trump administration has announced that it has created a new North Korea policy that is aimed at exerting maximal pressure on Pyongyang but also achieving negotiations to denuclearize North Korea. However, denuclearization negotiations do not appear imminent. The Trump administration has stated that now is the time for focusing on creating greater pressure on North Korea, and North Korea has signaled little interest in negotiations and much more interest in developing and keeping its nuclear weapons, comprised of both the warheads and missiles. But it is not too early to discuss what negotiations should look like. Many have stated that the denuclearization process should start with the creation of a freeze of North Korea’s nuclear program, as was done in previous North Korean negotiations. A freeze, albeit limited, was also the starting point for the negotiation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), or Iran nuclear deal. But what should this freeze look like in new North Korean negotiations, given all its nuclear advances in the last several years?
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and Negotiation
Political Geography:
Asia, North Korea, and United States of America

24. A Freeze of North Korea’s Nuclear Program: Finding a Definition More Fitting of Today’s Reality

Author:
David Albright
Publication Date:
06-2017
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
The Trump administration has announced that it has created a new North Korea policy that is aimed at exerting maximal pressure on Pyongyang but also achieving negotiations to denuclearize North Korea. However, denuclearization negotiations do not appear imminent. The Trump administration has stated that now is the time for focusing on creating greater pressure on North Korea, and North Korea has signaled little interest in negotiations and much more interest in developing and keeping its nuclear weapons, comprised of both the warheads and missiles. But it is not too early to discuss what negotiations should look like. Many have stated that the denuclearization process should start with the creation of a freeze of North Korea’s nuclear program, as was done in previous North Korean negotiations. A freeze, albeit limited, was also the starting point for the negotiation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), or Iran nuclear deal. But what should this freeze look like in new North Korean negotiations, given all its nuclear advances in the last several years?
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Negotiation, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

25. Heavy Water Loophole in the Iran Deal

Author:
David Albright and Andrea Stricker
Publication Date:
12-2016
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
Although President-elect Donald Trump’s position on the Iran nuclear deal remains unclear, he and his allies in the Congress are expected to at least better enforce and strengthen the Iran deal. They should start by focusing on the deal’s heavy water loophole, whereby Iran can store offshore in Oman heavy water it owns and controls in excess of the nuclear deal’s limits, awaiting its eventual sale. To date, if the stocks in Iran and Oman are counted together (a reasonable view since Iran owns and controls both stocks), Iran has far exceeded the nuclear deal’s stated limit of maintaining a stock of only 130 metric tons of heavy water. Yet, this loophole was sanctioned by the executive body of the Iran deal, the Joint Commission. Despite such generous treatment, Iran has even so twice violated the narrow limit of 130 metric tons of heavy water it can hold inside Iran since the deal started in January 2016. Iran should no longer be facilitated in its overproduction of nuclear-related heavy water. Oman would do the world a favor by halting its willingness to accept Iranian heavy water and send any back to Iran for downblending. The return of the heavy water and its blending down would dramatically signal to Iran that violations of the Iran deal are no longer going to be tolerated, or worse, facilitated. Moreover, any further overproduction should be seen by the United States as a violation of the deal. It should work to end the Oman loophole and mitigate damage caused by a U.S. purchase of Iranian heavy water.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Nuclear Power, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

26. Future Directions in the DPRK’S Nuclear Weapons Program: Three Scenarios for 2020

Author:
David Albright
Publication Date:
02-2015
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
Like many secret nuclear weapons programs, the DPRK goes to great lengths to hide its capabilities to produce nuclear explosive materials and nuclear weapons. Despite these actions, a picture can be drawn of North Korea’s current and projected plutonium and weapons-grade uranium (WGU) stocks. Knowing these plutonium and WGU stocks can, in turn, allow an estimate of the DPRK’s current number of nuclear weapons and a range of projections of the number North Korea could build in the next several years. Although great uncertainty surrounds these projections, as well as the quality of North Korea’s nuclear weapons, these projections form a reasonable picture of the DPRK’s possible nuclear weapons futures, absent actions to significantly limit its nuclear programs. After summarizing estimates of stocks of separated plutonium and weapons-grade uranium as of the end of 2014, this report develops three projections of future nuclear arsenals through 2020: low-end, medium, and high-end nuclear futures. In developing these projections, which are intended to bound North Korea’s nuclear futures, a number of constraints are considered, including the number and size of nuclear production facilities, future underground testing, the extent and success of nuclear weaponization efforts, costs, and access to necessary goods and classified and proprietary technologies abroad.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Science and Technology
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

27. Civil HEU Watch Tracking: Inventories of Civil Highly Enriched Uranium: National and Global Stocks, as of End 2014

Author:
David Albright and Serena Kelleher-Vergantini
Publication Date:
10-2015
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
Highly enriched uranium (HEU) is a key ingredient in nuclear weapons, making it one of the most dangerous materials in existence. As a result, governments take extraordinary measures to secure HEU against theft or diversion and to reduce the inventories of HEU in the world. To that end, it is important to track how much civil HEU exists and where it is. However, national civil HEU stocks are difficult to estimate, with transparency policies varying by country and few countries providing official declarations of their stocks. As a result, this report contains the few official civil HEU declarations and estimates civil HEU stocks in countries that do not provide public declarations. This study relies on open source information to derive these estimates. It is an update of a report published in 2005.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Power, and Uranium
Political Geography:
Global Focus

28. India’s Stocks of Civil and Military Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium, End 2014

Author:
David Albright and Serena Kelleher-Vergantini
Publication Date:
11-2015
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
India has one of the largest nuclear power programs among developing nations. Utilizing plutonium produced in these power reactors and discharged in irradiated or spent fuel, India has developed a relatively large civil plutonium separation program and an associated fast breeder reactor program that is using that separated plutonium. India has a sizeable nuclear weapons effort. The weapons use separated plutonium produced primarily in a set of small, dedicated reactors and a smaller amount produced in nuclear power reactors. It has a growing gas centrifuge program able to produce significant amounts of highly enriched uranium (HEU) mostly for naval reactor fuel and perhaps for nuclear weapons, including thermonuclear weapons. India is not transparent about its fissile material stocks. This report estimates India’s stocks of separated plutonium and highly enriched uranium.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Power, Uranium, and Plutonium
Political Geography:
South Asia and India

29. Military Highly Enriched Uranium and Plutonium Stocks in Acknowledged Nuclear Weapon States

Author:
David Albright and Serena Kelleher-Vergantini
Publication Date:
11-2015
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
Plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU), called “fissile materials,” were first produced in large quantities for use in nuclear weapons. Starting in World War II, and for over two decades afterwards, almost all the plutonium and HEU in the world was produced for these immensely destructive weapons. This production was centered almost exclusively in five states: Britain, China, France, Russia, and the United States. In the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) these five countries are designated as “nuclearweapon states” because all five had manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon prior to January 1, 1967. To this day, they remain the only acknowledged nuclear weapon states. Although other countries possess nuclear weapons, the acknowledged states have gained a special status in international affairs. As part of that status, however, these five states also committed to work towards nuclear disarmament, in particular steps accompanied by the elimination of their own stocks of fissile material for nuclear weapons. At the end of 2014, these five states had military stocks totaling about 238 tonnes of plutonium and 1,330 tonnes of HEU, mostly weapon-grade uranium (WGU is defined as HEU enriched over 90 percent). Table 1 provides a summary of the results. Tables 2 and 3, located at the end of the report, provide official declarations or detailed estimates of each country’s military plutonium and HEU holdings. These tables provide extensive endnotes describing official declarations, other sources, and the derivation of the various estimates. In addition to aggregate totals, tables 2 and 3 provide partial information about the various types of military stocks held by these five countries, including fissile material dedicated to nuclear weapons activities and naval propulsion programs, and declared excess to defense requirements.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Uranium, and Plutonium
Political Geography:
Britain, Russia, China, France, and United States of America

30. Highly Enriched Uranium Inventories in South Africa

Author:
David Albright
Publication Date:
11-2015
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
South Africa produced highly enriched uranium (HEU) for nuclear weapons at the Y plant at the Pelindaba nuclear center located near Pretoria. This plant, which operated from 1977 until early 1990, was designed to make weapon-grade uranium. However, it experienced operational problems that led to the production of less than expected amounts of weapon-grade uranium and a considerable amount of HEU enriched less than 90 percent. In late 1989, then-President F.W. de Klerk ordered an end to the nuclear weapons program, including the shutdown of the Y Plant, and decided to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Following the dismantlement of its nuclear weapons, South Africa brought the NPT into force in 1991, subjecting its entire inventory of HEU to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. As part of the IAEA’s effort to verify South Africa’s initial nuclear material declaration, it conducted an unprecedented investigation aimed at determining that South Africa had declared its HEU inventory completely. After a two year investigation into both the production and use of HEU, the IAEA concluded in September 1993 that South Africa had satisfactorily declared its HEU.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and Uranium
Political Geography:
Africa and South Africa