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1. Crucial Collaborators or Petty Players? The Globalization of R and the Rise of China and India

Author:
Andrew B. Kennedy
Publication Date:
11-2013
Content Type:
Course Pack
Institution:
Center for the Advanced Study of India
Abstract:
In recent decades, research and development has become a key new arena of globalization. Whereas multinational corporations once conducted R primarily in their home countries, it is now often dispersed across multiple locations around the world. Has this process transformed economic ties between the world's dominant state and its would-be rising powers in ways that imply an important power shift? Focusing on China and India's growing collaboration with the U.S., this paper argues that it has not. China and India remain considerably more reliant on the globalization of R than the U.S. does, and this remains a potential source of leverage for Washington. This vulnerability mainly reflects the fact that U.S. R investments in China and India are far more important for these two Asian countries than they are for the U.S. These investments loom larger in the Chinese and Indian innovation systems than they do in their American counterpart, and it is difficult to imagine any country substituting for the U.S. in this regard. In contrast, the U.S. cannot derive a great deal of leverage as a platform for R Both China and India are considerably less dependent on the U.S. in this respect.
Topic:
Development, Economics, Globalization, International Trade and Finance, and Markets
Political Geography:
United States, China, and India

2. Correspondence: Debating India's Pathway to Nuclearization

Author:
Karthika Sasikumar, Andrew B. Kennedy, Gaurav Kampani, and Jason Stone
Publication Date:
10-2012
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Security
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
In his article, Andrew Kennedy attributes India's nuclear restraint from 1964 to 1989 to (1) implicit nuclear umbrellas extended by the two superpowers and (2) the normative beliefs of Indian leaders. Using newly available declassified documents, he argues that India's apparent absence of nuclear balancing against China and Pakistan until the 1980s was a distortion of reality, because the balancing occurred in secret. Its means were implicit nuclear umbrellas, first extended against China in the mid-1960s by both superpowers and then from 1970 to 1991 by the former Soviet Union. As Soviet power in the mid-1980s waned, India resorted to internal balancing by developing an independent nuclear arsenal (pp. 151-152). Kennedy further claims that Indian leaders first sought security through international disarmament institutions. Only when that quest failed did they proceed with nuclear acquisition (pp. 144-146).
Political Geography:
Pakistan, China, and India

3. "India's Nuclear Odyssey: Implicit Umbrellas, Diplomatic Disappointments, and the Bomb"

Author:
Andrew B. Kennedy
Publication Date:
11-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Security
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
Why did India merely flirt with nuclear weapons in the 1960s and 1970s only to emerge as a nuclear power in the 1990s? Although a variety of factors informed India's prolonged restraint and subsequent breakthrough, new evidence indicates that India's “nuclear odyssey” can be understood as a function of Indian leaders' ability to secure their country through nonmilitary means, particularly implicit nuclear umbrellas and international institutions. In the 1960s and 1970s, India was relatively successful in this regard as it sought and received implicit support from the superpowers against China. This success, in turn, made acquiring the bomb a less pressing question. At the end of the Cold War, however, nonmilitary measures ceased to be viable for India. In the late 1980s, waning Soviet support and the failure of Rajiv Gandhi's diplomatic initiatives led to the creation of India's de facto nuclear arsenal. In the 1990s, India developed a more overt capability, not simply because the pro-bomb Bharatiya Janata Party came to power, but also because its external backing had vanished and because its efforts to improve its security through diplomacy proved unsuccessful.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
China, India, and Soviet Union