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9892. When War is Not Worth Winning
- Author:
- Matthew Testerman
- Publication Date:
- 09-2015
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Fletcher Security Review
- Institution:
- The Fletcher School, Tufts University
- Abstract:
- Winning a war requires the capacity to wage a war and an understanding of an end-state that equates to winning. These fundamental concepts, however, are not well defined. This essay draws from recent historical examples, contemporaneous strategy documents, and formal game theory to provide some additional degree of conceptual clarity that will enhance the debate about winning without war. In the past two decades, the U.S. has developed a demonstrated capacity to win with war. Victory in kinetic war fighting is nearly assured and can be accomplished with limited cost. Despite this, in the modern context, war has evolved to the point that war is not worth winning. It is far from the case that there are no wars to be fought, but the political and economic constraints of the international system have transformed the environment in which the U.S. operates militarily. Evidence of this is found in the strategic outlook of the U.S. military as documented in the revised U.S. naval strategy, especially when compared to earlier maritime strategy. To inform this discussion, game theoretic explanations of strategic interactions are helpful. The assumptions underlying recent U.S. naval strategy can be understood by applying the basic construct of a “game of strategic entry." Applying this construct, one finds that war is not worth winning– a conclusion that has substantive consequences for designing, organizing, and employing naval forces.
- Topic:
- Security, War, Military Strategy, Military Affairs, and Iraq War
- Political Geography:
- North America and United States of America
9893. The Strategic Duel over Taiwan
- Author:
- Ian Easton
- Publication Date:
- 09-2015
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Fletcher Security Review
- Institution:
- The Fletcher School, Tufts University
- Abstract:
- The United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) are firmly entrenched in what will be a long and intense strategic competition for dominance over the Pacific Rim. American strategists Andrew Marshall, Robert Kaplan, and Aaron Friedberg began foretelling of this great power struggle over a decade ago.[1]. They recognized before anyone else that there are strong forces underpinning the U.S.-China rivalry. The two countries’ political systems and national interests stand in fundamental opposition. This is why, despite Washington’s reluctance to officially admit it, strategic competition between the U.S. and the PRC is unavoidable. The United States, while an imperfect democracy, is an inspiration to people everywhere who yearn for the freedom and dignity that comes from having a representative government, independent legal system, and market economy. In the PRC, on the other hand, power is monopolized by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), a political organization that is directly responsible for more human suffering than possibly any other regime past or present, anywhere in the world.[2] Numerous State Department reports detail the past and continuing human rights violations occurring under the watch of the CCP.[3] For all its much ballyhooed economic reforms, China’s economy is still largely controlled by massive state-owned corporations, making it a mercantilist country, not a capitalist one.[4] Much of Beijing’s economic power ultimately stems from its remarkable ability to lure foreign business elites with promises of access to its huge market. Once the hook is set, China pockets their investments, steals their intellectual property, and undercuts their market competitiveness.[5] Yet it is not the PRC’s unsavory political or economic practices that will ensure sustained U.S.-China competition over the coming decades, although future American presidents, like Barack Obama, will undoubtedly be tempted to paper over ideological differences for expedience sake. Rather, Beijing’s insecure and aggressive nature is at the root of the problem. In recent years, China has stoked maritime tensions with Japan and the Philippines, both treaty allies of the United States; provoked border clashes with India, a democratic nation and American security partner; and enabled nuclear missile proliferation amongst its friends: North Korea, Pakistan, and Iran.[6] Track records tell a compelling story. The PRC’s track record indicates that a growing number of geostrategic issues could eventually result in a clash between the United States and China...
- Topic:
- Security, Military Strategy, Economy, and Grand Strategy
- Political Geography:
- China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America
9894. China’s Development of Space Warfare and Its Operational Applications
- Author:
- Feng-tai Hwang
- Publication Date:
- 09-2015
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Fletcher Security Review
- Institution:
- The Fletcher School, Tufts University
- Abstract:
- As early as March 2011, the journal Aerospace America featured an article with the title “China’s Military Space Surge,”[1] which warned that there had been a rapid increase in China’s capability to conduct warfare in space. Such capabilities would then in turn threaten and jeopardize the ability of the carrier battle groups of the United States to conduct operations in the Pacific. This article was soon translated into Japanese and published in Space Japan Review. This and other high profile articles highlight the anxieties on the part of the U.S. and Japan about China’s increasing ability to militarize space, and also their concerns about its implications for the peace and security of East Asia and the entire Pacific Asia region. On December 31, 2015 China announced the creation of three new branches of armed forces to be added into the reformed People’s Liberation Army (PLA): Army General Command, Strategic Support Force, and the PLA Rocket Force. While the PLA Rocket Force replaced the old Second Artillery Corps, what is even more intriguing is the mission of the new Strategic Support Force. According to Chinese media, the Strategic Support Force will be responsible for overseeing intelligence, technical reconnaissance, satellite management, electronic warfare, cyberwarfare, and psychological warfare. It is no coincidence that Gao Jin (高津), the newly appointed commander of the Strategic Support Force, is also an expert on rocket science, which has further fueled media speculations that the Strategic Support Force has been created for the purpose of conducting future space warfare.[2] In fact, China has been increasing the focus on the military applications of space since the end of Persian Gulf War in the 1990s. During that war, the United States mobilized dozens of satellites to aid the American-led coalition forces, enabling them to defeat Iraqi forces with extraordinary efficiency and ease. The Persian Gulf War greatly shocked PLA observers at the time, and served as a reminder that the conduct of modern warfare had been transformed by the arrival of a new generation of technology. Chinese military theorists then began to study the concept of “space warfare.” The most influential was Chang Xian-Qi (常顯奇), who categorized space warfare into three distinct phases based on his observations of U.S. planning: the “Entry into Space,” the “Utilization of Space,” and the “Control of Space.” “Entry into Space” is represented by the delivery of a military-purpose spacecraft into its designated orbit path. “Utilization of Space” is to harness the power of existing space assets to aid military operations across the land, naval, and air domains. For example, such power can manifest in the forms of using space sensors to conduct surveillance and gather intelligence for Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) against potential foes, to provide ballistic missile early warning, satellite navigation and communications, among other purposes. The “Control of Space” phase focuses on establishing “space superiority” with the missions of: (1) increasing survivability of one’s own military satellites and systems; (2) disrupting, sabotaging, or destroying opposing countries’ satellites and their systems when necessary; and (3) directly using space-based weapons to aid in combat operations on the ground.[3]...
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Science and Technology, War, Military Affairs, and Space
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, North America, and United States of America
9895. China’s United Front Strategy and its Impacts on the Security of Taiwan and Asia-Pacific Region
- Author:
- Michael M. Tsai and Po-Chang Huang
- Publication Date:
- 09-2015
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Fletcher Security Review
- Institution:
- The Fletcher School, Tufts University
- Abstract:
- In 1949, Mao Zedong, leader of the Communist Party of China (CCP), defeated Chiang Kai-shek’s Kuomintang (KMT) troops and succeeded in establishing the communist dictatorship of the People’s Republic of China out of the “barrel of a gun.” At the beginning of its rule, the CCP believed that the use of violent instruments as provided by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) was in and of itself sufficient to both suppress “reactionaries” at home and defeat “invaders” from abroad. In this vein, during the Korean War of the early 1950s, the CCP regime sent a million-strong “Volunteer Army” into the Korean Peninsula and fought against the U.S.-led United Nations forces, thus cementing the political division of Korea and its complications that linger to this day. Between 1958 and 1960, PLA troops heavily bombarded the Chiang Kai-shek-controlled island of Kinmen, resulting in significant casualties on both sides. Between the 1960s and 1980s, the PLA and militia troops engaged in a series of border conflicts and clashes with the Soviet Union, India, and Vietnam. Throughout this period, the CCP regime still believed that military force alone was sufficient to serve as the primary bargaining chip and policy instrument in its dealing with other states.[1] However, from the late 1980s to 1990s, the collapse of Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc marked the end of Cold War and the confrontation between two global superpowers. The CCP’s strategy in the international arena evolved from an overreliance on hard military force to one that utilizes both “soft power” and the “carrot and stick.” From the Chinese perspective, the concept of “soft power” encompasses the exploitation of any policy or tool outside the traditional definition of “hard” military power to achieve its desired political, economic, and diplomatic objectives. Such exploitation takes place via political, societal, commercial, economic, legal, psychological, cultural, and other means. Mass media and even tourist groups could all be used as a means of penetration to funnel and support Chinese agents deep inside enemy territory and to create conditions that are conducive to achieving China’s desired outcome. This is the essence of China’s strategy of the “United Front.” This article examines the United Front strategy and the ways in which China’s deployment of this strategy impacts the national security of Taiwan as well as neighboring countries such as Japan, Vietnam, the Philippines, and even the United States.[2] The article concludes with proposed policy recommendations for how Taiwan can counter such strategies...
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Cold War, History, Military Strategy, and Soft Power
- Political Geography:
- Japan, China, Taiwan, Soviet Union, Vietnam, Philippines, and United States of America
9896. Fletcher Opening Arctic Conference
- Author:
- Rabia Altaf, Molly Douglas, and Drew Yerkes
- Publication Date:
- 09-2015
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Fletcher Security Review
- Institution:
- The Fletcher School, Tufts University
- Abstract:
- Many Western leaders point to the Arctic as a zone of cooperation—and we have observed such cooperation with the formulation of the Arctic Council, joint scientific endeavors, Search and Rescue agreements, and the very recent Arctic Coast Guard Forum—but disputes between Russia and other Arctic nations in regions to the south have raised concerns in certain quarters. While an ongoing struggle for dominance over the Northern Sea Route and Northwest Passage and competing continental shelf claims may reflect these tensions, tit-for-tat military exercises and plans for expanded military infrastructure in the Arctic certainly do. The Russian government recently announced completion of a new military base in Franz Josef Land capable of supporting 150 soldiers, as well as its intention to rebuild six existing airfields. While such a nominal increase in military personnel posted to the Arctic may merely be seen as a posturing act, taken in context with Russia’s recent actions in Europe and the Middle East, it might also be seen as a bold move to project power from a previously overlooked region.
- Topic:
- Security, Economics, International Cooperation, and Geopolitics
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Asia, North America, Arctic, and United States of America
9897. A Useful Pause in Arctic Drilling
- Author:
- Bruce M. Everett
- Publication Date:
- 09-2015
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Fletcher Security Review
- Institution:
- The Fletcher School, Tufts University
- Abstract:
- Until last year, drilling for oil in the Arctic was the subject of considerable discussion focused not only on the potential impacts of Arctic resources on the oil market, but also on the environmental and geopolitical implications of opening this area to development. Prospects for Arctic drilling dimmed considerably in 2015 when Shell decided to abandon its ambitious drilling efforts in the Burger Field in the Chukchi Sea, writing off several billion dollars in the process. The recent collapse in oil prices has probably put a stop to Arctic drilling for the time being, and this pause may prove useful in resolving some of the outstanding issues.
- Topic:
- Environment, Oil, Natural Resources, Geopolitics, and Maritime
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Canada, Norway, Denmark, Greenland, Arctic, United States of America, and Oceans
9898. Russia's Arctic: A Necessary Space for Dialogue
- Author:
- Andrew Yerkes
- Publication Date:
- 09-2015
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Fletcher Security Review
- Institution:
- The Fletcher School, Tufts University
- Abstract:
- Over the weekend of November 21st, 2015, Russia flew 141 sorties over Syria, hitting 472 targets in eight different provinces throughout the country.[1] While the deployment of the Russian Air Force over Syria has been in full affect since last September, the events of November 20th proved to be unique. Two of the TU-160 blackjack bombers that participated in the weekend’s campaign took flight not from a base in southern Russia, but rather from Olenegorsk Airbase on the Kola Peninsula of the Russian Arctic.[2] The two bombers traveled southwest along the coast of Norway, skirting United Kingdom airspace, turning east through the straits of Gibraltar, and achieved their goal of firing cruise missiles on Syria from the eastern Mediterranean. After their mission was complete, they flew northeast over Iran and the Caspian Sea to their home base in Engles, Saratov Oblast, in Southern Russia.[3] In total, the flight lasted 16 hours, with the aircraft traveling 8,000 miles, while motivating Norway[4] and Britain,[5] among other nations, to scramble fighter jets in the process. Presumably, the Russians chose such a circuitous route along the edges of Europe to demonstrate its long range bombing capabilities. In doing so, the Russian Federation also showed the rest of the world that its capabilities might rival those of the United States, proving that Russia too could attack targets all throughout the world. This use of an Arctic airbase for active bombing missions also marks a turning point in history; not even during the Cold War did the Russians demonstrate Arctic-based military capabilities with such expansive reach.[6] While this mission did not focus on targets within the Arctic, the use of an Arctic base for active bombing missions draws attention to Russia’s military buildup in the region...
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Weapons
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Syria, Arctic, and United States of America
9899. Arctic Strategy: Trust the Invisible Hand
- Author:
- Victor Marsh
- Publication Date:
- 09-2015
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Fletcher Security Review
- Institution:
- The Fletcher School, Tufts University
- Abstract:
- On April 18, 1775, Massachusetts businessman and U.S. revolutionary Paul Revere alerted fellow patriots that British military action against the rebellion in Boston would come by sea rather than by land. The warning that “the [British] regulars are coming” was a verbal intelligence report. It was based on what Revere and his associates had seen with their own eyes. They interpreted the visual data correctly; British military action came the very next day via an initial naval landing of troops that engaged in the first battles of the United States’ Revolutionary War. Intoning the urgency of Mr. Revere, these U.S. analysts and Alaskan politicians seek to inspire a sense of urgency within United States decision-making, warning that the Russians are coming to dominate the north. While taking exhaustive notes on the ambiguous “duality” in Russia’s Arctic policies, the pessimists have nonetheless quickly resolved this open question and pronounced with alarm the fear that Russia is secretly deploying a “new ice curtain,” meaning actions to deny the United States access to the allegedly vital Arctic region.
- Topic:
- Conflict Prevention, Security, Diplomacy, and Geopolitics
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Arctic, and United States of America
9900. Counter-Piracy as a Model for an Arctic Task Force: An Opportunity for International Cooperation
- Author:
- Tracy Reynolds
- Publication Date:
- 09-2015
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Fletcher Security Review
- Institution:
- The Fletcher School, Tufts University
- Abstract:
- The Arctic region sits at a jumping-off point. The international community may choose to leap toward global tension and a reinvigoration of Cold War-style conflict in the high north. Or, those with interests in the region may choose to elevate the current spirit of cooperation and build extant multilateral partnerships into lasting formal relationships that will safeguard and develop regional interests. Organizations such as the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) and its affiliated organizations already work together to promote security, stability, and prosperity across 3.2 million square miles of international waters. Naval forces, nation-states, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and private industry voluntarily work together without political or military mandate.[1] The organizational structure is flexible, maximizes each contributing partner’s assets, encourages communication among all interested stakeholders, and builds upon already established networks. Arctic stakeholders need only turn to CMF and its affiliated organizations to find a model for future Arctic cooperation. The necessary international will,[2] multilateral partnerships, and international organizations currently exist to serve as the foundation for an Arctic organizational structure in the spirit of CMF operations. Current momentum is toward more cooperation among Arctic stakeholders. However, the global order is fragile and tides are subject to ambiguous change. The present serves as an opportune time to begin working toward CMF-style operations in the Arctic...
- Topic:
- International Cooperation, Military Strategy, Territorial Disputes, and Piracy
- Political Geography:
- Arctic, Global Focus, and United States of America