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31. Terrorism in West African History: A 21st Century Appraisal

Author:
Walter Garn Nikwi
Publication Date:
12-2014
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy International Relations
Institution:
Postgraduate Program in International Strategic Studies, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
Abstract:
This article focuses on the history of terrorism in West Africa in the first half of the 21st Century and attempts by regional and international bodies to combat it. It argues that although recently much attention has been paid to the sub region as a zone of terrorism, such terrorism has deeper historical roots and as such pre-dates the position taken by most contemporary scholars. West Africa has been a victim of terrorism over the years and to take on board only recent happenings is to do injustice to history. What has changed and continued? Who have been the key players? What attempts have been carried out by the respective organizations to stamp out terrorism?
Topic:
International Cooperation, Regional Cooperation, Terrorism, Violent Extremism, and War on Terror
Political Geography:
Africa and West Africa

32. Managing a Transnational Insurgency: The Islamic State of Iraqʹs “Paper Trail,” 2005‐2010

Author:
Jon Wallace, Jacob N. Shapiro, Pat Ryan, and Danielle F. Jung
Publication Date:
12-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Empirical Studies of Conflict Project (ESOC)
Abstract:
A cornerstone of strategic thinking is a clear understanding of one’s opponent. Developing such an understanding in dealing with the Islamic State (IS) is challenging. Constraints on access to the frontlines in Iraq and Syria make it unusually hard for researchers to ground assessments in evidence‐based approaches. This occasional paper contributes to the development of an empirically grounded understanding of the IS by analyzing the finances and management of the group’s predecessor, the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), which changed its name to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in April 2013 and then the Islamic State in June 2014. There is a direct line of descent from Al‐Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI) through the Islamic State of Iraq to today’s Islamic State, despite changes in the group’s territorial holdings and the announced scale of its ambitions. Using historical documents to understand how AQI and the ISI were run can therefore help us better understand the current incarnation of the group, as well as the strengths and weaknesses it may have inherited.
Topic:
Terrorism, Counterinsurgency, Violent Extremism, Counter-terrorism, Islamic State, and War on Terror
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, Middle East, and Syria

33. The Effect of Civilian Casualties in Afghanistan and Iraq

Author:
Radha Iyengar, Luke N. Condra, Joseph Felter, and Jacob N. Shapiro
Publication Date:
10-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Empirical Studies of Conflict Project (ESOC)
Abstract:
A central question in intrastate conflicts is how insurgents are able to mobilize supporters to participate in violent and risky activities. A common explanation is that violence committed by counterinsurgent forces mobilizes certain segments of the population through a range of mechanisms. We study the effects of civilian casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan to quantify the effect of such casualties on subsequent insurgent violence. By comparing uniquely detailed micro-data along temporal, spatial, and gender dimensions we can distinguish short-run 'information' and 'capacity' effects from the longer run 'propaganda' and 'revenge' effects. In Afghanistan we find strong evidence that local exposure to civilian casualties caused by international forces leads to increased insurgent violence over the long-run, what we term the 'revenge' effect. Matching districts with similar past trends in violence shows that counterinsurgent-generated civilian casualties from a typical incident are responsible for 1 additional violent incident in an average sized district in the following 6 weeks and lead to increased violence over the next 6 months. There is no evidence that out-of-area events—errant air strikes for example—lead to increased violence, nor is there evidence of short run effects, thus ruling out the propaganda, information, and capacity mechanisms. Critically, we find no evidence of a similar reaction to civilian casualties in Iraq, suggesting the constraints on insurgent production of violence may be quite conflict-specific. Our results imply that minimizing harm to civilians may indeed help counterinsurgent forces in Afghanistan to reduce insurgent recruitment.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, War, Conflict, Violence, War on Terror, Civilians, and Casualties
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, Iraq, and Middle East

34. The War on Terror: Forgotten Lessons from World War II

Author:
Stephen W. Van Evera
Publication Date:
10-2006
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:
President Bush recently likened the war oon terror to the struggles American faced in World War II, expkaning that our enemies are “successors to Fascists, to Nazis ... and other totalitar- ians of the 20th century.”1 The analogy to World War II is useful and illuminating. Important lessons from World War II apply to the war on terror. Yet the Bush administration has itself left the lessons of World War II largely unheed- ed. Its conduct of the war on terror departs from the policies that brought the United States victory in World War II and success in the postwar years.2 The administration will have more success against our terrorist enemies if it learns and applies the methods that won the Second World War.
Topic:
Terrorism, War on Terror, World War II, and Propaganda
Political Geography:
United States, Middle East, and North America

35. The Bush Administration is Weak on Terror

Author:
Stephen W. Van Evera
Publication Date:
10-2006
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:
The U.S. public widely credits President Bush with toughness on terror. An August 2006 poll found 55 percent of Americans approving his handling of the campaign on terror and only 38 percent disapproving. Republican candidates are running successfully on the terror issue in this fall’s election campaign. In fact, the Bush administration is weak on terror. The administration wages a one-front war against al-Qaeda, the main terror threat, when effort on every relevant front is needed. Specifically, it has focused on an offensive military and intelligence campaign abroad while neglecting five other critical fronts: bolstering homeland security, securing weapons and materials of mass destruction from possible theft or purchase by terrorists, winning the war of ideas across the world, end- ing conflicts that fuel support for al-Qaeda, and saving the failed states where al-Qaeda and like groups can find haven. The administration has also bungled parts of the mili- tary offensive by diverting itself into a counterproductive sideshow in Iraq and by alien- ating potential allies. As a result, al-Qaeda and related jihadi groups remain a potent threat more than five years after the 9/11 attacks.3 Assessments by U.S. intelligence and other analysts actually indicate that the terror threat has increased since 9/11.4 The Bush administration’s toughness on terror is an illusion. Its counterterror cam- paign has been inept and ineffective.5 President Bush talks the talk of strong action but doesn’t walk the walk. And his weakness on terror is a putting the United States in great danger.
Topic:
Intelligence, Terrorism, Al Qaeda, and War on Terror
Political Geography:
United States, Middle East, and North America