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1. Antitrust issues raised by answer engines

Author:
Christophe Carugati
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Rapid development of generative artificial intelligence chatbots like ChatGPT is leading search engine providers to move from search to answer engines. Unlike search engines, which provide search results in the form of blue links to content creators, answer engines generate personalised answers through a conversation with end users. This revolution impacts the internet ecosystem of content creators and the digital advertising market. This paper outlines some early antitrust issues related to answer engines, from the transition from search to answer engines (sections 2 and 3) and the response competition authorities should adopt (section 4). It finds that search and answer engines complement and compete with each other. While the answer-engine market is still at an early stage of development, it already raises some competition issues in relation to data scraping, vertical integration and unfair terms and conditions. Intervention by competition authorities is more likely than not to prevent market power in this new market. In this regard, competition authorities should act to preserve dynamic competition and minimise adverse effects on content creators. Finally, the paper concludes with several research questions for future research (section 5).
Topic:
Science and Technology, Governance, European Union, Digital Economy, Innovation, Artificial Intelligence, and Competition
Political Geography:
Europe

2. A model for a participative approach to digital competition regulation

Author:
Christophe Carugati
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Digital competition regulations often put in place participative approaches to ensure competition in digital markets. The participative approach aims to involve regulated firms, stakeholders and regulators in the design of compliance measures. The approach is particularly relevant in complex and fast-evolving digital markets, where whole industries often depend on the behaviours of the regulated firms. The participative approach enables stakeholders and regulated firms to design compliance measures that are optimal for all because they ensure legal certainty for regulated firms, save time for regulators and take into account the views of stakeholders. However, the participative approach is subject to regulatory capture. The regulated firms and stakeholders might try to promote their interests to the regulator. This could result in endless discussions at best, and the adoption of inappropriate solutions following intense lobbying at worst. A governance model is necessary to ensure that the participative approach works without risks of regulatory capture. The model should define clearly each participant's role, duties and rights. There should be: 1) equal and transparent access of all stakeholders to the dialogue; 2) the presentation of tangible and evidence-based solutions from stakeholders and regulated firms; 3) public decisions from the regulator that contain assessments of the proposed solutions, with guidance to clarify rules; and 4) compliance measures proposed by the regulated firm in line with the guidance. The model should provide an assessment framework for the proposed solutions to identify the most effective. The assessment should rely on the principle of proportionality to assess whether the proposed compliance measure is proportionate, to ensure the effectiveness of the regulation. Finally, the model should safeguard against regulatory capture thanks to transparency rules and external monitoring.
Topic:
Regulation, Digital Economy, Innovation, Stakeholders, and Competition
Political Geography:
Global Focus

3. How best to ensure international digital competition cooperation

Author:
Christophe Carugati
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Large digital firms pose similar competition issues worldwide, such as promoting their own services over those of rivals, or imposing unfair terms and conditions. Competition authorities have opened several antitrust investigations and policymakers have proposed digital competition regulations to tackle these issues. G7 competition authorities have called for several years for international cooperation on digital markets. They want competition cases and laws around the world that are consistent and work together. However, the question of how this can be done remains. A toolbox for international cooperation in competition enforcement already exists, but it does not provide for cooperation in competition policy and has shortcomings in relation to competition enforcement. Current and proposed legislation targets the largest digital firms to tackle the characteristics of digital markets, such as multi-sidedness, and the same or very similar behaviours, such as self-preferencing. Legislation in different jurisdictions addresses these issues with similar rules. While there is some convergence, some rules diverge in substance and some are at high risk of divergence in interpretation. Inconsistency is thus likely to arise from a divergence of interpretation rather than substance. The solution would be to ensure a coherent approach to competition in digital markets. This could be done by developing a framework based on four elements: (1) adoption of common legal phases for future digital competition laws to ensure clarity; (2) adoption of a common legal interpretation through guidance drafted by international forums, such as the International Competition Network (ICN); (3) adoption of common technical requirements developed in the context of ICN technical workshops, when the rules require it; and (4) the implementation of an international monitoring committee within the ICN to evaluate whether competition authorities and courts enforce the rules consistently. The impact of the framework might be limited because of the non-binding nature of the approach, and the focus on specific competition-related legislation, excluding laws that can also address the issues, such as civil law. Countries can overcome these limitations if they are willing to cooperate to ensure a consistent approach.
Topic:
Markets, Digital Economy, Digital Cooperation, and Competition
Political Geography:
Global Focus

4. Competition in generative artificial intelligence foundation models

Author:
Christophe Carugati
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Foundation models (FMs) are the origin of breakthrough innovations in generative artificial intelligence (AI) applications, such as ChatGPT. Only responsible developments in competitive markets can help ensure that FMs deliver their full benefits at minimum risk. FM developers require language models (LMs), data and computing power to generate natural language output, such as texts, from language input. Thus, the FM value chain is composed of three main elements: LMs, data and computing resources. These markets are currently competitive, with multiple providers and degrees of openness thanks to several closed- and open-source models, open-source and proprietary data, and vigorous competition between firms at the computing-resources level, despite high degrees of concentration in some of these markets. These market characteristics ensure that FM developers face low or surmountable entry barriers. Still, potential competition issues are likely to arise in the future. Dominant firms could leverage their dominant positions, refuse to give access to their LMs, scrape data, refuse to grant access to data, impose undue barriers to switching and lock their users into their ecosystems. Firms could also use LMs to achieve an anticompetitive agreement through algorithmic collusion. Competition authorities should focus their efforts on short-term risks. They should also remain vigilant in terms of ensuring the competitive process between open- and closed-source models works and that open-source developers and public authorities do not impose undue restrictions to mitigate the risks of open-source models, which would deter their development in a way that would favour closed-source models. Finally, at this development stage, studies are lacking. Researchers and competition authorities should investigate the impact of fms on content providers and the digital advertising industry, the role of FMs in digital ecosystems, and cooperation mechanisms between competent authorities across regulatory fields and countries.
Topic:
Digital Economy, Artificial Intelligence, Competition, and ChatGPT
Political Geography:
Global Focus

5. How to implement the self-preferencing ban in the European Union’s Digital Markets Act

Author:
Christophe Carugati
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Large online platforms are intermediaries between end-users and business users. They sometimes propose their own products and services alongside those of rivals. This can lead to platforms promoting their offers over those of competitors in so-called self-preferencing. The European Union Digital Markets Act (DMA) bans large online platforms under its scope from treating their own products and services more favourably that those of rivals when ranking, crawling and indexing. Platforms – or gatekeepers in the DMA definition – should apply transparent, fair and non-discriminatory conditions when ranking products and services. However, the identification, detection, compliance with and monitoring of self-preferencing is complex and resource-intensive. It requires a case-by-case approach and access to and analysis of platform data and algorithms. The DMA allows gatekeepers to promote their own products and services if rivals are subject to the same treatment. Nonetheless, the DMA neither defines equal treatment nor the main elements of self-preferencing, thus preventing platforms within the DMA’s scope from correctly applying the prohibition. To ease enforcement, the European Commission should issue guidance on what constitutes self-preferencing under the DMA, outlining two main principles. First, gatekeepers should use objective and unbiased parameters to determine ranking, indexing and crawling. Second, gatekeepers should demonstrate equal treatment. The guidance will make compliance easier. The Commission should then monitor compliance by appointing and ensuring sufficient rotation of external auditors to avoid capture by gatekeepers. The Commission should also work with competent national authorities that develop technological tools. When monitoring flags a risk of non-compliance, the Commission should then further specify the ban on self-preferencing on a case-by-case basis.
Topic:
European Union, Digital Economy, Economy, Innovation, and Digital Markets Act (DMA)
Political Geography:
Europe