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Begin New Search Author Antonio Giustozzi Publication Year within 25 Years

1. Nomad-settler conflict in Afghanistan today

Author:
Antonio Giustozzi
Publication Date:
11-2019
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU)
Abstract:
Conflict between nomads and settlers appeared repeatedly in the media in Afghanistan and elsewhere after 2001, but it has rarely been studied systematically. In order to fill this gap, AREU launched a three-pronged research project on Natural Resources Management (NRM) in December 2016 supported by the EU. The purpose of this paper is primarily to inform and update policymaking on matters related to nomad-settler conflict in Afghanistan, as well as to lay the foundations for future research efforts. It provides a first, and necessarily mapped, assessment of the conflict and of resolution efforts as they stood in 2017—2019. The study looks at the several drivers of nomad-settler conflict, including the opacity around the Pastures Law, the government weakness, or demographic pressure over a scarcer irrigated land. It then looks at past conflict resolution efforts and their limited impact, before formulating recommendations around hybrid solutions where the state would play only a limited role. It also discusses possible options for future, improved resolution efforts.
Topic:
Natural Resources, Governance, Conflict, Public Policy, Land, and Nomad
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and South Asia

2. Electoral Offensive: Taliban Planning for Afghanistan's 2014 National Elections

Author:
Antonio Giustozzi and Casey Garret Johnson
Publication Date:
11-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
The Taliban have more resources and are better organized to disrupt Afghanistan's 2014 national elections than was the case in any of the country's last four elections. Still, there are disagreements between insurgent leaders about carrying out a campaign of violence and intimidation. One group, led by Akhtar Mansur and tied to the Quetta Shura, favored, at least for some time, a more conciliatory approach and in the spring met informally with Afghan government officials to discuss allowing the polls to go forward. Another Group, led by Taliban military commander Zakir and the Peshawar Shura, favors disrupting the election. These upper-level divisions may have little consequence on the ground since rank-and-file fighters are either vowing to carry out attacks regardless or, as has happened in the past, may strike local deals with political entities to look the other way and allow voting to take place.
Topic:
Security, Political Violence, Democratization, Islam, War, and Insurgency
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Central Asia, and Taliban

3. Hearts, Minds, and the Barrel of a Gun: The Taliban's Shadow Government

Author:
Antonio Giustozzi
Publication Date:
03-2012
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
PRISM
Institution:
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:
The predominant image of the Taliban is a military organization bent almost exclusively on wreaking havoc on the Afghan state and whoever sides with it. However, for all their reputation of “warrior mullahs,” the Taliban have not altogether neglected the civilian dimensions of power. In the early post-9/11 period, as an insurgent organization, they were indeed little more than roving bands of warrior mullahs who were trying to regroup and relaunch an insurgency. They did not have the resources or capacity to develop a shadow government structure. After 2003, however, the situation gradually changed and the Taliban started investing greater resources in their shadow government. Apart from the increased availability of financial resources, what might have driven the Taliban's desire for building their own shadow government was their thirst for legitimacy. They wanted to show that they were the authentic government of Afghanistan and not merely an opposition military force. Another reason appears to have been that the Taliban actually realized that a shadow governance structure brought them some practical benefits, such as a greater ability to interact with the population. Particularly since the Taliban started entering relatively heavily populated areas in 2006, their commanders were no longer skilled enough to deal with the villagers. In a sense, the Taliban realized that they could not outfight the forces arrayed against them, which included the strongest military on the planet and a series of allies, also of respectable military capability. They tried, therefore, to outgovern their rivals, identifying the ineffectiveness of Kabul's government as their greatest opportunity.
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and Taliban

4. The Taliban Beyond the Pashtuns

Author:
Antonio Giustozzi
Publication Date:
07-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for International Governance Innovation
Abstract:
Although the Taliban remain a largely Pashtun movement in terms of their composition, they have started making significant inroads among other ethnic groups. In many cases, the Taliban have co-opted, in addition to bandits, disgruntled militia commanders previously linked to other organizations, and the relationship between them is far from solid. There is also, however, emerging evidence of grassroots recruitment of small groups of ideologically committed Uzbek, Turkmen and Tajik Taliban. While even in northern Afghanistan the bulk of the insurgency is still Pashtun, the emerging trend should not be underestimated.
Topic:
Islam, Politics, Armed Struggle, and Insurgency
Political Geography:
Afghanistan