Author: Alan J. Kuperman / Publication Year: within 25 Years

Author:: Alan J. Kuperman
Publication Date:: 10-2013
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Security
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: On March 17, 2011, the United Nations authorized military intervention in Libya to protect the country's civilians. The Security Council was reacting to violence between Libyan government forces and domestic opponents that had erupted the preceding month. Two days after the authorization, NATO initiated the intervention, including establishing a no-fiy zone and launching aerial attacks on government forces. After seven months, Libyan rebel forces conquered the country and killed the former authoritarian ruler, Muammar al-Qadda, in October 2011. Western media and politicians praised the intervention as a humanitarian success for averting a bloodbath in Libya's second largest city, Benghazi, and helping replace the dictatorial Qadda regime with a transitional council pledged to democracy. Based on this ostensible success, many experts now cite Libya as a model for implementing the humanitarian principle known as the “responsibility to protect” (R2P). Before such conclusions are embraced, however, a more rigorous assessment of the net humanitarian impact of NATO's intervention in Libya is warranted.
Political Geography:: Libya

Author:: Alan J. Kuperman
Publication Date:: 09-2013
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: Many commentators have praised NATO\'s 2011 intervention in Libya as a humanitarian success for averting a bloodbath in that country\'s second largest city, Benghazi, and helping eliminate the dictatorial regime of Muammar al-Qaddafi. These proponents accordingly claim that the intervention demonstrates how to successfully implement a humanitarian principle known as the responsibility to protect (R2P). In-deed, the top U.S. representatives to the transatlantic alliance declared that “NATO\'s operation in Libya has rightly been hailed as a model intervention.” A more rigorous assessment, however, reveals that NATO\'s intervention backfired: it increased the duration of Libya\'s civil war by about six times and its death toll by at least seven times, while also exacerbating human rights abuses, humanitarian suffering, Islamic radicalism, and weapons proliferation in Libya and its neighbors. If this is a “model intervention,” then it is a model of failure.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, NATO, War, and Regime Change
Political Geography:: United States, Libya, Arabia, and North Africa

Author:: Alan J. Kuperman
Publication Date:: 03-2009
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:: School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University
Abstract:: One of the most recent innovations of institutional liberalism in international politics is the so-called Responsibility to Protect. Defined in 2001 by an international commission established by Canada, this emerging norm challenges the Westphalian tradition by arguing that sovereignty is neither absolute nor an entitlement of statehood, but rather a privilege that states may earn only by protecting their people. Moreover, if a state refuses to protect its people, or intentionally harms some of them, the international community has not merely the right, but the responsibility, to violate that state's traditional sovereignty to protect the at-risk population—if necessary, through military intervention.
Political Geography:: Canada and Westphalia

Refine your search