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Begin New Search Author Benjamin Augé Publication Year within 25 Years

1. New African Union Commission (2021-2025) Challenges and Issues After the Reform Initiated by Paul Kagamé

Author:
Benjamin Augé and Félicité Djilo
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The election of the Commission to run the African Union (AU) on February 6 and 7, 2021 was an important step towards implementing its institutional reform. The Commission is the institution’s real government, setting the pan-African organization’s objectives under the leadership of the Heads of State who meet once a year at the Assembly. The Chadian Moussa Faki, who was re-elected as AU Commission (AUC) Chairperson, has the onerous task of undertaking this reform, initiated by the former AU Chair, Rwandan president Paul Kagamé, between 2016 and 2018. The African Union (AU) has been led for the past year by a new Commission whose results will be closely scrutinized by the organization's member countries. The Covid-19 pandemic has largely contributed to slowing down the institutions in Addis Ababa, handicapping the South African and Congolese presidencies. The Senegalese presidency is eagerly awaited to exit the AU from the theme that has dominated debates for 24 months into Covid-19. The reform of the African Union initiated by Rwandan President Paul Kagame is beginning to be implemented, but its results will have to be assessed in the long term. The AU's Peace and Security Council (PSC) is in the hands of Nigerian Bankole Adeoye after 18 years of Algeria's stranglehold. The PSC is facing a multitude of a multitude of crises - civil war in Ethiopia, Cabo Delgado in Mozambique, English-speaking provinces of Cameroon, coups d'état in Mali, Guinea and transition in Chad - the management of which remains particularly politicized.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Reform, and African Union
Political Geography:
Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa

2. Saudi Arabia’s Policy in Africa : Vectors and Objectives

Author:
Benjamin Augé
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Until recently, Saudi Arabia was the country out of the Gulf countries that had the greatest number of diplomatic missions in Africa. Although it is now outstripped by Qatar, which has been striving since the beginning of the Emirati-Saudi embargo that started in June 2017 to open a large number of diplomatic posts in Africa. The Saudi diplomatic network was formerly established in predominantly Muslim states (in the Maghreb, West Africa and in the Horn of Africa) and in South Africa. The kingdom can mainly rely on experienced diplomats, who have maintained a presence in Africa since the 1970s, boosted after the 1979 Iranian Islamic Revolution and the desire to prevent a spread of Shiism on the continent. Nowadays, Saudi Arabia is also clearly involved in Africa as elsewhere, to counter the influence of its Qatari neighbor.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Islam, Soft Power, and Trade Policy
Political Geography:
Africa, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Gulf Nations

3. Israel-Africa Relations: What Can We Learn from the Netanyahu Decade?

Author:
Benjamin Augé
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Since he came to power in 2009, Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has not made Israeli-African relations a priority in his foreign policy. After they broke off diplomatic relations with Israel following the Yom Kippur War in 1973, most African states – besides Malawi, South Africa (apart from between 1975 and 1979), Swaziland and Lesotho – finally resumed relations with the Jewish state during the 1980s and 1990s and more recently for some others. The resumption of diplomatic ties was gradual, as peace efforts were initiated regarding Palestine. Israel now enjoys diplomatic relations with more than 40 sub-Saharan African states, but only has 12 embassies throughout the entire continent, including in Cairo. The last ones to be opened were in Kigali (Rwanda) in 2019 and Accra (Ghana) in 2011. The Israeli government today views Africa either as a longstanding sphere of influence (Ethiopia, Eritrea, Cameroon, Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, Uganda and for the last two decades Rwanda) that needs to be strengthened, or as a new sphere of influence to be developed (the Sahel countries, central Africa, etc.) These relations operate through various conventional channels, including some that have been significantly weakened by Benjamin Netanyahu when he was Israeli prime minister between 1996 and 1999 and since 2009. This is particularly true for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its counterpart, Mashav, responsible for development cooperation. However, the security and intelligence sectors (Mossad), controlled by the Prime Minister’s Office, are strong drivers of Israeli foreign policy, hence Benjamin Netanyahu’s dominance over foreign affairs in general, and Africa in particular. The objective of this paper is to explain how political, economic and security relationships between Africa and Israel have developed in practice during the decade 2009-2020. The aim here is to go beyond a mere account of the history of these relationships. Since 2009, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu – still in power at the time of writing – has frequently talked about his country’s return to the African stage, without necessarily providing his government with the financial resources to achieve this.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, International Affairs, and Benjamin Netanyahu
Political Geography:
Africa, Middle East, and Israel

4. The Development of Hydrocarbons in East Africa: Political and Security Challenges

Author:
Benjamin Augé
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
East Africa has the potential to experience a gas and liquefied natural gas (LNG) export boom in the coming years due to several projects that have been released. Mozambique has approved two projects totaling more than 15 million tons per year (Mt/yr.) of liquefied gas and a third should be started by the end of 2019. The first ENI Floating Liquefied Natural Gas plant (FLNG) will come onto the market in 2022 and four other onshore liquefaction trains, two of which will produce 6.44 Mt (Anadarko/Total) and two of which will produce 7.6 Mt (ExxonMobil/ENI), will be available around 2025. However, with the recoverable reserves, the companies involved are counting on 50 or even 60 Mt/yr. by 2030. This volume will help this East African country to achieve the world’s fourth-largest LNG export capacity in the medium term after the United States, Qatar and Australia. As for Tanzania, no development should be approved before 2020 in the best-case scenario.
Topic:
Security, Development, Oil, and Gas
Political Geography:
Uganda, Kenya, Africa, Mozambique, Tanzania, and East Africa

5. Angola under Joao Lourenço: Who Are the New Players of MPLA State?

Author:
Benjamin Augé
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
In 2017, the coming to power of João Lourenço put an end to nearly four decades of rule by the former head of state, José Eduardo Dos Santos. João Lourenço’s first objective was to strengthen his authority by appointing people close to him and cadres from the old regime, who had professed loyalty to him, to high office. The speed of the takeover of all the decision-making centers – army, intelligence services, state-owned companies, oil industry and above all the MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) party-state – by the new “Comrade Number One” surprised the leaders of the Dos Santos era, some of whom were abruptly dismissed or even sentenced to prison. Now firmly established in Angola’s command centers, João Lourenço is however facing a serious economic crisis, the most worrying for the country since the end of the civil war in 2002.
Topic:
Economics, Politics, and Governance
Political Geography:
Africa and Angola

6. The 2016 Failed Coup in Turkey: What Is the Impact on Turkish-African Relations?

Author:
Benjamin Augé
Publication Date:
06-2018
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The July 2016 failed coup against President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s government not only resulted in a dramatic upheaval in Turkey, it also had a significant impact on the structure of its international relations and its networks of influence abroad. The way this coup affected the political actors who shaped Turkish policy in Africa highlights the extent to which Fethullah Gülen’s movement – accused by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of having organised the coup- shaped those relations up to 2016. Today, Turkish diplomacy in Africa is undergoing a process of reconstruction, as it dismantles functional networks, and supports the new actors championed by Ankara. The destruction of what has been patiently established for 20 years and the creation of new channels of influence is a challenging task for Turkish diplomats and politicians who multiply their visits to Africa. In some countries, Turkish diplomacy sometimes faces difficulties in removing the Gülenist networks, as some are closely linked to high-ranking local leaders.
Topic:
International Relations, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and Fethullah Gülen
Political Geography:
Africa, Turkey, and Middle East

7. A Year after the Start of the Saudi-Emirati Blockade against Qatar. What Are the Consequences for West Africa?

Author:
Benjamin Augé
Publication Date:
10-2018
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
On June 5th 2017, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt and Bahrain broke off diplomatic relations with Qatar and agreed to isolate the Emirate via an air and land blockade. These countries decided to punish Qatar under the pretext of a speech the Emir of Qatar, Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani, would have made on May 23rd, which reiterated the strong ties between his country and Iran.[1] The situation has been at a deadlock for a year, and Qatar refuses to apply the Emirati and Saudi Arabian list of the 13 demands. The latter mainly include the closure of the Al Jazeera TV station and the Turkish military base on its territory, downgrading diplomatic relations with Iran, as well as a total separation with movements such as Hezbollah or even the Muslim Brotherhood.[2] However, although this crisis only pits Persian Gulf countries against each other, apart from Egypt, both sides have tried to win support. Donald Trump has adopted the stance of the Saudi-Emirati side[3] – but the State Department under Rex Tillerson (2017-2018) has always remained cautious –, Europe remains neutral with no leader daring to choose one side rather than another. The confrontation was particularly marked in West Africa. Four countries in this area – Senegal, Mauritania, Chad and Niger – quickly downgraded their diplomatic relations with Qatar shortly after the start of the crisis. However, their strategy vis-à-vis this wealthy gas Emirate has changed considerably over the last twelve months, as Doha's efforts to obtain new support in the rest of West Africa has started to bear fruit.
Topic:
International Relations, Diplomacy, and Economics
Political Geography:
Saudi Arabia, West Africa, Senegal, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Chad, Mauritania, Niger, and Gulf Nations