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Begin New Search Topic Corruption Author Charles Kenny

1. Results-Based Payments Reduce the Real Costs of Corruption in Foreign Aid

Author:
Charles Kenny and William Savedoff
Publication Date:
01-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Global Development
Abstract:
Why don't foreign aid programs simply pay recipients for attaining agreed upon results? The idea has been around for decades, but it continues to meet resistance. Some donors worry that programs that pay for outputs or outcomes would not be able to control how funds are used and would thus be vulnerable to corruption. This brief explains why results-based payment systems are actually likely to be less vulnerable to corruption than traditional input-tracking approaches by making the effects of corruption-the failure of programs to deliver results-more visible.
Topic:
Corruption, Development, and Foreign Aid

2. Can Results-Based Payments Reduce Corruption?

Author:
Charles Kenny and William Savedoff
Publication Date:
10-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Global Development
Abstract:
A common objection to results-based programs is that they are somehow more vulnerable to corruption. This paper explains why results-based approaches to foreign aid may be less vulnerable to corruption than the traditional approaches which monitor and track the purchase and delivery of inputs and activities. The paper begins by classifying different corruption costs and specifically distinguishes the problem of diverted funds from the costs associated with failing to generate benefits. It then characterizes the key differences between traditional input-tracking programs and results-based approaches in terms of how they are supposed to work, the implicit risks that preoccupy designers, how they function in practice, and what this means both for the scale of corruption and the realization of benefits. It then considers the conditions under which one approach or another might be more appropriate. The paper concludes that input-tracking approaches are vulnerable to corruption because they have high failure costs and a weak track record for controlling diverted funds. By contrast, results-based approaches are less prone to failure costs and limit the capacity of dishonest agents to divert funds unless those agents first improve efficiency and outputs.
Topic:
Corruption, Development, Foreign Aid, and Governance

3. Publishing Construction Contracts as a Tool for Efficiency and Good Governance

Author:
Charles Kenny
Publication Date:
11-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Global Development
Abstract:
Construction is a $1.7 trillion industry worldwide, much of which is linked to publicly financed projects. Outcomes from this financing are frequently suboptimal. Cost and time escalation, as well as poor quality, are linked to weak governance and corruption, which are endemic in the sector. There is considerable evidence that transparency and oversight are potentially powerful tools to reduce the development impact of corruption. One comparatively cheap and potentially powerful tool to improve outcomes in public procurement is the regular publication of contract and implementation details. In particular, the publication of government contracts would considerably improve transparency. Publication would also provide a large stock of public intellectual capital which should (i) reduce legal costs of contracting; and (ii) help spread best practices and ease the process of learning lessons from failed approaches. The approach is feasible: some jurisdictions have already introduced it.
Topic:
Corruption, Development, Political Economy, and Infrastructure