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1. January 2022 Issue

Author:
Michael Knights, Alex Almeida, Don Rassler, Brian Fishman, and Amira Jadoon
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
Notwithstanding a night attack that killed 11 Iraqi soldiers on an army base in the Iraqi province of Diyala earlier this month, the Islamic State is at its lowest ebb in Iraq in many years, according to new data published by Michael Knights and Alex Almeida in this month’s feature article. They write that “a comprehensive analysis of attack metrics shows an insurgency that has deteriorated in both the quality of its operations and overall volume of attack activity, which has fallen to its lowest point since 2003. The Islamic State is increasingly isolated from the population, confined to remote rural backwaters controlled by Iraq’s less effective armed forces and militias, and lacks reach into urban centers.” They note that “the key analytical quandary that emerges from this picture is whether the downtrend marks the onset of an enduring decline for the group, or if the Islamic State is merely lying low while laying the groundwork for its survival as a generational insurgency.” In this month’s interview, Amy Zegart speaks to Brian Fishman and Don Rassler about her soon-to-be published book Spies, Lies, and Algorithms: The History and Future of American Intelligence. In the interview, she calls for the creation in the United States of a dedicated open-source intelligence agency because “OSINT will never get the priority or resources the nation needs without its own agency.” Amira Jadoon, Abdul Sayed, and Andrew Mines assess the threat trajectory of Islamic State Khorasan (ISK) in the wake of the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan. They assess that “given the absence of multilateral counterterrorism pressure, the Taliban’s limited capacity to govern, and a worsening humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan, ISK now finds itself perhaps in the most permissive environment yet to rebuild, rally, and expand.” Drawing on extensive fieldwork, including interviews with bandits and jihadi defectors, James Barnett, Murtala Ahmed Rufa’i, and Abdulaziz Abdulaziz examine the nexus between Nigeria’s bandits and jihadi organizations in northwestern Nigeria. They find that despite widespread fears bandits and jihadis would find common cause, there has been infrequent cooperation between them because they have conflicting approaches in their treatment of local inhabitants and because the more powerful bandits feel they have little to gain from working with the jihadis.
Topic:
Crime, Insurgency, Taliban, Counter-terrorism, and Islamic State
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Africa, Iraq, South Asia, Middle East, and Nigeria

2. Syria Proving More Fertile Than Iraq to Al-Qa'ida's Operations

Author:
Brian Fishman
Publication Date:
11-2013
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
Al-qa`ida's operation in Syria is both its most dangerous and dysfunctional. Al-Qa`ida chief Ayman al-Zawahiri's rebuke of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), in which he ordered it to focus solely on Iraq and defer authority in Syria to Jabhat al-Nusra (JN), is evidence that terrorist groups can still pose a significant threat even when plagued by internal divisions.1 Moreover, despite al-Qa`ida's internal strife in Syria, the context in which it operates is deeply advantageous compared to other environments, including Iraq.
Political Geography:
Iraq and Syria

3. Al-Qaeda and the Rise of China: Jihadi Geopolitics in a Post-Hegemonic World

Author:
Brian Fishman
Publication Date:
06-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Washington Quarterly
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
Prognosticating about China's economic, political, and military rise has become a favorite conversation for Western politicians and policy wonks. But Western observers are not the only strategists debating the impact of increased Chinese power. A parallel conversation has been taking place among al-Qaeda affiliated jihadi thinkers for much of the last decade. That discussion ranges from debate about how best to support rebellion among Muslim Uyghurs in China's Xinjiang province to more abstract disagreements over how a transnational militant network such as al-Qaeda should adapt when a traditional state upends the U.S.-led system that has been its primary boogeyman for nearly 15 years.
Political Geography:
United States and China

4. Dysfunction and Decline: Lessons Learned From Inside al-Qa'ida in Iraq

Author:
Brian Fishman
Publication Date:
03-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
Al-Qa`ida in Iraq (AQI) is a shadow of its former self, primarily because broad sectors of Iraq's Sunni population rejected it after more than three years of active and tacit cooperation. Anger over AQI's brutal radicalism infused the Sunni backlash against jihadists, but AQI also made two fundamental strategic overreaches that exacerbated its alienation from Sunnis in Iraq. First, it incited a sectarian backlash from Iraqi Shi'a without the means to defend Iraq's Sunnis from the onslaught it provoked. Second, AQI created a formal political entity, the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), to dominate Iraq after a U.S. withdrawal without adequate support from Iraq's Sunni population.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Political Violence, Terrorism, and War
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, Middle East, and Arabia

5. Dysfunction and Decline

Author:
Brian Fishman
Publication Date:
03-2009
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
Al-Qa`ida in Iraq (AQI) is a shadow of its former self, primarily because broad sectors of Iraq’s Sunni population rejected it after more than three years of active and tacit cooperation. That AQI’s ideological extremism alienated many Iraqis is well understood, but radicalism alone does not fully explain AQI’s decline: poor leadership, vulnerable communication mechanisms, tension between Iraqi and foreign members, and weak indoctrination efforts contributed to strategic and tactical blunders that alienated even other Sunni insurgents. In lieu of major social and political shifts (which are possible) that offer AQI a sustained safe-haven, these dynamics are unlikely to change dramatically; they serve as important obstacles to AQI’s resurrection. Conversely, al-Qa`ida elements elsewhere, primarily along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, are hindered less by these weaknesses. There are lessons from the fight against AQI that are applicable in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but al-Qa`ida’s operations there are likely to be much more durable than those in Iraq. Section I of this paper traces al-Qa`ida in Iraq’s transition from welcome partner to mortal enemy of Iraq’s Sunni insurgents, focusing particularly on the Islamic Army of Iraq. Section II draws on declassified internal AQI correspondence and open sources to describe how external pressures from U.S. forces and tribal sources exacerbated AQI’s fallout with other insurgents while rending the movement from within. Section III assesses AQI’s prospects in Iraq and the impact of AQI’s failure on the future of the global jihadist movement. Section IV offers recommendations for containing AQI in the future and for applying the lessons of AQI’s demise to other elements.
Topic:
Terrorism, Military Strategy, Al Qaeda, Islamic State, and History
Political Geography:
Iraq

6. The Power of Truth? Questions for Ayman al-Zawahiri

Author:
Brian Fishman, Jarret Brachman, and Joseph Felter
Publication Date:
07-2009
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
On 16 December 2007, Ayman al-Zawahiri invited journalists and Jihadist enthusiasts to ask him questions via the primary Jihadist web forums. Zawahiri promised to personally answer some of those questions in a subsequent statement. On 2 April 2008, As-Sahab Media released the first part of Zawahiri’s response in the form of a one hour, forty-three minute audio statement, which was accompanied by Arabic and English transcripts. Zawahiri used the opportunity to publicly address topics that have been dogging him for years. He answered some questions directly, like whether al-Qa’ida’s willingness to kill innocent Muslims in the course of their operations is apostasy. He sidestepped other questions, including more politicized ones about al-Qa’ida’s increasing difficulties in Iraq and, in particular, al-Qa’ida’s official position toward Iran. In our analysis of those questions, we found a major disconnect between what was actually asked to Zawahiri versus the topics that he chose to answer. Beyond the obvious selection bias of the questions that Zawahiri chose to answer, we believe that he made one major strategic mistake in his 2 April statement, one that bolsters suggestions that Abu Umar al-Baghdadi, “Emir” of al-Qa’ida’s Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), is a fabricated persona. The following analysis of Zawahiri’s Part I response is broken into three sections. The first evaluates the most important themes that Zawahiri addressed on 2 April, namely HAMAS, the killing of innocents, Yusuf al-Qaradawi and the Muslim Brotherhood, the Lebanese Jihadist group Fatah al-Islam, and Zawahiri’s dispute with Sayyid Imam Sharif, the former Emir of Egyptian Islamic Jihad. The second section explores the issues that Zawahiri mentioned but failed to actually answer, namely al-Qa’ida’s relationship with other insurgents in Iraq and al-Qa’ida’s position toward Iran. In the third section, we are pleased to offer our analysis of 1,888 questions that were posed to Zawahiri on the password-protected Al-Ekhlass and Al-Hesbah websites.
Topic:
Communications, Al Qaeda, Media, Hamas, and Muslim Brotherhood
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Iraq, and Palestine

7. Iranian Strategy in Iraq: Politics and "Other Means"

Author:
Joseph Felter and Brian Fishman
Publication Date:
10-2008
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
Iran has a robust program to exert influence in Iraq in order to limit American power-projection capability in the Middle East, ensure the Iraqi government does not pose a threat to Iran, and build a reliable platform for projecting influence further abroad. Iran has two primary modes of influence. First, and most importantly, it projects political influence by leveraging close historical relationships with several Shi'a organizations in Iraq: the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), the Badr organization, and the Dawah political party. Second, Iran uses the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Qods Force (QF) to provide aid in the form of paramilitary training, weapons, and equipment to various Iraqi militant groups, including Moqtada al-Sadr's Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) and the Special Group Criminals (SGCs). Iran also projects influence through economic initiatives and various religious programs. Iranian influence in Iraq is inevitable, and some of it is legal and constructive. Nonetheless, Iranian policy in Iraq is also duplicitous. Iran publicly calls for stability while subverting Iraq's government and illegally sponsoring anti‐government militias.
Topic:
International Political Economy and War
Political Geography:
Iraq, Iran, and Middle East

8. Bombers, Bank Accounts and Bleedout

Author:
Brian Fishman, Jacob N. Shapiro, Joseph Felter, Peter Bergen, and Vahid Brown
Publication Date:
07-2008
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
This report is the second to assess the demographics, procedures, finances, and leadership of al-Qa`ida’s foreign fighters, especially those currently fighting in Iraq. It analyzes al-Qa`ida in Iraq’s (AQI) operations from spring 2006 to summer 2007 and includes almost 600 AQI personnel records for foreign fighters crossing into Iraq, AQI contracts for suicide bombers, AQI contracts for fighters leaving Iraq, narratives written by al-Qa`ida’s Syrian smugglers, and AQI financial records.
Topic:
Radicalization, Islamic State, Recruitment, and Foreign Fighters
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, and Syria

9. Iranian Strategy in Iraq

Author:
Brian Fishman and Joseph Felter
Publication Date:
10-2008
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
Iranian Strategy in Iraq: Politics and “Other Means” assesses Iran’s strategy to project influence in Iraq and the means it uses to do so. This report addresses Iran’s dual-strategy of providing military aid to Iraqi militia groups while simultaneously giving political support to Iraqi political parties. Although the report details the scope and nature of Iranian support to Iraqi militias, it concludes that Iran’s political efforts are the core of its effort to project influence in Iraq. This report provides an overview of Iran’s multi-faceted efforts to pursue its national interests by influencing the political and security dynamics in Iraq from the Iranian Revolution to the present day. Although the report describes Iran’s direct and indirect lethal aid to surrogates in Iraq since the U.S. led invasion, it ultimately concludes that U.S. policy focuses on Iranian lethal aid to Iraqi militias at the expense of countering Iran’s primary mode of power projection in Iraq: support of Iranian-affiliated Iraqi political parties. The report also concludes that Iran has recently worked to reduce the level of violence in Iraq while concentrating on a political campaign to shape the SFA and SOFA agreements to its strategic ends.
Topic:
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC), Quds Force, and Jaysh al-Mahdi
Political Geography:
Iraq, Iran, and Middle East

10. Al-Qa’ida’s Foreign Fighters in Iraq: A First Look at the Sinjar Records

Author:
Brian Fishman and Joseph Felter
Publication Date:
01-2007
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
On December 4, 2007 Abu Umar al-Baghdadi, the reputed Emir of al-Qa’ida’s Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), claimed that his organization was almost purely Iraqi, containing only 200 foreign fighters. Twelve days later, on December 16, 2007, Ayman al-Zawahiri urged Sunnis in Iraq to unite behind the ISI. Both statements are part of al-Qa’ida’s ongoing struggle to appeal to Iraqis, many of whom resent the ISI’s foreign leadership and its desire to impose strict Islamic law. In November 2007, the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point received nearly 700 records of foreign nationals that entered Iraq between August 2006 and August 2007. The data compiled and analyzed in this report is drawn from these personnel records, which was collected by al-Qa’ida’s Iraqi affiliates, first the Mujahidin Shura Council (MSC) and then the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI). The records contain varying levels of information on each fighter, but often include the fighter’s country of origin, hometown, age, occupation, the name of the fighter’s recruiter, and even the route the fighter took to Iraq. The records were captured by coalition forces in October 2007 in a raid near Sinjar, along Iraq’s Syrian border. The data reveals several critical findings: Saudis made up the largest contingent of foreign fighters entering Iraq. Libyans were second and Syrians third. Recent political developments in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the prevalence of Libyan fighters in Iraq, and evidence of a well-established smuggling route for Libyans through Egypt, suggests that Libyan factions are increasingly important in al-Qa’ida. The Sinjar Records reinforce anecdotal accounts suggesting that al-Qa’ida’s Iraqi affiliates rely on smugglers and criminals—rather than their own personnel—to funnel recruits into Iraq. Many of the foreign fighters entering Iraq arrived with a group from their hometown, suggesting that al-Qa’ida’s recruiters try to attract groups of friends simultaneously. The majority of fighters that listed their occupation before traveling to Iraq were students. Universities have become a critical recruiting field for al-Qa’ida. The Sinjar Records reveal several weaknesses that the United States and other governments can exploit: Al-Qa’ida’s reliance on criminal and smuggling networks exposes it to the greed of mercenaries. The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group’s unification with al-Qa’ida and its apparent decision to prioritize providing logistical support to the Islamic State of Iraq is likely controversial within the organization. The Islamic State of Iraq has failed politically because it has been unable to balance the practical demands of its local Iraqi constituency and the religious demands of its foreign supporters. The Syrian and Libyan governments share the United States’ concerns about violent salafi-jihadi ideology and the violence perpetrated by its adherents. The authors assert that the United States may be able to increase cooperation from governments to stem the flow of fighters into Iraq by addressing their concerns about domestic jihadi violence.
Topic:
Radicalization, Al Qaeda, Islamic State, Recruitment, and Foreign Fighters
Political Geography:
Iraq, Libya, Yemen, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia