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Begin New Search Topic Nuclear Weapons Author David Albright

11. Civil HEU Watch Tracking: Inventories of Civil Highly Enriched Uranium: National and Global Stocks, as of End 2014

Author:
David Albright and Serena Kelleher-Vergantini
Publication Date:
10-2015
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
Highly enriched uranium (HEU) is a key ingredient in nuclear weapons, making it one of the most dangerous materials in existence. As a result, governments take extraordinary measures to secure HEU against theft or diversion and to reduce the inventories of HEU in the world. To that end, it is important to track how much civil HEU exists and where it is. However, national civil HEU stocks are difficult to estimate, with transparency policies varying by country and few countries providing official declarations of their stocks. As a result, this report contains the few official civil HEU declarations and estimates civil HEU stocks in countries that do not provide public declarations. This study relies on open source information to derive these estimates. It is an update of a report published in 2005.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Power, and Uranium
Political Geography:
Global Focus

12. India’s Stocks of Civil and Military Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium, End 2014

Author:
David Albright and Serena Kelleher-Vergantini
Publication Date:
11-2015
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
India has one of the largest nuclear power programs among developing nations. Utilizing plutonium produced in these power reactors and discharged in irradiated or spent fuel, India has developed a relatively large civil plutonium separation program and an associated fast breeder reactor program that is using that separated plutonium. India has a sizeable nuclear weapons effort. The weapons use separated plutonium produced primarily in a set of small, dedicated reactors and a smaller amount produced in nuclear power reactors. It has a growing gas centrifuge program able to produce significant amounts of highly enriched uranium (HEU) mostly for naval reactor fuel and perhaps for nuclear weapons, including thermonuclear weapons. India is not transparent about its fissile material stocks. This report estimates India’s stocks of separated plutonium and highly enriched uranium.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Power, Uranium, and Plutonium
Political Geography:
South Asia and India

13. Military Highly Enriched Uranium and Plutonium Stocks in Acknowledged Nuclear Weapon States

Author:
David Albright and Serena Kelleher-Vergantini
Publication Date:
11-2015
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
Plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU), called “fissile materials,” were first produced in large quantities for use in nuclear weapons. Starting in World War II, and for over two decades afterwards, almost all the plutonium and HEU in the world was produced for these immensely destructive weapons. This production was centered almost exclusively in five states: Britain, China, France, Russia, and the United States. In the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) these five countries are designated as “nuclearweapon states” because all five had manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon prior to January 1, 1967. To this day, they remain the only acknowledged nuclear weapon states. Although other countries possess nuclear weapons, the acknowledged states have gained a special status in international affairs. As part of that status, however, these five states also committed to work towards nuclear disarmament, in particular steps accompanied by the elimination of their own stocks of fissile material for nuclear weapons. At the end of 2014, these five states had military stocks totaling about 238 tonnes of plutonium and 1,330 tonnes of HEU, mostly weapon-grade uranium (WGU is defined as HEU enriched over 90 percent). Table 1 provides a summary of the results. Tables 2 and 3, located at the end of the report, provide official declarations or detailed estimates of each country’s military plutonium and HEU holdings. These tables provide extensive endnotes describing official declarations, other sources, and the derivation of the various estimates. In addition to aggregate totals, tables 2 and 3 provide partial information about the various types of military stocks held by these five countries, including fissile material dedicated to nuclear weapons activities and naval propulsion programs, and declared excess to defense requirements.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Uranium, and Plutonium
Political Geography:
Britain, Russia, China, France, and United States of America

14. Highly Enriched Uranium Inventories in South Africa

Author:
David Albright
Publication Date:
11-2015
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
South Africa produced highly enriched uranium (HEU) for nuclear weapons at the Y plant at the Pelindaba nuclear center located near Pretoria. This plant, which operated from 1977 until early 1990, was designed to make weapon-grade uranium. However, it experienced operational problems that led to the production of less than expected amounts of weapon-grade uranium and a considerable amount of HEU enriched less than 90 percent. In late 1989, then-President F.W. de Klerk ordered an end to the nuclear weapons program, including the shutdown of the Y Plant, and decided to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Following the dismantlement of its nuclear weapons, South Africa brought the NPT into force in 1991, subjecting its entire inventory of HEU to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. As part of the IAEA’s effort to verify South Africa’s initial nuclear material declaration, it conducted an unprecedented investigation aimed at determining that South Africa had declared its HEU inventory completely. After a two year investigation into both the production and use of HEU, the IAEA concluded in September 1993 that South Africa had satisfactorily declared its HEU.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and Uranium
Political Geography:
Africa and South Africa

15. Israel’s Military Plutonium Inventory

Author:
David Albright
Publication Date:
11-2015
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
Israel developed its first nuclear weapon shortly before the 1967 Six Day War, making it the sixth nation to develop nuclear weapons.2 To this day, Israel maintains an ambiguous posture about its nuclear weapons, despite the declassification of formerly secret U.S. government documents which assert the existence of Israeli nuclear weapons. In addition, the revelations of Mordechai Vanunu in 1986 revealed a larger nuclear weapons program than commonly assessed at that time.3 The heart of Israel’s nuclear weapons production complex is the Dimona site near the city of Beersheva. This site contains a number of secret nuclear facilities for the production of plutonium, including a heavy water reactor, a fuel fabrication plant, and a plutonium separation plant, all provided by France in the 1950s and early 1960s. The site also reportedly contains facilities likely involved in tritium extraction and purification (using tritium also produced in the reactor), lithium production, and possibly facilities dedicated to uranium enrichment, at least on a research and development scale.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
Middle East and Israel

16. Daesh Hype about Stealing Nuclear Weapons

Author:
David Albright and Sarah Burkhard
Publication Date:
10-2015
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
With Daesh entrenched in Syria and Iraq and growing in influence in North Africa and Pakistan, the risk is likely to grow that the terrorist group or one of its allies will seek nuclear weapons. Or at least this is what they want the world to think since their publications imply these intentions. But Daesh’s public claims of ways to accomplish that goal are unfounded and mainly seem intended to simply incite fear. At ISIS, we assess that the risk of Daesh acquiring nuclear weapons is low. However, that characterization needs to be carefully considered. The chance of Daesh acquiring a nuclear weapon, either through theft of a functioning nuclear weapon, or of nuclear explosive material followed by the manufacturing of a crude nuclear explosive, is assessed as low, similar to the risk of a major nuclear reactor accident, such as the Chernobyl and Fukishima disasters. However, although the chance of Daesh stealing a nuclear weapon is low, the consequences would be horrible and extraordinary efforts need to be waged to ensure that the risk becomes even lower. A nuclear explosive going off in a major city would have catastrophic consequences, probably far worse than those of Chernobyl or Fukishima. While the threat of Daesh stealing or otherwise acquiring a nuclear weapon needs to be taken seriously, Daesh writings on the subject should be discounted. In a May 2015 article in the Daesh magazine Dabiq, the British journalist John Cantlie warns of Daesh’s rapid global expansion and its capabilities to launch major terroristic attacks – including acquiring a nuclear weapon and smuggling it into the United States. It is uncertain if Cantlie actually penned the article, titled “The Perfect Storm.” However, the sentiments of the piece likely reflect Daesh ambitions.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Terrorism, and Islamic State
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Middle East, and North Africa

17. Daesh Hype about Stealing Nuclear Weapons

Author:
David Albright and Sarah Burkhard
Publication Date:
10-2015
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
With Daesh1 entrenched in Syria and Iraq and growing in influence in North Africa and Pakistan, the risk is likely to grow that the terrorist group or one of its allies will seek nuclear weapons. Or at least this is what they want the world to think since their publications imply these intentions. But Daesh’s public claims of ways to accomplish that goal are unfounded and mainly seem intended to simply incite fear. At ISIS, we assess that the risk of Daesh acquiring nuclear weapons is low. However, that characterization needs to be carefully considered. The chance of Daesh acquiring a nuclear weapon, either through theft of a functioning nuclear weapon, or of nuclear explosive material followed by the manufacturing of a crude nuclear explosive, is assessed as low, similar to the risk of a major nuclear reactor accident, such as the Chernobyl and Fukishima disasters. However, although the chance of Daesh stealing a nuclear weapon is low, the consequences would be horrible and extraordinary efforts need to be waged to ensure that the risk becomes even lower. A nuclear explosive going off in a major city would have catastrophic consequences, probably far worse than those of Chernobyl or Fukishima.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Terrorism, and Islamic State
Political Geography:
Middle East

18. North Korea’s Estimated Stocks of Plutonium and Weapon-Grade Uranium

Author:
David Albright and Christina Walrond
Publication Date:
08-2012
Content Type:
Case Study
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
For years, great controversy has surrounded North Korea’s uranium enrichment program (UEP). How large is it? Has it made weapon-grade uranium (WGU)? How much could it make in the future? But there are also broader questions. What is the role of the UEP in the larger North Korean nuclear program? Is the UEP program strictly oriented to make 3.5 percent low enriched uranium for a civilian light water reactor (LWR) under construction at the Yongbyon nuclear complex, as North Korea says? Is it to make WGU? Or could North Korea intend to further enrich uranium for use in the light water reactor to make plutonium for nuclear weapons? Although LWRs are not typically used to make weapon-grade plutonium, they can do so efficiently if the reactor core is specially designed. Finally, how should the United States respond to the UEP and the associated uncertainties in this program? This ISIS report attempts to answer these questions utilizing plausible scenarios about past and possible future operation of the centrifuge program that could result in the production of WGU and future operation of the LWR that could make weapon-grade plutonium. In doing so, the report seeks to organize the incomplete data and derive answers to the above questions that have policy relevance. The report’s results are necessarily preliminary because significant uncertainties exist about the number of North Korean gas centrifuge plants, their operation, and the amount and enrichment level of the enriched uranium produced in them. In addition, although North Korea has said that its Yongbyon LWR is for civilian purposes, this statement is unverified and doubts about its potential use are justified. This report is designed to be updated if and when additional information is obtained.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, and Weapons
Political Geography:
Asia, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

19. Understanding the IAEA’s Mandate in Iran: Avoiding Misinterpretations

Author:
David Albright, Olli Heinonen, and Orde Kittrie
Publication Date:
11-2012
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
Much attention has focused on Iran's advancing nuclear program, on the peace and security concerns which that program has raised, and on the international policy debate over how to respond to that program. Far less attention has been paid to the various legal-sounding arguments used by Iran and a few academics to call into question the mandate of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to investigate and make determinations about actual or suspected violations of Iran’s legal obligations. Although arguments used by Iran and these academics to undermine the legitimacy of IAEA activities regarding Iran are patently false, they are nevertheless dangerous to both current and future nonproliferation efforts. Unless these arguments are clearly countered, and their fallaciousness clearly demonstrated for all the world to see, these arguments may decrease the chances of Iran agreeing to comply with its international legal obligations, could provide a fig leaf to those countries disinclined to hold Iran accountable, and might undercut the IAEA's and the United Nations Security Council's potentially pivotal roles in facilitating a peaceful resolution to disputes over the nuclear programs of Iran and future proliferators. It is in that light that we have chosen to address the dangerous claim published on September 13, 2012 by Daniel Joyner, a law professor at the University of Alabama, that the IAEA has exceeded its legal mandate in applying safeguards in Iran in accordance with a comprehensive safeguards agreement (CSA) under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In view of the importance of the IAEA's activities regarding Iran, the persistent efforts by Iran to call into question the legitimacy of those IAEA activities, and our concern to ensure that there is no misunderstanding as to the agency's mandates, we are writing to discuss those mandates and explain why Joyner is incorrect.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, and Treaties and Agreements
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

20. Understanding the IAEA’s Mandate in Iran: Avoiding Misinterpretations

Author:
David Albright, Olli Heinonen, and Orde Kittrie
Publication Date:
11-2012
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
Much attention has focused on Iran's advancing nuclear program, on the peace and security concerns which that program has raised, and on the international policy debate over how to respond to that program. Far less attention has been paid to the various legal-sounding arguments used by Iran and a few academics to call into question the mandate of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to investigate and make determinations about actual or suspected violations of Iran’s legal obligations. Although arguments used by Iran and these academics to undermine the legitimacy of IAEA activities regarding Iran are patently false, they are nevertheless dangerous to both current and future nonproliferation efforts. Unless these arguments are clearly countered, and their fallaciousness clearly demonstrated for all the world to see, these arguments may decrease the chances of Iran agreeing to comply with its international legal obligations, could provide a fig leaf to those countries disinclined to hold Iran accountable, and might undercut the IAEA's and the United Nations Security Council's potentially pivotal roles in facilitating a peaceful resolution to disputes over the nuclear programs of Iran and future proliferators.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Nonproliferation, and Nuclear Energy
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East