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1. Online Harms White Paper: Open Consultation Submission

Author:
Bradley Hanlon, Lindsay Gorman, and Bret Schafer
Publication Date:
06-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
In April 2019, the United Kingdom’s Home Office published its Online Harms White Paper, which proposed a regulatory framework designed to address the prevalence of “illegal and harmful content online.” The Paper called for the establishment of a “duty of care” that would place greater responsibility on companies to ensure the safety of their users and address harm caused through the use of their services. It broadly defined the companies to which the framework would apply as those “that allow users to share or discover user-generated contact or interact with each other online” and included among its “online harms” threats ranging from disinformation and terrorist activity to cyberbullying and child exploitation and abuse. The Paper further advocated the establishment of an independent regulator to oversee compliance with the new regulations and enforce punishments for non-compliance. The UK government also solicited open consultation on the specifics of its proposals. To this end, ASD’s Brad Hanlon, Lindsay Gorman, and Bret Schafer submitted the following key recommendations to increase the effectiveness of the Online Harms White Paper’s response to online threats, which are drawn directly from their report: Lawmakers should reassess the broad scope of the “online harms” framework and consider the different legislative actions that may be necessary (or unnecessary) to combat varied challenges. They should also acknowledge the need for solutions that are tailored not only to specific threats, but that account for the nature, size, and capabilities of online platforms. Lawmakers should reassess whether an independent regulator is an effective method to combat the full range of “online harms” encompassed in the White Paper and consider other actions for countering threats that are difficult to define. If lawmakers proceed to establish an independent regulator, they should ensure that it is guided by a defined and proportionate enforcement structure and that it maintains credible independence from government. Lawmakers should construct a definition of “private communications” that includes encrypted messaging platforms and craft legislation that regulates “online harms” on these platforms without threatening democratic norms. As one of the first efforts to create a comprehensive framework to address threats to online safety, the regulations that the UK adopts will influence the approaches of other countries – including those with a weaker democratic record. By taking these steps, the UK can most effectively shape international norms surrounding online regulation.
Topic:
Regulation, Internet, Norms, and Cyberspace
Political Geography:
United Kingdom and Europe

2. Online Information Laundering: The Role of Social Media

Author:
Kirill Meleshevich and Bret Schafer
Publication Date:
01-2018
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Russia’s ability to successfully conduct hybrid warfare is predicated on the creation of a fog of ambiguity between the Kremlin’s actions and the Kremlin itself. By conducting operations through an ad hoc network of proxies, carve-outs, and cutouts — whose connection to the Kremlin is difficult to definitively establish — the Russian government is able to maintain plausible deniability and thus lower the diplomatic and military costs of its actions. It is a strategy with deep roots: maskirovka — a Soviet-era military doctrine that translates as “mask” or “masquerade” — established operational deceit as a core tenet of both conventional and irregular warfare. While modern maskirovka is most commonly associated with the use of “little green men” to occupy Crimea, it is a tactic that is also deeply ingrained in the Kremlin’s ongoing disinformation campaign against the United States and Europe. This presents an obvious challenge: How can the West respond to an adversary who denies even being present on the battlefield? One answer may lie in understanding the operational resemblance between the spread of disinformation and the laundering of illicit funds. Just as ill-gotten money needs to be moved from an illegitimate source into an established financial institution, disinformation is most powerful when a façade of legitimacy is created through “information laundering.” Anti-money laundering practitioners describe the need for financial criminals to place, layer, and integrate illicit funds, meaning that money obtained through criminal means needs to find an entry point into the financial system, then move between banks or financial products to hide the identity of the owner, and finally be woven into an asset from which seemingly legitimate funds can be drawn. Russian disinformation follows a similar pattern; only here, the currency is information and the reward is influence. This piece will examine these similarities and explore the policy measures that could be taken in light of these findings.
Topic:
Internet, Social Media, Disinformation, and Cyberspace
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and United States of America