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281. The Defense Monitor: The World At War

Author:
Col. Daniel Smith
Publication Date:
02-2003
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Defense Information
Abstract:
At the start of 2003, the United States remains focused on fighting global terrorism in general even as it zeroes in on Iraq as the nexus of evil. But a number of factors in play today make international support for such a venture less effusive than in 1990-91, when the last anti-Saddam “coalition of the willing” formed. Many economies, including those of three of the four big financial supporters of the 1990-91 war — Japan, Germany, and Saudi Arabia — are weaker. Any war would be relatively more expensive. Suspicions about U.S. motives, fueled by the Bush administration's initial unilateralism, remain alive despite Washington's patient work in obtaining a UN Security Council resolution on new inspections. Germany has declared it will provide no forces; use of Saudi Arabian airbases to launch combat missions against Iraq remains unclear; and troop contributions, as well as moral support, from other Arab states such as Egypt and Syria may not materialize.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Terrorism, War, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
United States, Japan, Iraq, Germany, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Egypt

282. Effectiveness of Nuclear Weapons against Buried Biological Agents

Author:
Michael May and Zachary Haldeman
Publication Date:
06-2003
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International Security and Cooperation
Abstract:
This report describes the results of some calculations on the effectiveness of penetrating nuclear weapons of yield 1 and 10 kilotons against targets containing biological agents. The effectiveness depends in detail on the construction of the bunkers, on how the bio-agents are stored, on the location of the explosions with respect to the bunkers, the bio-agent containers and the surface of the ground, and on the yield of the explosion and the geology of the explosion site. Completeness of sterilization of the bio-agents is crucial in determining effectiveness. For most likely cases, however, complete sterilization cannot be guaranteed. Better calculations and experiments on specific target types would improve the accuracy of such predictions for those targets, but significant uncertainties regarding actual geology, actual target layouts, and knowledge of the position of the explosion with respect to the target would remain. Aboveground effects of the nuclear explosions, all of which would vent to the surface, are estimated. They include intense local radioactivity and significant fallout, air blast, and seismic effects to kilometers distances. It is likely, however, that casualties from those effects would be less than the casualties that would result from the dispersal of large quantities of bio-agents.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
United States

283. Addressing the Threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction: A moment of opportunity for the EU?

Author:
Ian Anthony
Publication Date:
04-2003
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EastWest Institute
Abstract:
A free market that controlled the number and type of arms available to states and to non-state actors on the basis of their financial means and technological capacity would breed insecurity and stimulate un-necessary military spending. Rules are needed to regulate military capacities, but questions abound. What kinds of rules are needed? How should these rules be applied? As is the case with the provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), these rules could apply equally to all parties, and be universal and uniform in their application.
Topic:
International Relations, Human Welfare, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Europe

284. Addressing the Threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction: A moment of opportunity for the EU?

Author:
Ian Anthony
Publication Date:
04-2003
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
EastWest Institute
Abstract:
A free market that controlled the number and type of arms available to states and to non-state actors on the basis of their financial means and technological capacity would breed insecurity and stimulate un- necessary military spending. Rules are needed to regulate military capacities, but questions abound. What kinds of rules are needed? How should these rules be applied? As is the case with the provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), these rules could apply equally to all parties, and be universal and uniform in their application.
Topic:
Security, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Non State Actors
Political Geography:
Africa, Iraq, Europe, and Kuwait

285. EU cooperative threat reduction activities in Russia

Author:
Burkard Schmitt
Publication Date:
06-2003
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
To strengthen the security structure of an erstwhile enemy, and a country that hard-nosed defence analysts and military planners - think of the last two US Nuclear Posture Reviews – still view as a potential threat, is quite an unorthodox and innovative way to address one's own security concerns. Yet cooperative threat reduction (CTR) has become part and parcel of Western security policy. A considerable number of NATO and European Union (EU) member states are involved in this sort of activity, as is the EU itself, including its most genuinely European actor, the European Commission (EC).
Topic:
International Cooperation and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, and Soviet Union

286. Terrorism, proliferation: a European threat assessment

Author:
Harald Müller
Publication Date:
03-2003
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
Since 11 September, it has become fashionable to maintain that nothing is as it was before. This statement is, however, much less reasonable a proposition than the memory of the unforgettable images of that day may suggest. It is thus useful, at the beginning of a study of security in today's circumstances, to list those items that have emphatically not changed: Power relations in the world have not changed. The United States was the dominant power before the attacks on its territory, and it is more dominant today than ever before. The problems resulting from globalisation, such as financial instability, poverty, unequal development and damage to the world's ecology are still there, and there are still no comprehensive solutions to them. Regional conflicts continue to cost lives, and continue without let-up. Conflict between the great powers is looming in East Asia as before. The need for instruments of global governance, though largely ignored in the most important capital city of the world, is becoming increasingly urgent, and is not being properly addressed. Finally, the sources of large-scale, extremely violent terrorism have existed for more than a decade and will not go away quickly and easily. Thus, there is much more continuity than the superficial comments that abound in public discourse would have it.
Topic:
Security, Terrorism, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Europe

287. From Alliances to Ambivalence: The Search for a Transatlantic Agenda In the 21st Century

Author:
Jackson Janes
Publication Date:
11-2003
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute of European Studies
Abstract:
During the Cold War, European-American relations were often marked by differences over tactics, but we did share for the most part a strategic goal that was to be achieved on the basis of the twin principles of deterrence and détente. Yet there are some that would argue that this past year has been different; that the transatlantic rift goes deeper and will last longer. If the Americans and Europeans cannot find common ground in certain regulatory areas, it may be that we will agree to disagree on the use of GMO's, technological standards, or Anti-trust legislation. This could lead to more competition but also to duplication in an increasingly interwoven global market. Yet, because we face a vastly more complicated environment today than during previous years — full of threats and opportunities — it will remain a challenge for the coming decade to strategize as to how transatlantic political policy problems can best be dealt with.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Cold War, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
America and Europe

288. Conversion at Stepnogorsk: What the Future Holds for Former Bioweapons Facilities

Author:
Sonia Ben Ouagrham and Kathleen M. Vogel
Publication Date:
02-2003
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Judith Reppy Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies
Abstract:
This study examines the ongoing efforts to convert a former biological weapons (BW) facility in Stepnogorsk, Kazakhstan. The facility, known in the Soviet period as the Stepnogorsk Scientific and Experimental Production Base (SNOPB), was the USSR's largest mobilization facility dedicated to the production and weaponization of anthrax bacteria. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Kazakh government has demonstrated its commitment to nonproliferation and international security by opening and providing full transparency into the facility. The Kazakh government has issued mandates for a number of restructuring changes and conversion efforts at the facility. Subsequent U.S. and international assistance have played key roles in dis- mantling the facility and redirecting its personnel to peaceful purposes. Yet, the continuing economic and political instability in Kazakhstan maintains concerns regarding the threat of proliferation involving former BW personnel from the facility.
Topic:
Security, Economics, Government, Peace Studies, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
United States, Kazakhstan, and Soviet Union

289. New Challenges in Missile Proliferation, Missile Defense, and Space Security

Author:
James Clay Moltz
Publication Date:
08-2003
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
Although missiles, missile defense technology, and space issues are intricately related, most policy analysis tends to treat each in a separate category. This tendency causes policymakers to miss the linkages among them and the overlap in the issues that affect developments in each of the other sectors. For this reason, four organizations—the Mountbatten Centre of the University of Southampton, the Simons Centre of the University of British Columbia, the U.N. Center for Disarmament Research in Geneva, and the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) of the Monterey Institute of International Studies—decided to organize a joint international conference that would consciously explore these linkages and treat the relevant issues in an integrated manner, benefiting from the expertise of specialists present from each of the three fields.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Geneva and United Nations

290. Commercial Radioactive Sources: Surveying the Security Risks

Author:
Charles D. Ferguson, Tahseen Kazi, and Judith Perera
Publication Date:
07-2003
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
This study examines the security risks posed by commercial radioactive sources. While these sources provide benefits to humanity through numerous applications in medicine, industry, and research, some of these same materials, if not secured, may end up in radiological dispersal devices (RDDs)—one type of which is popularly known as a “dirty bomb.” Though RDD use has not occurred, the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, al Qaeda's expressed interest in acquiring the means to unleash radiological terror, and widespread news reporting on this topic have sparked renewed concern about the security of commercial radioactive sources.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Terrorism, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Counterinsurgency