1. Reputation and War: Explaining the Intractability of Territorial Conflict
- Author:
- Barbara F. Walter
- Publication Date:
- 04-2003
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies
- Abstract:
- Between 1940 and 1996, governments were seventy percent less likely to negotiate with rebels seeking independence or greater territorial autonomy than with rebels seeking any other goal. Current theories suggest that this is due to the economic, strategic, or psychological value of territory under dispute. I argue that a government's decision to negotiate has more to do with the signal the government wishes to send to future challengers than with any specific characteristics of the land in question. If the government believes it could face multiple separatist challenges in the future, it will invest in a reputation for toughness now rather than face additional challengers down the road. If the government knows it will face such a challenge only once, there is less reason to invest in a reputation and negotiation is likely to result. An analysis of all self-determination movements between 1940 and 2000 demonstrates that governments of multiethnic states are far less likely to negotiate than are governments that preside over more homogenous populations.
- Topic:
- Security, Peace Studies, and Politics