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1. Regional Financial Arrangements and the International Monetary Fund: Sustaining Coherence in Global Financial Governance

Author:
C. Randall Henning
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for International Governance Innovation
Abstract:
Cooperation and competition among regional financial arrangements (RFAs) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) increasingly determine the effectiveness of the global financial safety net (GFSN), which many observers fear is becoming fragmented. Overlap among these crisis-fighting institutions has important benefits but also pitfalls, including with respect to competition, moral hazard, independence, institutional conflict, creditor seniority and non-transparency. The study reviews the RFAs in Latin America, East Asia and Europe to assess their relationships with the IMF and address these problems. Among other things, it concludes: institutional competition, while harmful in program conditionality, can be beneficial in economic analysis and surveillance; moral hazard depends critically on institutional governance and varies substantially from one regional arrangement to the next; secretariats should be independent in economic analysis, but lending programs should be decided by bodies with political responsibility; and conflicts among institutions are often resolved by key member states through informal mechanisms that should be protected and developed. Findings of other recent studies on the GFSN are critiqued. Architects of financial governance should maintain the IMF at the centre of the safety net but also develop regional arrangements as insurance against the possibility that any one institution could be immobilized in a crisis, thereby safeguarding both coherence and resilience of the institutional complex.
Topic:
Governance, Surveillance, Strategic Competition, and IMF
Political Geography:
Europe, Middle East, Asia, South America, Australia, North America, and Global Focus

2. Fiscal Federalism: US History for Architects of Europe's Fiscal Union

Author:
C. Randall Henning and Martin Kessler
Publication Date:
01-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
European debates over reform of the fiscal governance of the euro area frequently reference fiscal federalism in the United States. The “fiscal compact” agreed by the European Council during 2011 provided for the introduction of, among other things, constitutional rules or framework laws known as “debt brakes” in the member states of the euro area. In light of the compact and proposals for deeper fiscal union, we review US fiscal federalism from Alexander Hamilton to the present. We note that within the US system the states are “sovereign”: The federal government does not mandate balanced budgets nor, since the 1840s, does it bail out states in fiscal trouble. States adopted balanced budget rules of varying strength during the nineteenth century and these rules limit debt accumulation. Before introducing debt brakes for euro area member states, however, Europeans should consider three important caveats. First, debt brakes are likely to be more durable and effective when “owned” locally rather than mandated centrally. Second, maintaining a capacity for countercyclical macroeconomic stabilization is essential. Balanced budget rules have been viable in the US states because the federal government has a broad set of fiscal powers, including countercyclical fiscal action. Finally, because debt brakes threaten to collide with bank rescues, the euro area should unify bank regulation and create a common fiscal pool for restructuring the banking system.
Topic:
Debt, Financial Crisis, and Governance
Political Geography:
United States and Europe

3. Coordinating Regional and Multilateral Financial Institutions

Author:
C. Randall Henning
Publication Date:
03-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
Recent crises and the expansion of international financial arrangements have dramatically elevated the importance of cooperation between regional institutions and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). While the case for coordination between regional and multilateral institutions is generally accepted, however, the need to organize it on an ex ante basis is not fully appreciated. The relatively successful cooperation among the European Commission, European Central Bank, and IMF on the European debt crisis is not likely to be easily replicated in joint programs for countries in other regions, moreover, and the costs of coordination failure could be very large. Recent innovations at the IMF, on the other hand, present opportunities for cooperation with regional facilities. Henning reviews (1) the case for organizing cooperation on an ex ante basis, (2) the policy and institutional matters that should be coordinated, (3) how East Asian arrangements in particular and the IMF might cooperate, and (4) an Interinstitutional Agenda of general principles, modalities, and institutional recommendations. The G-20, member states, and institutions themselves should address this agenda proactively.
Topic:
Debt, Economics, Regional Cooperation, International Monetary Fund, and Financial Crisis
Political Geography:
Europe and East Asia

4. The External Policy of the Euro Area: Organizing for Foreign Exchange Intervention

Author:
C. Randall Henning
Publication Date:
06-2006
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
Scholarship on European integration has extensively debated the external character of the monetary union. The institutions of exchange rate policymaking bear substantially on the euro area's role in international monetary conflict and cooperation. This working paper examines the institutional arrangements for foreign exchange intervention within the euro area and the policymaking surrounding the market operations of autumn 2000—the only case to date of euro area intervention in currency markets. Drawing on interviews of officials in finance ministries, central banks, European institutions, and international organizations, as well as public sources, the paper specifies the division of labor among the European Central Bank (ECB), Euro group, and other European actors and compares that arrangement with corresponding arrangements in the G-7 partners. It concludes, among other things, that (1) the interinstitutional understanding within the euro area gives substantial latitude to the ECB, greater latitude than held by central banks in its G-7 partners, (2) but the understanding is susceptible to renegotiation over time, and (3) economic divergence within the euro area potentially threatens the ability of the monetary union to act coherently externally.
Topic:
Economics, International Organization, and Political Economy
Political Geography:
Europe