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1. CTC Sentinel: January 2024 Issue

Author:
Haroun Rahimi, Andrew Watkins, Gabriel Weimann, Alexander T. Pack, and Rachel Sulciner
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
In the feature article, Haroun Rahimi and Andrew Watkins assess Taliban rule two and a half years into their renewed control of Afghanistan. They write: “Since their 2021 takeover, the Taliban have consolidated control over an impoverished and austere postwar Afghanistan. Since their victory, the Taliban’s emir has reasserted his status as a ‘supreme leader’ and oriented domestic policy in favor of highly conservative constituencies—which has revealed deep differences among their leadership of visions for the future of the Afghan state and society and how authority is divided among themselves. Yet, the Taliban have persistently prioritized the cohesion of their movement and governing apparatus. This trajectory has earned condemnation from Western states and prompted caution in the entire world’s engagement, which has in turn fueled Taliban motivations to reject foreign demands. After two and a half years of rule, the Taliban’s domestic agenda has become intertwined with their foreign relations impasse.” Gabriel Weimann, Alexander Pack, Rachel Sulciner, Joelle Scheinin, Gal Rapaport, and David Diaz write that “with the arrival and rapid adoption of sophisticated deep-learning models such as ChatGPT, there is growing concern that terrorists and violent extremists could use these tools to enhance their operations online and in the real world. Large language models have the potential to enable terrorists to learn, plan, and propagate their activities with greater efficiency, accuracy, and impact than ever before.” The authors offer “an early exploration of how these large language models could be exploited by terrorists or other violent extremists … to support their efforts in training, conducting operational planning, and developing propaganda.” Georgia Gilroy decodes al-Shabaab’s social media strategy, outlining the “controlled, adaptive, and coordinated approach the terrorist group takes to its online behavior.” She writes that the group’s “continued resilience, even in the face of mounting counterinsurgency efforts, is underpinned by its sophisticated communications architecture.” Christian Jokinen assesses whether left-wing terrorism is making a comeback in Germany in a case study of the violent left-wing Engel – Guntermann network. He writes that “the recent concerning trend among German left-wing extremists is toward greater violence and transnationalism.”
Topic:
Terrorism, Taliban, Violent Extremism, Artificial Intelligence, Leftist Politics, and Al-Shabaab
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Europe, South America, Germany, and Global Focus

2. August 2022 Issue

Author:
Paul Cruickshank, Madeline Field, Andrew Watkins, Don Rassler, and Muhammad Al-'Ubaydi
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
One year ago, the Taliban returned to power in Afghanistan, raising concerns that they would again provide al-Qa`ida with a safe haven. Soberingly, in the months before his death in a U.S. airstrike at the end of July, al-Qa`ida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri was releasing videos encouraging global terror, while living in a salubrious neighborhood of Kabul under the apparent protection of the Haqqani Taliban. This special issue of CTC Sentinel focuses on evolving dynamics relevant to the terrorism threat landscape one year into Taliban rule. In the feature article, Andrew Watkins takes a deep look at the Taliban’s first year in power. He writes: “Until the subtle, almost imperceptible attempts to nudge the needle on controversial issues within the movement gain more momentum, the Taliban’s emphasis on policing public life—and most critically, keeping women out of it—is likely to continue. And given this dynamic, al-Zawahiri’s killing under sanctuary in Kabul may confront the Taliban with a greater obligation to shore up their legitimacy among jihadi circles than to fall in line with international expectations on counterterrorism.” Our interview is with Edmund Fitton-Brown, the outgoing coordinator of the ISIL/Al-Qaida/Taliban Monitoring Team at the United Nations, who argues that a key determinant of the future international terror threat will be the degree to which the Taliban inhibit al-Qa`ida from launching attacks with fingerprints that lead directly back to Afghanistan. Don Rassler and Muhammad al-`Ubaydi evaluate who may be next in line to lead al-Qa`ida. They write: “The decision that al-Qa`ida makes could end up strengthening the group and al-Qa`ida’s status as a global brand. It could also, like someone pulling a loose thread, facilitate a greater unraveling of al-Qa`ida and its network of formally aligned regional affiliate partners.” Tore Hamming and Abdul Sayed assess the evolving threat posed by al-Qa`ida in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), writing, “it appears that with Taliban-run Afghanistan offering it a platform for regional expansion, AQIS is pivoting its focus to other parts of the South Asia region. Having set its eyes particularly on India and the contested Kashmir region, AQIS is currently pushing out targeted propaganda to recruit new operatives and to instigate new insurgencies in the region.” Nishank Motwani looks at the lessons learned for countering violent extremism in Afghanistan based on a survey of how former governing elites saw the violent extremism problem set in Afghanistan before the Taliban takeover.
Topic:
Taliban, Violent Extremism, Counter-terrorism, Al Qaeda, and Ayman al-Zawahiri
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, South Asia, India, and United States of America

3. November 2021 Issue

Author:
Andrew Watkins, Seth Morrow, Nicholas Tallant, Jerome P. Bjelopera, and Matthew Bamber
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
It has been three months since the Taliban entered Kabul and retook control of Afghanistan. According to the head of the U.N. World Food Programme, “23 million people [are now] marching toward starvation. 95% of Afghans don’t have enough food. The economy is collapsing. Winter is coming. This is going to be hell on earth.” In this month’s feature article, Andrew Watkins assesses the Taliban’s efforts to rule Afghanistan so far. He writes that “The Taliban have busied themselves consolidating control, reacting swiftly and harshly to perceived threats. They have not clearly defined the scope or structure of their state, nor have they shared long-term plans for their rank-and-file, many of which continue to operate as they did before August 15, 2021. Taliban leaders have demonstrated the continued primacy of maintaining internal cohesion, a longstanding trait that will likely stunt the group’s response to Afghanistan’s impending economic and humanitarian crises.” Watkins writes that from their perspective, “accepting aid that might sustain their state would prove worthless if doing so fueled a fissure within their own organization. The Taliban would become the very thing their origin story professes they rose up to eradicate and replace: a fractious constellation of militant bands. To put it another way, if Afghanistan’s compounding crises pose the Taliban with the prospect of either failing to provide for the desperate needs of the Afghan people or their own potential fragmentation, the Taliban will put their own organization first.” This month’s interview is with General Richard D. Clarke, commander of U.S. Special Operations Command. In a commentary, Jerome Bjelopera argues that “given that the U.S. national security establishment has taken up great power competition (GPC) as its primary concern recently, and terrorism has slipped from the top position, it is time for the security policy community to place terrorism within a new conceptual framework, one that combines terrorists, violent criminals, drug traffickers, insurgents, and others under the heading of violent non-state actors (VNSA).” Interviews that Matthew Bamber conducted with 43 former Islamic State civilian employees shed light on two distinct categories: those who became full members of the group and those who did not. He writes that “there are significant differences in how these two categories were treated by the Islamic State, the positions they were able to fill, the financial benefits they received, and the processes through which they joined and left Islamic State employment ... Understanding the nuances is important in assessing the culpability of the Islamic State’s civilian workers and the danger they may pose in the future.”
Topic:
Terrorism, Non State Actors, Military Affairs, Taliban, Counter-terrorism, Islamic State, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Middle East, and United States of America

4. Taliban Fragmentation: Fact, Fiction, and Future

Author:
Andrew Watkins
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
The U.S. and Afghan governments have, at various times, intentionally pursued strategies of “divide and defeat” in an attempt to fragment and weaken the Taliban. These approaches have proved ineffective and, as long as peace efforts are being pursued, should be discontinued. Contrary to lingering narratives from earlier eras of the Afghan conflict, the Taliban today are a relatively cohesive insurgent group and are unlikely to fragment in the near term. This has not happened by accident: the Taliban’s leadership has consistently, at times ruthlessly, worked to retain and strengthen its organizational cohesion. To this day, the group is unwilling to cross internal “red lines” that might threaten that cohesion. The literature on insurgency and negotiated peace suggests that only cohesive movements are capable of following through and enforcing peace agreements. Many of the feared scenarios of Taliban fragmentation, including the defection of “hard-liners” or mass recruitment by the Islamic State, do not correspond to current realities on the ground. Fragmentation of the Taliban is not impossible, and the group is certainly far from monolithic, but ideological rifts are not a sufficient explanation of why this has taken place in the past—or might again. By studying what makes the Taliban cohesive and what has caused instances of its fragmentation, all parties invested in an Afghan peace process might be better equipped to negotiate with the Taliban under terms the movement would be willing to accept, even if it has not defined those terms publicly. This report examines the phenomenon of insurgent fragmentation within Afghanistan’s Taliban and implications for the Afghan peace process. This study, which the author undertook as an independent researcher supported by the Asia Center at the U.S. Institute of Peace, is based on a survey of the academic literature on insurgency, civil war, and negotiated peace, as well as on interviews the author conducted in Afghanistan in 2019 and 2020.
Topic:
Non State Actors, Taliban, Conflict, Negotiation, and Peace
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Asia, North America, and United States of America