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1. Solid foundation, rocky future? Assessing transatlantic defence and security ties after NATO’s Madrid summit

Author:
Michael J. Mazarr and Daniel Fiott
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:
Russia’s war on Ukraine has raised serious questions about European security, but it has also led to much greater transatlantic unity. This Policy Insights paper argues that the war on Ukraine has given rise to a new consensus among large parts of NATO and the EU to reinvest in collective security. Charting the progress made by both NATO and the EU, this paper looks at how transatlantic partners are addressing questions related to the so-called need to balance between Europe and the Indo-Pacific, EU strategic autonomy and the implementation of NATO’s Strategic Concept and the EU’s Strategic Compass, as well as the conclusions of the NATO Madrid Summit. It finds that there are several areas for enhanced EU-NATO cooperation, but issues pertaining to future US elections, defence industrial policy and NATO’s force posture could sorely undermine transatlantic unity.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Alliance, Transatlantic Relations, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe

2. Navel Gazing? The Strategic Compass and the EU’s maritime presence

Author:
Daniel Fiott
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
Seventeen days prior to the accidental blockage of the Suez Canal on 23 March 2021 by the super container Ever Given, a French aircraft carrier strike group had passed through the canal on its way to the Indian Ocean (1). It does not take an active imagination to think what could have transpired had these naval forces become trapped in the Suez Canal following a hostile act on their navigation systems. It is only possible to envision such scenarios because maritime security is increasingly beset by geopolitical tensions. We know that the European Union is heavily dependent on maritime trade routes for power projection and its economic prosperity — 75 % of goods entering Europe do so by sea today and Europe’s navies and shipping firms rely on free navigation. However, China’s naval expansion in the Indo-Pacific, Russia’s naval presence in the High North and the Baltic, Black and Mediterranean Seas and Turkey’s hostile maritime acts in the Eastern Mediterranean call into question the relative freedoms Europeans have enjoyed at sea for decades. Of course, it remains to be seen whether the EU can generate a greater maritime presence in such a context. The Union has accrued experience in deploying naval operations, undertaking border and coastguard functions, performing maritime safety tasks, countering piracy and conducting maritime surveillance assignments. More recently, the EU has even established new maritime initiatives such as the Coordinated Maritime Presence (CMP) concept, which is designed to enhance maritime security in fragile areas such as the Gulf of Guinea. EU member states such as France, Germany and the Netherlands have also invested in national strategies and guidelines for maritime engagement in the Indo-Pacific, and the EU will follow suit by the end of 2021 with its own strategy. A new EU Arctic strategy will be released in October 2021. NATO is also about to revise its own Strategic Concept, which will undoubtedly focus on maritime issues too. At the same time, by March 2022, the EU will present a Strategic Compass for security and defence, which is in part supposed to provide clearer guidance on what type of maritime actor the Union should become. This is a challenging task. There is limited political agreement on the Union’s maritime security role, and there is uncertainty about how far the EU should geographically extend itself when it has concerns closer to home. There is also the question of limited European naval capabilities. Tackling these issues, this Brief asks how the Strategic Compass can make a tangible difference to the Union’s role as a maritime security provider. Our first port of call, however, is to better understand the contemporary nature of maritime threats, risks and challenges.
Topic:
Security, European Union, Navy, and Maritime
Political Geography:
Europe

3. Uncharted Territory? Towards a common threat analysis and a Strategic Compass for EU security and defence

Author:
Daniel Fiott
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
Words have meaning. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen took up her mandate calling for a ‘geopolitical Commission’ and Josep Borrell, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP), echoed this by stating that the EU needs to ‘learn the language of power’. Reflecting the current geopolitical turbulence facing Europe, the EU’s rhetorical shift could split opinion – at the very least, the choice of language is open to interpretation. It could be argued that the word ‘geopolitics’ sits uneasily alongside terms such as ‘multilateralism’, especially when one considers the historical connotations of geopolitics. The implication is that visions of peace and international cooperation cannot simultaneously sit alongside ideas such as the military control of the ‘heartland’ or mastery of the seas – to put it differently, if the EU is Monnet, can it ever survive in the world of Mackinder or Mahan? EU member states would react to this statement in different ways and this is one among many reasons why it is so difficult to form a ‘common strategic culture’ in Europe. Behind the EU’s mosaic of various national strategic cultures lie profound differences between geopolitical interests and strategic histories. As the 2017 French Defence and National Security Strategic Review observes, ‘[g]eography and history remain important factors in the manner in which European states rank threats and risks, and more generally, in the diversity of their strategic cultures.’ Despite the direction offered by the EU Global Strategy, there is as yet no common approach to how member state governments understand threats to the EU’s security. Defining ‘threats’ is not an easy task and it has split security scholars. Nevertheless, member states have stressed the need for a strategic reflection on security and defence based on ‘a shared assessment of threats and challenges.’ This echoes the EU Global Strategy, which stated that ‘European security hinges on better and shared assessments of internal and external threats and challenges.’
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, European Union, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:
Europe and Global Focus

4. Sovereignty Over Supply? The EU’s ability to manage critical dependences while engaging with the world

Author:
Daniel Fiott and Vassilis Theodosopoulos
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
Fears about the EU’s trade, resource and technology dependences have only grown since the outbreak of the pandemic, even though US-China trade disputes and the rolling out of 5G have played a significant role, too. Some analysts have pointed to the beginning of a ‘decoupling’ of certain supply chains away from China, and, while evidence suggests that some ‘reshoring’ has taken place since at least 2011, there are debates about whether the production of certain technologies should be relocated back to Europe after decades of de-industrialisation. Decoupling and/or reshoring are a reaction to geopolitically risky dependences, with the fear being that certain products, technologies or raw materials will be unavailable during times of crisis or that a reliance on third-party supplies will limit political freedom. In the digital age – where data dominates – there are also concerns that dependences may lead among other things to espionage or a curtailment of personal rights and freedoms. Despite the fact that decoupling is unfeasible, save perhaps for in very specific critical technology domains, the threat perception surrounding critical supplies has given rise to a different vocabulary and EU communiques and strategies are today replete with references to ‘technological sovereignty’, ‘open strategic autonomy’ and ‘digital sovereignty’. Yet, in conjunction with this rhetoric has come a raft of new policy initiatives. In February 2020, the European Commission released a bundle of strategies on data, Artificial Intelligence (AI) and the digital future, which stressed the importance of reducing technological dependences in strategic areas. This is why the Commission is to invest €8 billion in supercomputing and help leverage €20 billion per year for AI. In March, a new ‘Industrial Strategy for Europe’ was published that stated that critical raw materials are ‘crucial for markets such as e-mobility, batteries, renewable energies, pharmaceuticals, aerospace, defence and digital applications’. It will be much harder for the EU to develop supercomputers and batteries without secure supplies of raw materials. To this end, on 3 September a ‘Commission Action Plan on Critical Raw Materials’ was released along with an updated List of Critical Raw Materials and a foresight study looking at strategic technologies and dependent sectors over the 2030-2050 horizon. This bundle of initiatives has made the case for the EU to diversify resource supplies, especially in an era of digitalisation that demands increasing amounts of strategic resources found outside of the Union’s territory.
Topic:
Climate Change, Science and Technology, Sovereignty, European Union, Geopolitics, Supply, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and United States of America

5. Digitalising Defence: Protecting Europe in the age of quantum computing and the cloud

Author:
Daniel Fiott
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
Any discussion about the digitalisation of defence is hampered by the imprecision of associated terms and words. ‘Cyber’, ‘the cloud’, ‘Internet of Things’ (IoT), ‘block chain’ and ‘quantum computing’ are widely used but their exact meaning or application can be quite fuzzy. The truth is that we may be intellectually ill-equipped to understand the full intricacies and implications of digitalisation, even if the economic rationale for digitalisation is clear. In fact, some estimates show that the digitalisation of products and services could add more than €110 billion to industrial revenue in Europe over a relatively short time frame of five years, so it is easy to see why the economic rationale for greater digitalisation is so powerful. Yet digitalisation is clearly not just about economics and the geopolitical ramifications of a proliferation of digital technologies is becoming a mainstay of international politics today. The assumption is that the competition to control new technologies (both hardware and associated software and algorithms), and the willingness to use them to gain an advantage over other states, underlines the growing importance of ‘digital power’. It is for this reason that the European Commission has stated that it is imperative for the EU to establish ‘technological sovereignty’ in areas of key strategic importance such as defence, space, mobile networks (5G and 6G) and quantum computing.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Science and Technology, European Union, and Quantum Computers
Political Geography:
Europe

6. The Poison Pill: EU defence on US terms?

Author:
Daniel Fiott
Publication Date:
06-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
It took two letters. One, sent to Brussels on 1 May 2019 by two US undersecretaries, accused the EU of damaging transatlantic cooperation and hindering US access to Europe’s defence market through the rules it plans to set for the participation of third states in the European Defence Fund (EDF) and Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). The other, sent to Washington on 16 May 2019 by senior EU officials of equal standing, refuted these claims by showing the objective and transparent way in which the EU had established the EDF and PESCO. Unlike the letter from Washington, which was laced with robust language and questionable accusations, the EU response argued that, even with the introduction of the two initiatives, the European defence market would remain more open than that of the US. The EU institutions also stated that by creating the EDF and PESCO, the Union was showing its collective determination to reduce European capability duplication and enhance interoperability, while also ensuring the competitiveness of Europe’s defence industry. In essence, the EU pointed out that its security and defence initiatives are designed to contribute to transatlantic burden sharing – something the US has been requesting from European allies for some time. While the US welcomes that the Fund allows for the participation of third states, it objects to the fact that recipients and subcontractors supported by the EDF will not be permitted to transfer sensitive information and/or Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) outside of the EU.1 Additionally, the US fears that the unanimity principle governing PESCO could ensure that any future US participation in the initiative could be vetoed by a single EU member state. At the core of Washington’s fears is the idea that EDF and PESCO could lock US firms out of the European market. However, the EU has made it clear that the EDF and PESCO will not alter EU defence procurement rules, lead to EU-owned defence capabilities, affect bilateral defence agreements between the US and individual member states and/or harm NATO defence planning targets and processes. Furthermore, given the US’ own long-standing and legitimate protection of its core defence industrial interests, there is a certain irony to its accusations of the EU because the Union has equally legitimate security interests. Following the exchange of letters between the partners, a number of questions have surfaced. First, despite a sustained campaign of influencing the EU to adopt favourable conditions for the US,2 why has Washington raised tensions with the Union now? Second, given that €13 billion has been earmarked under the EDF, and its own defence budget stood at $650 billion in 2018, why is the US so concerned? With a view to answering these questions, this Brief begins with an analysis of US government data that shows the asymmetry between US and EU defence markets. It then moves on to a discussion about a web of regulations and laws which effectively provides the US government with the discretionary power to control its defence market and technologies. The Brief ends with some reflections on why the US has decided to formally raise objections about the EDF and PESCO now and the deeper reasons underlying American concerns.
Topic:
European Union, Transatlantic Relations, and Defense Industry
Political Geography:
Europe and United States of America

7. Stress Tests: An insight into crisis scenarios, simulations and exercises

Author:
Daniel Fiott
Publication Date:
09-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
Until the arrival of General Norman Schwarzkopf to United States Central Command (CENTCOM) in November 1988, American war planners assumed that the US’ biggest threat in the Middle East would come from a Soviet invasion of Iran. The Soviet Union had been a net exporter of oil until the late 1960s, but in order to meet its own growing industrial and energy demands Moscow looked increasingly to the Middle East and countries such as Iran to bolster its oil reserves. Based on his own reading, however, Schwarzkopf turned this planning assumption on its head and with CENTCOM he worked on a wargame based on an intra-regional conflict between Kuwait, Iraq and Saudi Arabia rather than a Soviet invasion. Apart from the precise details about potential US fatalities (Schwarzkopf and his team believed the US would suffer more casualties than it actually did), the general and his wargamers were right: Iraq eventually invaded and annexed Kuwait in August 1990 and Operation Desert Storm was over before the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991. Schwarzkopf’s wargame had been prophetic in preparing the US military for war with Iraq. Of course, the history of wargaming and scenario planning does not always mirror the success achieved by Schwarzkopf. Companies such as Shell that are famed for their in-house scenario planning departments do have notable periods of success, but the company’s ‘futures branch’ was nearly shut down three times in almost 50 years of scenario planning at the firm because Shell’s leaders saw little value in its work. In some cases, sound scenario planning and the assessments they lead to are not taken seriously enough: for example, vulnerability assessments of the Fukushima nuclear plant showed that there was a risk from natural disasters such as tsunamis but the consequences of these assessments were downplayed. Most of the time, however, crisis scenario planning unfortunately emerges in the wake of a major crisis such as the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in the US or the global financial crisis of 2007.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, European Union, Crisis Management, Hybrid Threats, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:
Europe and Global Focus

8. One size to fit all? Setting standards for European defence

Author:
Daniel Fiott
Publication Date:
04-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
While the crisis in Ukraine may contribute to a revision of defence expenditures in a number of European countries, the task of finding the right balance between cost-effective and strategicallyrelevant defence spending in Europe is still critical. As defence expenditure generally remains in decline across Europe, a range of innovative measures to ensure that defence budgets are spent more efficiently and effectively are being devised.
Topic:
Defense Policy and Economics
Political Geography:
Europe and Ukraine

9. The 'TTIP-ing Point': How the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Could Impact European Defence

Author:
Daniel Fiott
Publication Date:
11-2013
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The International Spectator
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
The European Union and the United States are on the verge of agreeing to a transatlantic free trade agreement. The proposed Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership is aimed at boosting EU and US economic growth, but the negotiating partners have not excluded the defence sector from negotiations. Europe is at a tipping point regarding the rationale for its defence-industrial integration efforts. Any TTIP extending to the defence sector will raise questions about the nature of the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base, and, crucially, how it impacts the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the Common Security and Defence Policy.
Topic:
Security
Political Geography:
United States and Europe

10. More Competitive, More Efficient? The 2013 European Commission Defence Communication

Author:
Daniel Fiott
Publication Date:
09-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
The European Commission has now released its renewed vision of European defence industrial cooperation called Towards a More Competitive and Efficient Defence and Security Sector. It is a Communication that can be characterised as an interesting hybrid of regulatory and project-based proposals. The Commission began thinking seriously about European defence in 1996 with the release of its first Communication; the latest version is the sixth since this time. Indeed, not perhaps since its 2003 defence Communication – developed in the context of the establishment of the European Security and Defence Policy, the convention on the Future of Europe and the then impending EU enlargement – has a Commission Communication on defence been so eagerly anticipated.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Industrial Policy, and Regional Cooperation
Political Geography:
Europe