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Begin New Search Topic Military Strategy Author Ben Zweibelson

1. Breaking the Newtonian Fetish: Conceptualizing War Differently for a Changing World

Author:
Ben Zweibelson
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:
Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:
Explaining what a military’s social paradigm concerning conflict and war is requires a theoretical approach to both frame the core constructs and offer feasible alternatives. This article introduces social paradigm theory for military application and how most modern, technologically advanced militaries sustain a Newtonian-styled worldview concerning warfare and what constitutes war. The Newtonian-styled war paradigm gained prominence during the last five centuries, yet is now becoming increasingly insufficient and possibly irrelevant. The integration of ever-increasingly sophisticated artificial intelligence into nearly all aspects of warfare will require new ways of thinking and how teams of humans and AI systems collaborate in complex security contexts immediately. The new combination of the space domain, cyberspace, those military forces associated with these new domains, and special operations activities are of increased focus for how and why conflict may change, particularly within an overarching traditional nuclear deterrence between state competitors. This requires a military paradigmatic shift, moving away from Newtonian constructs.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Artificial Intelligence, Warfare, Complexity, Force Design, and Emergence
Political Geography:
Global Focus, United States of America, and Space

2. An Awkward Tango: Pairing Traditional Military Planning to Design and Why It Currently Fails to Work

Author:
Ben Zweibelson
Publication Date:
03-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Over the past decade, traditional military planning methodology and doctrine has gained an unlikely dance partner-the ambiguous, conceptual, and controversial process called ‘design.’ Although I will expand in this article on what exactly traditional military planning’ constitutes as a methodology, readers familiar with the debate over conceptual and detailed planning will recognize traditional military planning as the linear, analytic process grounded in metrics, categories, and objective scientific tenets. Many call this ‘detailed planning’ to refer synonymously to traditional military problem-solving, reflecting a military institutional practice of developing specific, sequential, and highly scientific-based plans that are quantifiable (analytical, objective) according to an accepted language, format, and professional education.4Unlike detailed planning, design as an emerging practice evokes eclectic combinations of philosophy, social sciences, complexity theory, and often improvised, unscripted approaches in a tailored or “one of a kind” practice. Ultimately, design becomes something beyond military planning entirely, thus we should avoid an “either or” sort of debate with design and detailed planning. Although this article employs the metaphor of awkward dancing partners, the metaphor is incomplete in that design may “dance” with detailed planning, while also able to depart the dance floor and do things that detailed planning is simply incapable of. However, for military professionals facing complex problems, we might continue the awkward tango metaphor for this article in that a military might employ both design and detailed planning in many conflict environments.Both design and detailed planning are elements of sensemaking, where for military applications we derive the notion of ‘planning’ and ‘knowing’ in a broad sense as an integral part of comprehending reality. Planning is subordinate to ‘knowing’ in that the detailed blueprints for constructing a tank are subordinate to the conceptual design of“how does one construct an armored vehicle to dominate specific terrain”? Planning is subordinate to design, with detailed planning further subordinate to various types of planning, with ill-structured conflict environments requiring militaries to whirl various dancing partners of design and planning across confusing and dynamic dance floors. Yet as our associated western military doctrine, military education, and practice in conflict environments demonstrates repeatedly, we are unable to get these dance partners to work together as a team, or move to the music for purposes of effectively creating and directing useful action for a military organization.5Institutionally and as a practicing community of professionals, the Western military has little trouble agreeing upon the general principles of traditional planning.6Yet we collectively remain fiercely divided, confused, and often resistant to design in any form, whether a rival methodology, complimentary, or even a subset of traditional planning.7‘Military Design’ comes in as many shades and patterns as service camouflage patterns now, and just as uniform differences symbolize organizational relevance and identity, so do the various service-centric design versions available for sensemaking and subsequent planning applications. Design has become so much of a stumbling block that the U.S. Army has devoted multiple research projects on design integration using the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, and in 2011 revised Army design doctrine with a name change and “rebranding” complete with academic realignments.8While the U.S. Army has cycled through several incarnations of design in the past decade, American Joint doctrine (which strongly influences other western military doctrines) has separated design from ‘operational design’ while casting both within traditional planning, resulting in a rather befuddled operational force. The U.S. military Joint Staff’s Planner’s Handbook for Operational Design from 2011 offers the following explanation: In general, the terms [design and operational design] have been related but not identical. The focus of discussion and writing on design during the past three years has been on the critical and creative thinking and learning required to understand complex operational environments and ill-defined problems facing the commander. Such understanding should facilitate early development of a broad operational approach that can guide the more detailed planning process. Operational design is a construct that joint doctrine has used since 2002 to encompass various elements of operational design (previously called facets of operational art) that planners have applied to develop a framework for a campaign or major operation... In essence, the above explanation conveys that joint doctrine’s operational design has embraced and subsumed design’s philosophy and general methodology.” 9 Thus, United States military organizations at the Joint level apply some aspects of the service-specific “Army Design Methodology” into joint doctrine where “operational design” functions more as a reverse-engineering planning project for campaign construction.10 This confuses military professionals because our organizations are not only mixing terms and concepts, but engaging far too much in methodological discussions without getting above it all and into the challenging abstract levels this article will offer. Although “design” is intended in the various U.S. Army doctrinal incarnations to be an iterative and adaptive sensemaking process for focusing critical and creative thinking on complex military problems, the American Army struggles to make sense of why military organizations have so many problems grasping what design is, and how it integrates into traditional military decision making. 11 With all of these different interpretations of how to make sense of complex military situations with ‘design’, is it any wonder why our militaries remains unable, or perhaps at a deeper institutional level, unwilling to integrate design effectively with traditional planning? We need to explore why traditional military planning and design theory remain awkward dance partners, and where we might try to nudge the larger Western military institution towards in the future. The difference goes beyond superficial arguments on language, doctrine, or conflict environments- it has to do with how the military prefers to make sense of the world beyond methodologies entirely.
Topic:
Military Strategy and Military Affairs
Political Geography:
United States