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Begin New Search Topic Al Qaeda Author Brian Fishman

1. Dysfunction and Decline

Author:
Brian Fishman
Publication Date:
03-2009
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
Al-Qa`ida in Iraq (AQI) is a shadow of its former self, primarily because broad sectors of Iraq’s Sunni population rejected it after more than three years of active and tacit cooperation. That AQI’s ideological extremism alienated many Iraqis is well understood, but radicalism alone does not fully explain AQI’s decline: poor leadership, vulnerable communication mechanisms, tension between Iraqi and foreign members, and weak indoctrination efforts contributed to strategic and tactical blunders that alienated even other Sunni insurgents. In lieu of major social and political shifts (which are possible) that offer AQI a sustained safe-haven, these dynamics are unlikely to change dramatically; they serve as important obstacles to AQI’s resurrection. Conversely, al-Qa`ida elements elsewhere, primarily along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, are hindered less by these weaknesses. There are lessons from the fight against AQI that are applicable in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but al-Qa`ida’s operations there are likely to be much more durable than those in Iraq. Section I of this paper traces al-Qa`ida in Iraq’s transition from welcome partner to mortal enemy of Iraq’s Sunni insurgents, focusing particularly on the Islamic Army of Iraq. Section II draws on declassified internal AQI correspondence and open sources to describe how external pressures from U.S. forces and tribal sources exacerbated AQI’s fallout with other insurgents while rending the movement from within. Section III assesses AQI’s prospects in Iraq and the impact of AQI’s failure on the future of the global jihadist movement. Section IV offers recommendations for containing AQI in the future and for applying the lessons of AQI’s demise to other elements.
Topic:
Terrorism, Military Strategy, Al Qaeda, Islamic State, and History
Political Geography:
Iraq

2. The Power of Truth? Questions for Ayman al-Zawahiri

Author:
Brian Fishman, Jarret Brachman, and Joseph Felter
Publication Date:
07-2009
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
On 16 December 2007, Ayman al-Zawahiri invited journalists and Jihadist enthusiasts to ask him questions via the primary Jihadist web forums. Zawahiri promised to personally answer some of those questions in a subsequent statement. On 2 April 2008, As-Sahab Media released the first part of Zawahiri’s response in the form of a one hour, forty-three minute audio statement, which was accompanied by Arabic and English transcripts. Zawahiri used the opportunity to publicly address topics that have been dogging him for years. He answered some questions directly, like whether al-Qa’ida’s willingness to kill innocent Muslims in the course of their operations is apostasy. He sidestepped other questions, including more politicized ones about al-Qa’ida’s increasing difficulties in Iraq and, in particular, al-Qa’ida’s official position toward Iran. In our analysis of those questions, we found a major disconnect between what was actually asked to Zawahiri versus the topics that he chose to answer. Beyond the obvious selection bias of the questions that Zawahiri chose to answer, we believe that he made one major strategic mistake in his 2 April statement, one that bolsters suggestions that Abu Umar al-Baghdadi, “Emir” of al-Qa’ida’s Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), is a fabricated persona. The following analysis of Zawahiri’s Part I response is broken into three sections. The first evaluates the most important themes that Zawahiri addressed on 2 April, namely HAMAS, the killing of innocents, Yusuf al-Qaradawi and the Muslim Brotherhood, the Lebanese Jihadist group Fatah al-Islam, and Zawahiri’s dispute with Sayyid Imam Sharif, the former Emir of Egyptian Islamic Jihad. The second section explores the issues that Zawahiri mentioned but failed to actually answer, namely al-Qa’ida’s relationship with other insurgents in Iraq and al-Qa’ida’s position toward Iran. In the third section, we are pleased to offer our analysis of 1,888 questions that were posed to Zawahiri on the password-protected Al-Ekhlass and Al-Hesbah websites.
Topic:
Communications, Al Qaeda, Media, Hamas, and Muslim Brotherhood
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Iraq, and Palestine

3. Al-Qa’ida’s Foreign Fighters in Iraq: A First Look at the Sinjar Records

Author:
Brian Fishman and Joseph Felter
Publication Date:
01-2007
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
On December 4, 2007 Abu Umar al-Baghdadi, the reputed Emir of al-Qa’ida’s Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), claimed that his organization was almost purely Iraqi, containing only 200 foreign fighters. Twelve days later, on December 16, 2007, Ayman al-Zawahiri urged Sunnis in Iraq to unite behind the ISI. Both statements are part of al-Qa’ida’s ongoing struggle to appeal to Iraqis, many of whom resent the ISI’s foreign leadership and its desire to impose strict Islamic law. In November 2007, the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point received nearly 700 records of foreign nationals that entered Iraq between August 2006 and August 2007. The data compiled and analyzed in this report is drawn from these personnel records, which was collected by al-Qa’ida’s Iraqi affiliates, first the Mujahidin Shura Council (MSC) and then the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI). The records contain varying levels of information on each fighter, but often include the fighter’s country of origin, hometown, age, occupation, the name of the fighter’s recruiter, and even the route the fighter took to Iraq. The records were captured by coalition forces in October 2007 in a raid near Sinjar, along Iraq’s Syrian border. The data reveals several critical findings: Saudis made up the largest contingent of foreign fighters entering Iraq. Libyans were second and Syrians third. Recent political developments in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the prevalence of Libyan fighters in Iraq, and evidence of a well-established smuggling route for Libyans through Egypt, suggests that Libyan factions are increasingly important in al-Qa’ida. The Sinjar Records reinforce anecdotal accounts suggesting that al-Qa’ida’s Iraqi affiliates rely on smugglers and criminals—rather than their own personnel—to funnel recruits into Iraq. Many of the foreign fighters entering Iraq arrived with a group from their hometown, suggesting that al-Qa’ida’s recruiters try to attract groups of friends simultaneously. The majority of fighters that listed their occupation before traveling to Iraq were students. Universities have become a critical recruiting field for al-Qa’ida. The Sinjar Records reveal several weaknesses that the United States and other governments can exploit: Al-Qa’ida’s reliance on criminal and smuggling networks exposes it to the greed of mercenaries. The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group’s unification with al-Qa’ida and its apparent decision to prioritize providing logistical support to the Islamic State of Iraq is likely controversial within the organization. The Islamic State of Iraq has failed politically because it has been unable to balance the practical demands of its local Iraqi constituency and the religious demands of its foreign supporters. The Syrian and Libyan governments share the United States’ concerns about violent salafi-jihadi ideology and the violence perpetrated by its adherents. The authors assert that the United States may be able to increase cooperation from governments to stem the flow of fighters into Iraq by addressing their concerns about domestic jihadi violence.
Topic:
Radicalization, Al Qaeda, Islamic State, Recruitment, and Foreign Fighters
Political Geography:
Iraq, Libya, Yemen, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia