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11. The Hunt for Mobile Missiles: Nuclear Weapons, AI, and the New Arms Race

Author:
Paul Bracken
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
This report examines the increasing ability of major powers to destroy moving targets, in particular, land-based mobile missiles. Yet, at the same time, it analyzes something much broader and more fundamental. Technology has changed the use of force in peace and war. These changes stem from the growing importance of advanced technologies like AI, cyber, drones, cloud computing, data analytics, and hypersonic missiles.[1] These are increasingly becoming foundational technologies for new mission areas and strategies. One of these in particular is the focus of this report: locating and destroying mobile targets. The hunt for mobile missiles, seen in this broader way, is an exemplar of advanced technologies used in national security.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, National Security, Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, Weapons, and Artificial Intelligence
Political Geography:
Global Focus

12. Estimating the Arms Sales of Chinese Companies

Author:
Nan Tian and Fei Su
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:
Quantitative research on the finances of the Chinese arms industry has been limited by the scarcity of available data. A scoping study to estimate the financial value of the arms sales of companies in the Chinese arms industry—using a new methodology—found information on four companies: the Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC), the China Electronics Technology Group Corporation (CETC), the China South Industries Group Corporation (CSGC) and the China North Industries Group Corporation (NORINCO). These four companies cover three main sectors of conventional arms production: aircraft, electronics and land systems. The estimates suggest that China is the second-largest arms producer in the world, behind the United States and ahead of Russia. All four of the profiled companies would be ranked among the 20 largest arms-producing and military services companies globally in 2017, with three—AVIC, NORINCO and CETC—in the top 10. The new methodology improves the understanding of the structure, size and evolution of the global arms industry.
Topic:
International Trade and Finance, Weapons, Arms Trade, and Military Spending
Political Geography:
China and Asia

13. Strengthening Global Regimes: Addressing the Threat Posed by Chemical Weapons

Author:
Ian Anthony
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:
The inadequate response to the use of chemical weapons by a state against its own population was an important catalyst leading to the creation of the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). A great deal has been achieved under the CWC, which is an important example of how multilateral cooperation can succeed. Recent cases of confirmed use prove that the task of eliminating chemical weapons is not complete. Chemical weapons are once again being used on the battlefield and as terror weapons. Moreover, their use in targeted attacks against politically exposed persons presents a new challenge to the commitment made by CWC states parties that chemicals will be developed and produced exclusively for peaceful use. When they come together to review the CWC in late 2020, the states parties will have to assess whether their response to the challenges posed by the use of chemical weapons has been proportionate to the threat. If not, then they will have the responsibility to create the new capacities, invent the new instruments and develop the new initiatives that will make their efforts more effective. This SIPRI Policy Paper provides an explanation of the context for some important recent decisions and an analysis of them. It also proposes some actions that CWC states parties could take together in support of the effort to eliminate the threat of chemical weapons.
Topic:
Treaties and Agreements, War, Weapons, Disarmament, and Chemical Weapons
Political Geography:
Middle East and Syria

14. Greece’s call for an embargo on weapons sales to Turkey: a seminal step for the EU’s collective defence identity?

Author:
Antonis Kamaras
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:
This policy paper by Antonis Kamaras, Research Associate of ELIAMEP, situates Greece’s call to its fellow EU member states to implement a weapons embargo on Turkey in the context of the relevant past experiences of Greece and other EU member states. The policy brief argues that the EU’s ability to act collectively, aligned with the status of particular member states as producers of advanced weapons systems, means that weapons embargoes are potential milestone events in the Union’s evolution of a collective defence identity. EU member states threatened militarily by non-EU countries are bound to see EU weapons embargoes imposed on the threatening non-EU countries as constitutive, rather than incidental, aspects of the EU’s raison d’être.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, European Union, Weapons, and Embargo
Political Geography:
Europe and Turkey

15. Desert Drift, Declining Deadliness: Understanding the Evolution of AQIM’s Suicide Bombings

Author:
Jason Warner, Ellen Chapin, and Caleb Weiss
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
For the past several years, jihadi violence perpetrated by al-Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and its affiliated groups like Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) has contributed to renewed insecurity in the Sahara and Sahel. Despite the widespread violence that has emerged, few studies have focused on AQIM and its affiliates’ broader profiles of violence generally, or their use of specific tactics more acutely. This report examines how AQIM and its affiliated groups have deployed suicide bombers over the past 13 years. Using a unique dataset compiled by the CTC detailing the breadth of AQIM and its sundry affiliated groups’ use of suicide bombers from March 2007 to September 2020, this report offers the most comprehensive view to date of the groups’ use of the tactic. Among other findings, it underlines the existence of AQIM’s “desert drift:” the very clear shift in theaters of operation of AQIM’s suicide bombers from North Africa between 2007 and 2012 (focused primarily in Algeria, where it focused on police and domestic military targets) to the Sahel from 2013 to 2020 (focused primarily in Mali, where it targeted international peacekeepers). Using AQIM’s “desert drift” as a dividing point between two distinct suicide bombing campaigns, the report then compares various dimensions of AQIM and its affiliates’ suicide bombing efforts across these two campaigns, including comparative metrics on lethality, injuriousness, geographies, demographics of bombers’ age and gender, targeting tendencies, use of “teams” of bombers, and patterns of failure. In the main, it shows that despite being a long-used tactic by an increasingly pernicious group, AQIM’s use of suicide bombing has declined in prevalence, deadliness, and efficacy in the aftermath of its “desert drift.” Given these findings, the authors seek to provide new insight into how policymakers and academics understand the historical and contemporary threats posed by AQIM and its affiliates. In tracking one tactical choice of the group—suicide bombings—the authors also seek to provide a detailed analysis of how al-Qa`ida has manifested in the Sahel in a distinct form, tailoring its attacks profile to meet its evolving goals. Through these new insights, the report endeavors to provide new perspectives that will inform any response to insecurity in these regions and beyond.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Al Qaeda, Weapons, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Africa, Libya, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Burkina Faso

16. Small Groups, Big Weapons: The Nexus of Emerging Technologies and Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism

Author:
Stephen Hummel and F. John Burpo
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
Historically, only nation-states have had the capacity and resources to develop weapons of mass destruction (WMD) due to the significant capital, infrastructure, and intellectual capacity required to develop and maintain a WMD program. In recent years, however, this paradigm has been shifting, particularly for non-state actors. The commercialization of emerging technologies is reducing the financial, intellectual, and material barriers required for WMD development and employment. This report surveys three emerging technologies—synthetic biology, additive manufacturing (commonly known as 3D printing), and unmanned aerial systems—and examines the nexus of each with nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons agent proliferation. It examines how non-state actors might use these emerging technologies to overcome traditional barriers against the development and employment of WMD. This product, a joint collaboration of the Combating Terrorism Center and the Department of Chemistry and Life Science at West Point, is a timely primer for policymakers, scientists, and security specialists concerned with the impact of emerging technologies on WMD development and terrorists’ capabilities broadly.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Terrorism, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Weapons, and Innovation
Political Geography:
Global Focus

17. August 2020 Issue

Author:
J. Kenneth Wickiser, Kevin J. O'Donovan, Michael Washington, Stephen Hummel, F. John Burpo, Raffaello Pantucci, Nuno Tiago Pinto, Tomasz Rolbiecki, Pieter Van Ostaeyen, and Charlie Winter
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
The COVID-19 pandemic has renewed concerns over bioterror threats, with Microsoft founder Bill Gates recently warning that a bioterror attack involving a pathogen with a high death rate “is kind of the nightmare scenario” facing the planet. In this month’s feature article, J. Kenneth Wickiser, Kevin J. O’Donovan, Lieutenant Colonel Michael Washington, Major Stephen Hummel, and Colonel F. John Burpo assess the potential future threat posed by the malevolent use of synthetic biology. They write that synthetic biology “is a rapidly developing and diffusing technology. The wide availability of the protocols, procedures, and techniques necessary to produce and modify living organisms combined with an exponential increase in the availability of genetic data is leading to a revolution in science affecting the threat landscape that can be rivaled only by the development of the atomic bomb.” The authors, who all serve at, or are affiliated with, the Department of Chemistry and Life Science at the United States Military Academy, note that synthetic biology has “placed the ability to recreate some of the deadliest infectious diseases known well within the grasp of the state-sponsored terrorist and the talented non-state actor” and that “the techniques used to propagate bacteria and viruses and to cut and paste genetic sequences from one organism to another are approaching the level of skill required to use a cookbook or a home computer.” They argue that “an effective response to the threats posed by those using synthetic biology for nefarious purpose will require vigilance on the part of military planners, the development of effective medical countermeasures by the research community, and the development of diagnostic and characterization technologies capable of discriminating between natural and engineered pathogens.” In our interview, Gilles de Kerchove, the European Union’s longtime Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, speaks to Raffaello Pantucci. Nuno Pinto presents a detailed case study of an alleged Portuguese Islamic State network with strong connections to the United Kingdom that sheds significant light on the foreign fighter recruitment pipeline between Europe and Syria in the last decade. Tomasz Rolbiecki, Pieter Van Ostaeyen, and Charlie Winter examine the threat posed by the Islamic State across Africa based on a study of its attack claims. They write: “As the second half of 2020 unfolds, it is critical that military and counterterrorism policymakers recognize what is at stake in Africa. The Islamic State is not just fighting a low-grade insurgency on the continent; in at least two countries, it has been able to seize and hold territory and subsequently engage in pseudo-state activities.”
Topic:
Terrorism, European Union, Counter-terrorism, Weapons, Islamic State, Biological Weapons, and Foreign Fighters
Political Geography:
Africa, Europe, Middle East, Syria, and Portugal

18. Arms and the Diplomat—and the Red Brigades

Author:
Peter Bridges
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
American Diplomacy
Abstract:
In 1981 I was assigned to our Rome embassy as the deputy to the ambassador, Maxwell Rabb. The Red Brigade terrorists had been active in Italy for some years. They had been responsible for perhaps thousands of violent actions and had killed many people, most notably former Prime Minister Aldo Moro in 1978. One day before I left Washington, my colleague Gary Matthews said “You are going to carry a weapon in Rome, I assume.” “Why, no. I don’t have one and I don’t plan to buy one.” “Go down to the Department armory and they’ll fix you up.”
Topic:
Diplomacy, Weapons, and Memoir
Political Geography:
Europe, Italy, North America, and United States of America

19. Defence Procurement Canada: Opportunities and Constraints

Author:
Jeff Collins
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
Substantive defence issues rarely make national political campaign platforms. However, in the 2019 federal election, reforming the defence procurement bureaucracy to overcome delays became a highlight for not one but two of the country’s main political parties. To “ensure that priority projects are progressing on time and on budget”, the Conservatives called for the creation of a defence procurement secretariat within the Privy Council Office, akin to a model used by the Robert Borden government in the First World War. The winning Liberal party went further and promised to create a separate defence procurement agency, called Defence Procurement Canada (DPC). As of this writing, details remain sparse, but as with the Conservatives, the ostensible purpose of such a reform is to ensure that “Canada’s biggest and most complex defence procurement projects are delivered on time and with greater transparency …” Considering that the government’s own defence white paper, 2017’s Strong, Secure, Engaged (SSE) found that 70 per cent of all defence procurement projects were not delivered on time, the existing bureaucratic process warrants a serious look. In fact, a substantial shake-up of the Canadian defence procurement bureaucracy has not taken place since the last separate procurement organization, the Department of Defence Production (DDP), was abolished in 1969. Arguments for altering the bureaucratic architecture of Canadian defence procurement have ebbed and flowed since the mid-2000s, when the first of successive governments began acquisition plans for replacing decades-old fleets of equipment, including CF-18 jets, Protecteur-class auxiliary oiler replenishment ships, Halifax-class frigates and Iroquois-class destroyers. With much publicized delays in these and other major Crown projects (MCPs), reform advocates have drawn attention to Canada’s multi-departmental procurement process as a source of frustration. Unique among allies, Canada relies principally upon three departments – National Defence (DND), Public Services and Procurement Canada (PSPC) and Innovation, Science and Economic Development (ISED) – for acquiring MCPs. Other countries typically rely on one of three approaches to acquiring material for their armed forces: procurement by individual armed services (United States); centralized government organizations (United Kingdom) or independent civilian corporations (Sweden). Although it is not clear whether the Liberal proposal is a new department (akin to the DDP), a Crown corporation or an agency under the DND’s auspices, any restructuring of the defence procurement system will not be easy. No matter what shape it takes, any new organization must deal with rearranging a complex set of institutional realities based on decades’ worth of statutes, policy frameworks and human resources allocations. Political realties still apply, too. Any new organization must contend with Canadian procurement politics, including the impact of new governments, differing priorities, regionalism and purchasing patterns.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Politics, Military Affairs, Weapons, and Military Spending
Political Geography:
Canada and North America

20. The Human and Financial Costs of the Explosive Remnants of War in Afghanistan

Author:
Suzanne Fiederlein
Publication Date:
09-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs at Brown University
Abstract:
tries in the world, even after thirty years of clearance operations supported extensively by the United Nations and a number of major donors, including the United States. Long after armed conflicts are over, explosive remnants of war continue to cause harm to unsuspecting civilians and cost governments millions of dollars to clear and neutralize. Landmines can remain a threat that affects the population living around them for decades to come. When calculating the costs of waging war, the post-conflict clearance of leftover weapons scattered about the battlefields generally is not included. These costs can last for generations; Belgium, for instance, continues to remove large quantities of explosive shells from its World War I battlefield sites one hundred years after the end of that conflict.4 In the case of a country like Afghanistan, where armed conflict has continued for decades, adding additional explosive ordnance to the landscape on an ongoing basis, the clearance task becomes doubly challenging. The need to remove ordnance is crucial when attempting to provide a secure environment for war-weary civilians and returning refugees and to rebuild infrastructure and create opportunities for economic development – all essential ingredients for establishing and maintaining a stable and effective nation state.
Topic:
War, Weapons, Civilians, Casualties, and Landmines
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, South Asia, and United States of America