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1. Antitrust issues raised by answer engines

Author:
Christophe Carugati
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Rapid development of generative artificial intelligence chatbots like ChatGPT is leading search engine providers to move from search to answer engines. Unlike search engines, which provide search results in the form of blue links to content creators, answer engines generate personalised answers through a conversation with end users. This revolution impacts the internet ecosystem of content creators and the digital advertising market. This paper outlines some early antitrust issues related to answer engines, from the transition from search to answer engines (sections 2 and 3) and the response competition authorities should adopt (section 4). It finds that search and answer engines complement and compete with each other. While the answer-engine market is still at an early stage of development, it already raises some competition issues in relation to data scraping, vertical integration and unfair terms and conditions. Intervention by competition authorities is more likely than not to prevent market power in this new market. In this regard, competition authorities should act to preserve dynamic competition and minimise adverse effects on content creators. Finally, the paper concludes with several research questions for future research (section 5).
Topic:
Science and Technology, Governance, European Union, Digital Economy, Innovation, Artificial Intelligence, and Competition
Political Geography:
Europe

2. A model for a participative approach to digital competition regulation

Author:
Christophe Carugati
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Digital competition regulations often put in place participative approaches to ensure competition in digital markets. The participative approach aims to involve regulated firms, stakeholders and regulators in the design of compliance measures. The approach is particularly relevant in complex and fast-evolving digital markets, where whole industries often depend on the behaviours of the regulated firms. The participative approach enables stakeholders and regulated firms to design compliance measures that are optimal for all because they ensure legal certainty for regulated firms, save time for regulators and take into account the views of stakeholders. However, the participative approach is subject to regulatory capture. The regulated firms and stakeholders might try to promote their interests to the regulator. This could result in endless discussions at best, and the adoption of inappropriate solutions following intense lobbying at worst. A governance model is necessary to ensure that the participative approach works without risks of regulatory capture. The model should define clearly each participant's role, duties and rights. There should be: 1) equal and transparent access of all stakeholders to the dialogue; 2) the presentation of tangible and evidence-based solutions from stakeholders and regulated firms; 3) public decisions from the regulator that contain assessments of the proposed solutions, with guidance to clarify rules; and 4) compliance measures proposed by the regulated firm in line with the guidance. The model should provide an assessment framework for the proposed solutions to identify the most effective. The assessment should rely on the principle of proportionality to assess whether the proposed compliance measure is proportionate, to ensure the effectiveness of the regulation. Finally, the model should safeguard against regulatory capture thanks to transparency rules and external monitoring.
Topic:
Regulation, Digital Economy, Innovation, Stakeholders, and Competition
Political Geography:
Global Focus

3. Which mergers should the European Commission review under the Digital Markets Act?

Author:
Christophe Carugati
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Large digital platforms acquired 1149 firms in various economic sectors between 1987 and July 2022. The European Commission reviewed only 21 of these mergers as most did not meet the European Union merger control turnover threshold. This suggests under-enforcement, with some problematic mergers escaping merger review and thus posing competition risks. The EU Digital Markets Act, which entered into force in November 2022, imposes obligations on firms that are considered ‘gatekeepers’ in relation to some core platform services, such as online search engines. In particular, these firms must now inform the Commission of all their intended acquisitions. This, in combination with Commission guidance on referrals by EU national competition authorities of mergers for review, should ensure more merger reviews in the digital sector. Current European Commission guidance on referring cases for merger review is flexible but impractical as it relies on theories of harm rather than clear and objective criteria. Without clarification, there could be over-enforcement in which unproblematic mergers are reviewed, human resources are allocated inefficiently and legal uncertainty persists. The Commission should issue new guidance on which digital mergers are likely to be problematic, thus triggering referral for merger review. This is likely to be the case when the target’s user base overlaps with that of the acquirer, when the target is a leader in a future critical market and when the target is active in a core platform service.
Topic:
Economy, Innovation, European Commission, and Digital Markets Act (DMA)
Political Geography:
Europe

4. How to implement the self-preferencing ban in the European Union’s Digital Markets Act

Author:
Christophe Carugati
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Large online platforms are intermediaries between end-users and business users. They sometimes propose their own products and services alongside those of rivals. This can lead to platforms promoting their offers over those of competitors in so-called self-preferencing. The European Union Digital Markets Act (DMA) bans large online platforms under its scope from treating their own products and services more favourably that those of rivals when ranking, crawling and indexing. Platforms – or gatekeepers in the DMA definition – should apply transparent, fair and non-discriminatory conditions when ranking products and services. However, the identification, detection, compliance with and monitoring of self-preferencing is complex and resource-intensive. It requires a case-by-case approach and access to and analysis of platform data and algorithms. The DMA allows gatekeepers to promote their own products and services if rivals are subject to the same treatment. Nonetheless, the DMA neither defines equal treatment nor the main elements of self-preferencing, thus preventing platforms within the DMA’s scope from correctly applying the prohibition. To ease enforcement, the European Commission should issue guidance on what constitutes self-preferencing under the DMA, outlining two main principles. First, gatekeepers should use objective and unbiased parameters to determine ranking, indexing and crawling. Second, gatekeepers should demonstrate equal treatment. The guidance will make compliance easier. The Commission should then monitor compliance by appointing and ensuring sufficient rotation of external auditors to avoid capture by gatekeepers. The Commission should also work with competent national authorities that develop technological tools. When monitoring flags a risk of non-compliance, the Commission should then further specify the ban on self-preferencing on a case-by-case basis.
Topic:
European Union, Digital Economy, Economy, Innovation, and Digital Markets Act (DMA)
Political Geography:
Europe